From that Wikipedia page:
Shortly after its formation, the regiment was widely reported in the media to have recruited soldiers involved in war crimes, including multiple cases of beating to death civilians, torturing civilians, and for sharing videos of the prisoners they had tortured screaming in pain.
That sentence is a pretty decent summary of the £13 million
Baha Mousa Public Inquiry that published its 3 volume report in 2011.
On 14 September 2003 Baha Mousa, a 26 year old receptionist, was arrested as part of a raid on a hotel in Basra as part of Operation Salerno, which aimed to find people who had been, or had been helping former regime loyalists (FRLs). Weapons, ammunition and false identity equipment were found during the search. One of the hotel's co-owners fled and "the decision was taken to detain the Hotel's other workers and owners as suspected FRLs" [p5, volume 1] despite there being no evidence that they had any connections with the former regime. Seven men were detained and taken to Camp Stephen and then to the Temporary Detention Facility (TDF) where they were held until their transfer to the Theatre Internment Facility (TIF) two days later. Baha Mousa was not among those transferred to the TIF as he died on 15 September.
In the course of their detention, they were hooded with hessian sandbags for lengthy periods of time and made to assume stress positions...There can be no doubt that in the course of this detention the Detainees were assaulted by a soldier or soldiers, resulting in injuries being inflicted on them. [para 1.25, p5, volume 1]
A post mortem of Baha gave initial cause of death as ligature strangulation but it was later changed to postural asphyxiation. The pathologist also found 93 separate surface injuries on his body. He then examined some of the other Detainees and found they too exhibited injuries.
Save for injuries to one of the Detainees, these injuries were neither as numerous nor as serious as the injuries sustained by Baha Mousa, although some of the injuries were nevertheless significant. The Detainees also suffered varying levels of psychiatric injury as a result of their mistreatment. [para 1.28, p6, volume 1]
Part 2, Chapter 7 of volume 1 of the inquiry report details the physical and psychological injuries incurred by each detainee. There's photos. It's horrific.
Court martial proceedings were brought against seven members of the regiment. Four had their charges dismissed, two were found guilty and discharged and one, Cpl Donald Payne, was "was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, dismissed from the Army and reduced to the ranks." [para 1.30, p7, volume 1] The reason for the lack of convictions were, in the words of the presiding judge,
a result of a more or less obvious closing of ranks
[Source]
The detainees were tortured while at the TDF. They were forced to maintain stress positions, they were made to think they were about to be set on fire, they had urine thrown over them, they were beaten by multiple soldiers. Some of the beatings were termed "the choir",
A guard demonstrated to Crosbie “the choir” by kicking the Detainees on their backs causing them to make some noise such as a cry or groan. [para 53, page 1295, volume 3]
The abuse was filmed.
I'm only skimming the report - it's massive - but everywhere I stop I see people being criticised for their actions or, more often, their inactions. Take paras 110-112 of volume 3 (p1303),
110. Father Peter Madden was the padre for 1 QLR. He was unable to remember whether he visited the TDF when the Op Salerno Detainees were there. Stacey stated that Madden had visited the TDF on Sunday morning, and Rodgers said he visited on Monday morning, as did Pte Hunt. Aspinall said Madden visited the TDF during Monday.
111. I found Madden to be a poor witness, particularly in relation to inconsistencies as to whether he felt any responsibility for the welfare of detainees kept at BG Main, and whether, before Op Salerno, he had seen detainees being forced to maintain set positions.
112. I find that Madden did visit the TDF on Monday. Whether this was in the morning or afternoon, it follows from my findings that he must have seen the shocking condition of the Detainees, and the deteriorating state of the TDF. He ought to have intervened immediately, or reported it up the chain of command but, in fact, it seems he did not have the courage to do either.
Or para 125 a few pages later,
I find that Peebles must have become aware of the shocking state of the Detainees by Monday. I also suspect that Peebles did know of the physical abuse of the Detainees by Payne and other soldiers. Even if he did not know of that, he must have understood the serious adverse effects of hooding and stress positions in the significant heat for a period of around 36 hours. Peebles ought to have ordered the cessation of hooding and stress positions long before Baha Mousa’s death. He also ought to have reported to the Battlegroup second in command, Suss-Francksen, or the Commanding Officer, Mendonça, what he had seen.
A sub-heading titled "Loss of Discipline and Lack of Moral Courage" (p1316, volume 3) says,
My findings raise a significant concern about the loss of discipline and lack of moral courage to report abuse within 1 QLR. A large number of soldiers, including senior NCOs, assaulted the Detainees in a facility in the middle of the 1 QLR camp which had no doors, seemingly unconcerned at being caught doing so. Several officers must have been aware of at least some of the abuse. A large number of soldiers, including all those who took part in guard duty, also failed to intervene to stop the abuse or report it up the chain of command.
While the report states,
the evidence does not demonstrate disciplinary failures so widespread as to be regarded as an entrenched culture of violence within 1 QLR. [para 199, p 1315, volume 3]
it acknowledges that,
the events of 14 to 16 September cannot be described as a “one off” event. There were other incidents of abuse and mistreatment of Iraqi civilians by soldiers of 1 QLR.[para 199, p 1315, volume 3]
Given the thoroughness of the report I find the conclusion that there is not "an entrenched culture of violence" surprising. I also find it surprising that there no discussion (at least not one I've found yet) of the closing of ranks that was referenced by the judge in the court martial. But I think there's a clue as to why this is the case in one of the opening pages,
when writing this Report, I have been very conscious that criticisms made may seem to some, not only those in the Armed Services, particularly ungrateful and insensitive when set against the sacrifices and bravery of the vast majority. It must be stressed that the faults of some should not tarnish the image and reputation of the many [para 1.34, p7-8, volume 1]
It's the "one bad apple" defence all over again.
Maybe if the culture of violence and culture of cover-ups had been acknowledged and addressed, if the soldiers who took part in the torture of detainees had been properly punished and those who looked the other way had been punished too, if there had been a clear demonstration that civilians lives matter and are not just there for the amusement of soldiers, maybe Agnes would still be alive.