Blyatskrieg

[Imrael]

Instead of trying to be too aggressive for the moment their forces have now dug in on the initial attack axis to resist the Russian counterattack. Finding weakspots, hitting them hard enough to force a response, then digging in to defend against the response while GMLRS and long range gun artillery hits the Russian units forced to respond as they move around behind the front line appears to be a viable way to significantly weaken the Russian forces before attempting an actual breach of the fortifications.

A bit of a digression, but this was a large part of the allied tactics in the weeks following D-Day. They worked out that German doctrine was to counter-attack immediately on giving ground, and exploited the fact with artillery, and in their case air support and at certain points naval gunnery support.

[EACLucifer]

Instead of trying to be too aggressive for the moment their forces have now dug in on the initial attack axis to resist the Russian counterattack. Finding weakspots, hitting them hard enough to force a response, then digging in to defend against the response while GMLRS and long range gun artillery hits the Russian units forced to respond as they move around behind the front line appears to be a viable way to significantly weaken the Russian forces before attempting an actual breach of the fortifications.

A bit of a digression, but this was a large part of the allied tactics in the weeks following D-Day. They worked out that German doctrine was to counter-attack immediately on giving ground, and exploited the fact with artillery, and in their case air support and at certain points naval gunnery support.

Yes, and as well as attritional gains it allows for slow but sustainable advances - attack a short way, dig in, defend, hammer counterattack with heavy artillery, then repeat the process generally at a slightly different place along the front line. That won't break through a fortified line, but it can get units into the optimal position to do so, which is likely why a lot of the more astute observers, including Petr Pavel, are of the opinion we're still seeing the shaping phase of the offensive.

[headshot]

Oh yes…the Falaise Pocket. *shudder*

[EACLucifer]

One good way to clear a minefield, especially if speed is needed, is a line charge. That's basically a hose full of high explosive that's dragged into place by a rocket then detonated. This example appears to have been used to clear minefields as part of the advance south from Velyka Novosilka some days ago. It's been reported as a US supplied M-58 MICLIC, but it's also been reported as an UR-77 (which would presumably be captured if its in Ukrainian service). A line charge can be seen being launched just after the forty second mark in the video.

[Woodchopper]

Quote from Reznikov: "Everyone is publicly discussing how long it takes Ukrainian pilots to master F-16s. There is already a well-known period: after two of our pilots were tested in the United States, it is considered that up to six months will be enough.

I am optimistic that our experienced pilots, with their determination and aspirations, will probably be flying sooner. I mean not just flying, but flying freely: with manoeuvres, at night, in pairs. I think that's realistic in four months. I believe that because we know how to surprise people. That’s what we’re actually like - we know how to learn."

[…]

Reznikov is confident that Ukrainian pilots will be flying sooner than in six months: "However, a pilot cannot fly independently. He needs engineers, technicians, maintenance, gunsmiths, tankers, and so on. This is extremely complex technology. This course of study is longer than four months. And if we have pilots who speak English and learn faster, then there will be slightly fewer engineers and technicians."

In addition, in parallel, it will be necessary to prepare infrastructure: there is a need to prepare airfields for this, prepare shelters, and maintain them.

Reznikov said the airfields for these aircraft will be inside Ukraine.

At the same time, he stressed that Ukraine will be able to receive aircraft by the year 2024.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/16/7407227/

[bjn]

Reports around that Russia has lost four Ka-52 attack helicopters over the last three days. Wiki says they had 133 total in 2022, no idea how many are currently operational.

[jimbob]

Big explosion at a Russian ammunition dump and railhead at Rykove in Occupied Kherson Oblast.

looks to be one of the main railways to the Crimea https://www.bing.com/maps?osid=9eca74c0 ... orm=S00027



https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/sta ... 87078?s=20

[EACLucifer]

Big explosion at a Russian ammunition dump and railhead at Rykove in Occupied Kherson Oblast.

looks to be one of the main railways to the Crimea https://www.bing.com/maps?osid=9eca74c0 ... orm=S00027

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/sta ... 87078?s=20

Not so much "Main" as "Only", going by this map of rail lines in the area. Ignore the red rectangle, that's emphasising a previous location hit, though on the same line, the strike you posted is southwest of that point.

