The Invasion of Ukraine

[Woodchopper]

The so-called Quad — the US, UK, Germany and France — is working on an overarching political declaration with Ukraine, according to officials who declined to be identified given the sensitivity of the talks. They said that, under the umbrella declaration, Ukraine would conclude bilateral agreements formalising the current level of military and financial aid — and establish it on a more long-term footing with space to expand it if deemed necessary.

But neither the framework document nor the bilateral agreements would have the status of legal treaties and they would be signed outside the Nato alliance. Discussions are ongoing and a deal could be reached before Nato’s summit in Vilnius next month, officials said, while cautioning that there was no formal agreement between the western countries on a timeline.

[...]

western officials are wary of dangling the prospect of Nato membership before a country that is still at war. Alliance members cannot at this stage pledge to go to war on Ukraine’s behalf with a nuclear power like Russia, should it be attacked again, officials said. 

“We don’t take in countries with an open border dispute, and ones that are, in the case of Ukraine, in a full-scale war,” said one. “It’s the wrong time to talk about Nato membership [for Ukraine].”

[...]

A senior western official said Germany was in discussion with Ukraine about the idea of a multilateral framework agreement and acknowledged that it fell short of their demands. “They’re aware that the support they’re receiving is remarkable in scope and duration but when you’re at war it’s never enough,” he added.

“It’s important that we all recognise as Nato members that President Zelenskyy is under political pressure himself,” said UK defence secretary Ben Wallace on Tuesday. “He needs to show to his people that at Vilnius, if he isn’t offered Nato membership, what has he managed to secure?”

https://www.ft.com/content/8f0528ba-45a ... a34e2ee9ff

[Woodchopper]

Putin claims that he found out from Russian military bloggers about the problems in Russian units.
https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1669 ... 1zY-PW4R9w

Actually seems plausible, as governing from a bubble seems to explain his actions.

[Grumble]

Putin claims that he found out from Russian military bloggers about the problems in Russian units.
https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1669 ... 1zY-PW4R9w

Actually seems plausible, as governing from a bubble seems to explain his actions.

Or he’s playing the Good Tsar with Bad Advisers card.

[EACLucifer]

Ukraine warned for months about the Russians mining the Kakhovsky Dam.

The Russians blew the damn, unleashing a catastrophe that drowned at least hundreds and more likely thousands and hit food production for the next decade.

The response was tepid. The Americans in particular still seem scared of Russian escalation when the reality is it's appeasemen that's dangerous. Putin has always treated underwhelming responses to his crimes as invitation to commit more of them.

Ukraine is now warning the Russians are mining the nuclear power plant at Enerhodar.

Rather than repeat this cycle, we should believe them, impose costs on Russia for the destruction of the Kakhovsky dam - immediate and painful costs, not "we'll make them pay for reconstructiuon after the war", and make it extremely clear to Putin that if he causes a nuclear disaster, it will cost him more than he can cope with including, if necessary, kinetic actions against Russian and Wagner Group targets.

[jdc]

Ukraine warned for months about the Russians mining the Kakhovsky Dam.

The Russians blew the damn, unleashing a catastrophe that drowned at least hundreds and more likely thousands and hit food production for the next decade.

The response was tepid. The Americans in particular still seem scared of Russian escalation when the reality is it's appeasemen that's dangerous. Putin has always treated underwhelming responses to his crimes as invitation to commit more of them.

Ukraine is now warning the Russians are mining the nuclear power plant at Enerhodar.

Rather than repeat this cycle, we should believe them, impose costs on Russia for the destruction of the Kakhovsky dam - immediate and painful costs, not "we'll make them pay for reconstructiuon after the war", and make it extremely clear to Putin that if he causes a nuclear disaster, it will cost him more than he can cope with including, if necessary, kinetic actions against Russian and Wagner Group targets.

Graham and Blumenthal have been arguing that the US needs to make it extremely clear to Putin that if he causes a nuclear disaster, it will cost him more than he can cope with: https://twitter.com/LindseyGrahamSC/sta ... 3832802304 and the first ~10 minutes of this press conference: https://www.c-span.org/video/?528936-1/ ... ar-threats

Views the use of any tactical nuclear weapon by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, or their proxies, or the destruction of a nuclear facility, dispersing radioactive contaminates into NATO territory causing significant harm to human life....as an attack on NATO requiring an immediate response, including the implementation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.

