What is NATO for then?

[EACLucifer]

NATO is a deal whereby the USA pulls European military chestnuts out of the fire and in return Europe gives political support to other US adventures .

This is false. Some European countries may support some US misadventures, but NATO generally does not.

Countries can do things with other NATO countries without it being a NATO thing.

This is getting a bit "semantic" again, and not necessarily usefully. The examples of Afghanistan and Libya have already been given, for instance, and it seems fair to describe both as NATO things.

Afghanistan was the sort of thing NATO was designed to respond to, though - an attack on a member state.

[Bird on a Fire]

To give an idea of what dyqik is dismissing as "semantic pigeon chess", here's Professor Monica Toft of Tufts:

As a scholar of war and military interventions, I think the situation in Ukraine represents a classic case of a proxy war, in which outsiders give allies money, weapons and other kinds of support – but not at the risk of their own soldiers’ or civilians’ lives.

A better understanding of what proxy wars actually are, and what purpose they serve, provides useful context for the the U.S. and NATO’s current unofficial involvement in the Ukraine war.
An older white man wearing a gray suit is seen talking to a middle-aged Black woman, who is wearing a yellow jacket and a blue shirt.

What proxy wars are

Proxy wars are armed conflicts in which one nation sends resources other than its own military personnel – like weapons, trainers, advisers, surveillance drones, money or even mercenaries – to support another country fighting in a war. This is often done to achieve a political objective, like regime change in another country.

Most proxy wars feature a government trying to determine an outcome in another country’s war. The U.S., for example, supported France with aircraft, vehicles, and weapons in France’s effort to reestablish control of what was then known as Indochina from 1946 to 1954. The Vietnam War started just one year after, in 1955.

There are two other main kinds of proxy wars, both intended to accomplish political goals without risking a country’s own people.

The first kind is government support of terrorist groups that attack other governments. Iran’s financial and political support of Hezbollah – a Muslim political party and militant group in Lebanon that seeks Israel’s destruction – is an example.

But while Iran’s use of Hezbollah to attack Israel is by proxy, this wouldn’t exactly count as proxy war. Although terrorism involves lethal armed violence, it doesn’t rise to the level of war, in terms of loss of life and control of territory, for example.

The second form involves supporting an internationally recognized government engaged an international war. This is a rare occurrence, mainly because wars between different countries are more rare than internal conflicts.

Russia’s assault on Ukraine in 2022 is an international war, but NATO cannot easily risk a direct attack on Russia, since Russia has nuclear weapons and is also a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Russia is also unlikely to withdraw from Ukraine short of defeat on the battlefield, making Ukraine an ideal proxy client – or, at least, ideal for NATO, but very costly in terms of human life for Ukraine and Russia.

https://theconversation.com/the-us-isnt ... war-192064

AFAICT she's an entirely respectable academic who studies wars and how they work.

[EACLucifer]

To give an idea of what dyqik is dismissing as "semantic pigeon chess", here's Professor Monica Toft of Tufts:

As a scholar of war and military interventions, I think the situation in Ukraine represents a classic case of a proxy war, in which outsiders give allies money, weapons and other kinds of support – but not at the risk of their own soldiers’ or civilians’ lives.

A better understanding of what proxy wars actually are, and what purpose they serve, provides useful context for the the U.S. and NATO’s current unofficial involvement in the Ukraine war.
An older white man wearing a gray suit is seen talking to a middle-aged Black woman, who is wearing a yellow jacket and a blue shirt.

What proxy wars are

Proxy wars are armed conflicts in which one nation sends resources other than its own military personnel – like weapons, trainers, advisers, surveillance drones, money or even mercenaries – to support another country fighting in a war. This is often done to achieve a political objective, like regime change in another country.

Most proxy wars feature a government trying to determine an outcome in another country’s war. The U.S., for example, supported France with aircraft, vehicles, and weapons in France’s effort to reestablish control of what was then known as Indochina from 1946 to 1954. The Vietnam War started just one year after, in 1955.