The timing's significant. Firstly, the increased pressure from Ukrainian forces on the Zaporizhzhian frontline means greater need to supply lots of ammunition to Russian units trying to hold onto occupied territory. That in turn makes it harder to conceal depots like this one. Secondly, hitting a depot is good, it destroys lots of ammo that would otherwise be fired, but a lost depot can be worked around with a bit of time, albeit potentially at a reduced rate of supply. However in the immediate aftermath, there'll be ammunition supply shortfalls, so for Ukraine to time those shortfalls for when they are applying pressure to the frontline is significant, especially as HIMARS fear has pushed ammo depots well back from the frontline. Additionally it's worth noting it would have been difficult to hit this depot without Storm Shadow or other longer ranged munitions.

[EACLucifer]

Reports around that Russia has lost four Ka-52 attack helicopters over the last three days. Wiki says they had 133 total in 2022, no idea how many are currently operational.

Given just how big the disparity is between the Oryx list and the Ukrainian General Staff's count, it's fairly clear that while the former is a bit of an undercount, the latter overclaims quite a bit.

Ka-52s are equipped with quite long range guided missiles, and they have caused significant problems for Ukrainian advances as SHORADS either isn't present in sufficient quantity or hasn't the range etc. This is something fighter jets could fix as they could fly well behind the front line and pick off the helicopters with long range AAMs. The other approach is to hit them on the ground. That worked earlier in the war at Chornobaivka. Russian helis are based on the south coast of occupied mainlaind Ukraine and in Crimea, as all helicopters are slow and short ranged, meaning they can't be too far from the frontline if they are to be effective. The only weapon that can reach their bases right now, though, is Storm Shadow. In general, a Storm Shadow for an attack helicopter is a good trade for the nation firing the Storm Shadow - the BROACH warhead it carries was designed to knock out hardened aircraft shelters - but Ukraine hasn't struck any Ka-52s on the ground. It could be Storm Shadow supplies are too limited - in which case the US should supply older model JASSMs to make up the shortfall as they are available in quantity if political will is there, or ATACMS for that matter - or it could be Ukraine is waiting for the right moment. GLSDB, if delivered in time, would be ideal for taking out these helicopters as its accurate enough to target each one individually and hit it, but cheap enough to be used against lots of helicopters.

Alternatively, the French should be lobbied to provide the Apache anti-runway missile Storm Shadow was derived from and wipe out every damn helicopter base in its entirety with concrete-piercing submunitions.

[EACLucifer]

Reports around that Russia has lost four Ka-52 attack helicopters over the last three days. Wiki says they had 133 total in 2022, no idea how many are currently operational.

That said, here's at least one that was damaged. It's quite remarkable that it was able to limp back after that much damage. Ka-52s lack the sort of advanced weaponry western attack helicopters take for granted - most notably they have no Hellfire equivalent, and while their missiles are long ranged, they need to hover while the subsonic missile makes its way to the target, leaving them vulnerable - they are tough and can take a lot of punishment, and an appropriate remedy is needed on the Ukrainian side. Gepards will kill them if they get in range, but the Ka-52s missiles outrange the Gepards guns. I wonder if any more Stormer HVMs could be found, as they provide highly mobile Starstreak missiles, which were built to kill armoured helicopters as their primary role.

[EACLucifer]

I’m not currently worried by a nuclear war, more a deliberately induced repeat of Chernobyl.

The evidence that Russia blew the dam is, at this point, overwhelming. The response has been horrifyingly underwhelming. If Putin thinks he can get away with blowing the dam of one of the largest reservoirs in Europe to try and undermine a Ukrainian offensive, he'll do it with a nuclear power plant, too.

The degree to which the west - America particularly noted - has hedged and avoided forceful condemnation let alone a concrete response - is shameful and dangerous. We have escalation dominance over the Russians. We don't need to be scared of them responding to our action - it is our inaction that is dangerous, appeasement that is read by Putin as permission to act.