I think I heard the suggestion of the "total obliteration" of Russia's military as the NATO response they'd recommend.

[jimbob]

Meanwhile Russia is inventing more red lines.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/ ... -to-crimea

Sergei Shoigu, the Russian defence minister, said on Tuesday that the potential use of US-made Himars and the Storm Shadow missiles against targets in Crimea would mark the west’s “full involvement in the conflict and would entail immediate strikes upon decision-making centres in Ukrainian territory”.

Russia tried to capture/kill Zelensky in the first hours of the invasion, and Russia is not holding back anyway. Including genocide, and other war crimes.

I also liked the idea in the first paragraph of the article, not quoted, that Russia "accused" Ukraine of using Storm Shadow for the purpose for which it had been supplied.

[Woodchopper]

Started a new thread for the Russian civil war discussion, and moved some posts over there: viewtopic.php?f=10&t=3921&p=149088#p149089

[lpm]

The war is won.

Not sure how Ukraine plays the end game. But it's not just that Russia's supply lines into the occupied territories are gone, thanks to the seizure of Rostov. It's also that the closest source of arms for the various sides in the civil war are the supply dumps in Ukraine. The flow reverses. And if you are in Crimea, do you let arms flow onwards to the front line? No, you hoard it.

Every individual incentive of Russian players is against fighting Ukraine forces. Which makes it incredibly hard to choose how to exploit it. My instinct is you suddenly want to keep supply lines open, so that arms flow away from the front line.

But of course the insurrection could fizzle and you can't waste the opportunity.

[bjn]

Ukraine still wants all its territory back. Should Putin fall and be replaced by Prizoghin, it looks likely that Prizoghin would want to offer some sort of deal to the Ukrainians, given what he’s said about the reasons for the war. Ukraine would want to negotiate from a strong position should that happen. The more they win on the battlefield, the stronger that position will be. So go all in now and make facts on the ground as soon as possible. Whether Putin or Prizoghin prevails, they need to exploit this, and exploit it hard.

[lpm]

Anyone know how Germany / Austria responded to the 1917 revolutions? I know it ends with the Brest Litovsk Treaty but not the initial military exploitation. Perhaps its not a good parallel because the response was to switch forces to the Western front.

[EACLucifer]

Ukraine still wants all its territory back. Should Putin fall and be replaced by Prizoghin, it looks likely that Prizoghin would want to offer some sort of deal to the Ukrainians, given what he’s said about the reasons for the war. Ukraine would want to negotiate from a strong position should that happen. The more they win on the battlefield, the stronger that position will be. So go all in now and make facts on the ground as soon as possible. Whether Putin or Prizoghin prevails, they need to exploit this, and exploit it hard.

Agreed. That said, it might take a while for things to actually unfold. The initial effect of this is to cut supply lines, so continuing with current probing attacks to force a depletion of materiel makes sense. Only when that depletion bites does it make sense to start going for a breach of the lines. And the fortified lines are still fortified lines. Breaching them still takes time, but it will be a lot easier to turn probing attacks into breaches of the lines if the defenders have little artillery ammunition and terrible morale. It also might be possible to do something radical like crossing the Dnipro with raiding forces above or below the remains of the Kakhovsky dam, or even just outflanking Russian defences by crossing the dry ground that used to be under the reservoir.

On the other hand, if despair and defeatism really set in on the Russian side we might see units capitulate en masse, or take bribes to allow Ukrainian forces through their sector.

Basically watch this space. Zaluzhny is a capable general, don't expect something will automatically happen immediately, and don't take the absence of immediate action to mean this isn't being exploited. There's a lag time between some events and their consequences.

[lpm]

Ukraine still wants all its territory back. Should Putin fall and be replaced by Prizoghin, it looks likely that Prizoghin would want to offer some sort of deal to the Ukrainians, given what he’s said about the reasons for the war. Ukraine would want to negotiate from a strong position should that happen. The more they win on the battlefield, the stronger that position will be. So go all in now and make facts on the ground as soon as possible. Whether Putin or Prizoghin prevails, they need to exploit this, and exploit it hard.