[EACLucifer]

Instead of trying to be too aggressive for the moment their forces have now dug in on the initial attack axis to resist the Russian counterattack. Finding weakspots, hitting them hard enough to force a response, then digging in to defend against the response while GMLRS and long range gun artillery hits the Russian units forced to respond as they move around behind the front line appears to be a viable way to significantly weaken the Russian forces before attempting an actual breach of the fortifications.

A bit of a digression, but this was a large part of the allied tactics in the weeks following D-Day. They worked out that German doctrine was to counter-attack immediately on giving ground, and exploited the fact with artillery, and in their case air support and at certain points naval gunnery support.

Seems be exactly what Ukraine's doing right now. Bite, hold, then hammer the counterattack. It looks like a Russian armoured counterattack against recently liberated Pyatykhatky was torn apart by ATGMs in exactly that type of situation.

[EACLucifer]

Lots of people reporting that a Russian major general - Sergei Goryachev - got shwacked recently. Given the targetting of command posts with Storm Shadow, it is possible he was visited by a square missile.

Not going to post them, but pictures have emerged of an orthodox cross grave marker with various Russian tricolour ribbons and a plaque bearing the name "Sergey Vladimirovich Goryachev" have surfaced, so this looks to be confirmed.

[EACLucifer]

Road bridge at Chongar has taken a nasty hit. . There are only two solid land routes into Crimea, the Isthmus of Perekop at the western edge and the very narrow Arabat Spit at the eastern edge. Between them Crimea is separated from the rest of Ukraine by extensive lagoons. At Chongar these are narrow enough to bridge, and thus there is a third route from the peninsula to the mainland, with a road bridge and a rail bridge, the latter carrying the only rail connection between peninsula and mainland.

The blow was either harder than those inflicted on the Antonivsky Bridge by HIMARS, or the Chongar bridge resisted it less well. However, the damage looks rather mild compared to what one would expect from Storm Shadow, though one shouldn't rush to rule it out especially as the mechanics of the BROACH warhead and the shape of a bridge could result in a situation where only the precursor charge inflicts damage. Conventional GMLRS doesn't have the range, but there are a couple of other interesting possibilities. One of these is GL-SDB, a munition that launches an American Small Diameter Bomb glide bomb from HIMARS or M-270 with a rocket motor, giving range nearly twice that of GMLRS, and high accuracy and likely greater hitting power against structures. Two targets around Henichesk were also struck, so it is possible that GL-SDB has finally arrived and a pod was loosed off at targets along the southern edge of the mainland.

The other possibility is that it is something to do with Ukraine's MiG-29s now carrying a mystery weapon mounting. In addition to the photo in the article, footage of a MiG-29 was recently released where care was taken to blur out the ordnance carried on the inner pylons. However, there's no immediately obvious candidates for long range air to ground weapons that would use the mounting. Some people are suggesting that the mounting could be for IRIS-T, which can be fired against targets directly ahead without much integration with the aircraft, though at a substantial loss of performance compared to the MiG-29s native R-77 and high-off-boresight capabilities. Another possibility is some form of jammer or sensors system. One area the Ukrainians have really struggled with is that the radar warning receivers on the MiG-29s don't properly warn them when they are in danger, so a pod mounted upgrade could help with that.

Regardless of the munition used against the Chongar bridge, as long as there's more of them in inventory, it ought to be quite quick to deny the bridge to vehicular traffic, and hopefully the rail bridge can be knocked out too. That would really starve Russian forces in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as the southwestern part of occupied Donetsk oblast.

[EACLucifer]

Someone's helpfully shown the effect of hitting the Chongar bridge on the route for road-borne supply.

I believe there's a road on the Arabat spit, but not a good one.

[FlammableFlower]

Russians have attempted to paint this as a terrible attack on civilian infrastructure and civilians - only problem... the wreckage of cars they point to have been sitting there rusting since the Russians invaded.

Compare the last car (at ~9 seconds): https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/sta ... 6970840064
With the car here (at 30 seconds):https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pHqNBz-PY_s

[EACLucifer]

There's footage of the arrivals at Chongar now, and I think it's pretty clearly Storm Shadow. As well as footage, there's also this remarkable frame I got from SmartUACat, whose assessment of the plan re: supply lines to occupied Zaporizhzhia is much the same as mine.