I don't think this ends in any negotiation if it's a prolonged civil war. There's simply no way for occupying forces to continue. All areas are reclaimed by military means, not via the negotiating table.

But if it's just insurrection that fizzles, Russia still needs to regroup and manage a defence of their seized territory. After having done an accelerated attrition event on itself. So no negotiating table in this scenario either.

[bjn]

Ukraine still wants all its territory back. Should Putin fall and be replaced by Prizoghin, it looks likely that Prizoghin would want to offer some sort of deal to the Ukrainians, given what he’s said about the reasons for the war. Ukraine would want to negotiate from a strong position should that happen. The more they win on the battlefield, the stronger that position will be. So go all in now and make facts on the ground as soon as possible. Whether Putin or Prizoghin prevails, they need to exploit this, and exploit it hard.

I don't think this ends in any negotiation if it's a prolonged civil war. There's simply no way for occupying forces to continue. All areas are reclaimed by military means, not via the negotiating table.

But if it's just insurrection that fizzles, Russia still needs to regroup and manage a defence of their seized territory. After having done an accelerated attrition event on itself. So no negotiating table in this scenario either.

Agreed to the first scenario, as to the second, I’m not so sure. A President Prizoghin would probably try to negotiate something, a diminished Putin would keep pushing. Also, Ukraine kicking in as many Russians heads as they can now would probably help with stirring up the civil war and help achieve the first scenario. A collapsing front, mobiks deserting and surrendering will only add to the chaos in Russia.

[bjn]

Ukraine still wants all its territory back. Should Putin fall and be replaced by Prizoghin, it looks likely that Prizoghin would want to offer some sort of deal to the Ukrainians, given what he’s said about the reasons for the war. Ukraine would want to negotiate from a strong position should that happen. The more they win on the battlefield, the stronger that position will be. So go all in now and make facts on the ground as soon as possible. Whether Putin or Prizoghin prevails, they need to exploit this, and exploit it hard.

Agreed. That said, it might take a while for things to actually unfold. The initial effect of this is to cut supply lines, so continuing with current probing attacks to force a depletion of materiel makes sense. Only when that depletion bites does it make sense to start going for a breach of the lines. And the fortified lines are still fortified lines. Breaching them still takes time, but it will be a lot easier to turn probing attacks into breaches of the lines if the defenders have little artillery ammunition and terrible morale. It also might be possible to do something radical like crossing the Dnipro with raiding forces above or below the remains of the Kakhovsky dam, or even just outflanking Russian defences by crossing the dry ground that used to be under the reservoir.

On the other hand, if despair and defeatism really set in on the Russian side we might see units capitulate en masse, or take bribes to allow Ukrainian forces through their sector.

Basically watch this space. Zaluzhny is a capable general, don't expect something will automatically happen immediately, and don't take the absence of immediate action to mean this isn't being exploited. There's a lag time between some events and their consequences.

Why I said “as soon as possible”. I’d expect an uptick in Ukrainian probes at the least, while they look for a spot to throw those NATO armed and trained brigades they have in reserve.

A fortification is useless if no one is willing to defend it. How many mobiks at the front getting messages from their mums/wives/sisters are going want to stick around?

[lpm]

In the absence of clear command, all front line troops stay dug in where they are. So Ukraine needs to get them moving - at that point troops have options to flee, surrenders, mutiny or fight.

Which I why I think Ukraine stops preventing reserves moving, and instead wants them to move.

[EACLucifer]

In the absence of clear command, all front line troops stay dug in where they are.

That's not how it always works. When chains of command break down, units that come under attack have to decide what is best for them to do, and in the absence of orders, communications, knowledge about support or reinforcement, they often retreat to try and keep their unit intact and themselves alive.

[Woodchopper]

In the absence of clear command, all front line troops stay dug in where they are.

That's not how it always works. When chains of command break down, units that come under attack have to decide what is best for them to do, and in the absence of orders, communications, knowledge about support or reinforcement, they often retreat to try and keep their unit intact and themselves alive.

Yes, that’s correct.

Also, logistics tend to breakdown in the absence of a command structure. After a while they’ll pull out due to lack of food or ammunition.

[EACLucifer]

In the absence of clear command, all front line troops stay dug in where they are.

That's not how it always works. When chains of command break down, units that come under attack have to decide what is best for them to do, and in the absence of orders, communications, knowledge about support or reinforcement, they often retreat to try and keep their unit intact and themselves alive.

Yes, that’s correct.

Also, logistics tend to breakdown in the absence of a command structure. After a while they’ll pull out due to lack of food or ammunition.

Yes. That said, we don't know how badly the command structure has broken down - if at all yet - in occupied Ukraine. Logistics, on the other hand; with Rostov and potentially Krasnodar taken, the MOD can't send supplies to most of the occupation units as Prigozhin will nick them. It takes a little while for supplies to run low, but barring a miraculous reassertion of control, they'll run low.

[Woodchopper]

That's not how it always works. When chains of command break down, units that come under attack have to decide what is best for them to do, and in the absence of orders, communications, knowledge about support or reinforcement, they often retreat to try and keep their unit intact and themselves alive.

Yes, that’s correct.

Also, logistics tend to breakdown in the absence of a command structure. After a while they’ll pull out due to lack of food or ammunition.

Yes. That said, we don't know how badly the command structure has broken down - if at all yet - in occupied Ukraine. Logistics, on the other hand; with Rostov and potentially Krasnodar taken, the MOD can't send supplies to most of the occupation units as Prigozhin will nick them. It takes a little while for supplies to run low, but barring a miraculous reassertion of control, they'll run low.

Certainly, the Wagnerites appeared to have captured the headquarters in Rostov. But I don’t know how much that affects the overall command structure. Could be anything from paralysis through to managing somewhere else.

[Woodchopper]

Senior Ukrainian military official to me: “No visible signs of meltdown at the frontline. However, it certainly might create some new opportunities.”

https://twitter.com/christopherjm/statu ... 1zY-PW4R9w

[Martin Y]

Yesterday I was assuming Prigozhyn had to act to save his own neck and was just improvising a plan. Now I'm thinking that he really wants to beat Ukraine and been complaining loud and clear about being given the support to do the job, so maybe this was longer in the planning than I'd imagined.

Is it possible he already has the collusion of army commanders in Ukraine and he's gone to Moscow to get rid of anyone holding things back and really turn the war production and supply taps on?

I'm getting anxious that Putin's side won't put up enough of a fight for long enough to help Ukraine.

[dyqik]

Yesterday I was assuming Prigozhyn had to act to save his own neck and was just improvising a plan. Now I'm thinking that he really wants to beat Ukraine and been complaining loud and clear about being given the support to do the job, so maybe this was longer in the planning than I'd imagined.

Is it possible he already has the collusion of army commanders in Ukraine and he's gone to Moscow to get rid of anyone holding things back and really turn the war production and supply taps on?

I'm getting anxious that Putin's side won't put up enough of a fight for long enough to help Ukraine.

Prigozhyn has been broadcasting that the stated reasons for the invasion of Ukraine are a lie. That doesn't sound like someone who wants to continue the invasion.

[bjn]

Yeah. I originally thought that was Putin putting Prigozhin up to it to make Shoigu the fall guy and give himself a way out. Turns out not to be the case.

[Woodchopper]

Too early to know the long term. But two effects of the Wagner coup attempt on the war come to mind.

First, there’s going to be a purge in the Russian armed forces. Anyone whose loyalty is under suspicion will be in trouble. All of them may not be fired or pushed out of windows. This’ll cause disruption in the short term. Varying outcomes long term, not impossible that incompetents could be replaced with more capable people.

Second, Putin will have to station a few brigades of his most loyal and capable brigades in and around Moscow. That’ll reduce what is available on the frontlines.

[Martin Y]

Fingers crossed for a purge in the army that works out as well as it did in the Stalin era. Sure, it's not impossible that keeping only those with unquestioning loyalty will decrease corruption and increase competence. But of course it won't.