It's worth noting that some of the earlier footage suggested damage to one of the piers as well. My best guess is that the precursor charge - a very large shaped charge - ripped the holes in the bridge deck and the main charge exploded somewhere below, potentially damaging the piers, but it's also possible the main charge didn't achieve much. The damage to the deck appears to include the complete obliteration of some of the concrete reinforcing girders under the deck. It remains to be seen whether the bridges - both road bridges at Chongar were hit - can be repaired any time soon.

In the meantime, there's queues as lorries stack up at the checkpoint on the Isthmus of Perekop. The Arabat Spit route I mentioned in an earlier post also crosses multiple bridges just south of Henichesk, so a well designed long range campaign against the bridges could cut all rail traffic (Chongar rail bridge), and road traffic through Chongar (both Chongar road bridges) and the Arabat Spit (two bridges over the Velyke Hyrlo/Tonkyi or more likely a single bridge over the Arabat Strait just south of Henichesk). That would leave road traffic through the Isthmus of Perekop as the only route, and it's quite the detour, as shown on the map in my previous post.

[Imrael]

Reports of a Ukrainian crossing of the Dnipro a little east of Kherson. Not sure I believe this - seems incredibnly high risk even with the Russians in turmoil.

Twitter report of telgram report of.....

[EACLucifer]

Reports of a Ukrainian crossing of the Dnipro a little east of Kherson. Not sure I believe this - seems incredibnly high risk even with the Russians in turmoil.

Twitter report of telgram report of.....

It's not the first time Russian sources have claimed this.

In previous cases it has been untrue.

[EACLucifer]

Ukrainian forces reporting they have cleared all Russian positions west of the Donbas Canal in the vicinity of Bakhmut.

[EACLucifer]

Reports of a Ukrainian crossing of the Dnipro a little east of Kherson. Not sure I believe this - seems incredibnly high risk even with the Russians in turmoil.

Twitter report of telgram report of.....

It's not the first time Russian sources have claimed this.

In previous cases it has been untrue.

Well sh.t.

Looks like they are trying to get a toehold in the swampy areas where, on the one hand, a breakout is much more difficult, but on the other hand, so is a quick repulse and destruction of the beachhead.

[Woodchopper]

Reports of a Ukrainian crossing of the Dnipro a little east of Kherson. Not sure I believe this - seems incredibnly high risk even with the Russians in turmoil.

Twitter report of telgram report of.....

It's not the first time Russian sources have claimed this.

In previous cases it has been untrue.

Well sh.t.

Looks like they are trying to get a toehold in the swampy areas where, on the one hand, a breakout is much more difficult, but on the other hand, so is a quick repulse and destruction of the beachhead.

Yes, this doesn’t presage a breakout. Troops in that area will though be able to protect Kherson from mortar fire.

[jimbob]

It seems that Russian troops are using Telegram to request air support

[EACLucifer]

It's not the first time Russian sources have claimed this.

In previous cases it has been untrue.

Well sh.t.

Looks like they are trying to get a toehold in the swampy areas where, on the one hand, a breakout is much more difficult, but on the other hand, so is a quick repulse and destruction of the beachhead.

Yes, this doesn’t presage a breakout. Troops in that area will though be able to protect Kherson from mortar fire.

Most likely, but there's more they could do too.

Just to be clear to everyone, the area in question is a marshy area south of the Dnipro, but north of the Konka river, around the southern end of the now-destroyed Antonivsky road bridge.

A breakout would be very difficult, and likely quite foolish. However, it's a good spot for advanced positions. It, as Woodchopper pointed out, denies the area to Russian mortar teams, and allows Ukrainian mortar teams to push Russians further back. It also allows for the advanced placement of MANPADS and potentially other air defence, as well as ATGM teams and so on to push Russians back from the banks of the Konka river. It could be we eventually see a landing on the Konka river to seize Oleshky. While we probably won't, positioning troops in the area under discussion threatens that option, and means Russians need to have troops in position to prevent it. If those troops were to be removed, a landing to seize Oleshky becomes more possible, with the troops between the Dnipro and the Konka providing AA and ATGM support.

[EACLucifer]

It seems that Russian troops are using Telegram to request air support

Again. Always a good sign of healthy communications up and down the chain of command.