There are two other main kinds of proxy wars, both intended to accomplish political goals without risking a country’s own people.

The first kind is government support of terrorist groups that attack other governments. Iran’s financial and political support of Hezbollah – a Muslim political party and militant group in Lebanon that seeks Israel’s destruction – is an example.

But while Iran’s use of Hezbollah to attack Israel is by proxy, this wouldn’t exactly count as proxy war. Although terrorism involves lethal armed violence, it doesn’t rise to the level of war, in terms of loss of life and control of territory, for example.

The second form involves supporting an internationally recognized government engaged an international war. This is a rare occurrence, mainly because wars between different countries are more rare than internal conflicts.

Russia’s assault on Ukraine in 2022 is an international war, but NATO cannot easily risk a direct attack on Russia, since Russia has nuclear weapons and is also a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Russia is also unlikely to withdraw from Ukraine short of defeat on the battlefield, making Ukraine an ideal proxy client – or, at least, ideal for NATO, but very costly in terms of human life for Ukraine and Russia.

https://theconversation.com/the-us-isnt ... war-192064

AFAICT she's an entirely respectable academic who studies wars and how they work.

But to describe the conflict as a whole as a Proxy War would be a grotesque example of prioritising western viewpoints, because it would be framing America or EU countries or Britain's involvement or whatever as the definitive aspect of the conflict, when it is, compared to Ukraine's involvement, a sideshow.

That is why I referred to it those using it as having an imperialist mentality.

And a definition in which one or both sides of conflict receiving military aid from a non-belligerent party makes it a proxy war means that proxy war is an utterly meaningless term. The Wars of the Roses were a proxy war. World War 2 was a proxy war for the first few years. Yom Kippur war? Not about Egypt and Syria and Israel, but about the Soviet Union and the USA? It ends up completely useless as a term if such a broad definition is used.

[Bird on a Fire]

This is false. Some European countries may support some US misadventures, but NATO generally does not.

Countries can do things with other NATO countries without it being a NATO thing.

This is getting a bit "semantic" again, and not necessarily usefully. The examples of Afghanistan and Libya have already been given, for instance, and it seems fair to describe both as NATO things.

Afghanistan was the sort of thing NATO was designed to respond to, though - an attack on a member state.

Well sort of, except the attack was by Al Qaeda rather than Afghanistan or the Taliban, which again complicates the legal picture. (Yes I know they were helping to some extent.)

Libya seems more clearly iffy in terms of the stated purpose of NATO.

[dyqik]

NATO is a deal whereby the USA pulls European military chestnuts out of the fire and in return Europe gives political support to other US adventures .

This is false. Some European countries may support some US misadventures, but NATO generally does not.

Countries can do things with other NATO countries without it being a NATO thing.

This is getting a bit "semantic" again, and not necessarily usefully. The examples of Afghanistan and Libya have already been given, for instance, and it seems fair to describe both as NATO things.

I've given a multipart test for determining if something is a NATO thing, so no, it's not semantic games on my part. The semantic games are being played by those that insist that things they don't like are NATO things without testing whether they actually are.

If you want to be taken seriously, try to show that what you are talking about actually is a NATO thing.

[EACLucifer]

This is getting a bit "semantic" again, and not necessarily usefully. The examples of Afghanistan and Libya have already been given, for instance, and it seems fair to describe both as NATO things.

Afghanistan was the sort of thing NATO was designed to respond to, though - an attack on a member state.

Well sort of, except the attack was by Al Qaeda rather than Afghanistan or the Taliban, which again complicates the legal picture. (Yes I know they were helping to some extent.)

"To some extent" being they were close allies and the Taliban knowingly and willingly hosted them - in terms of Casus Belli, the Taliban government was responsible for the actions of their Al Qaeda allies they allowed to operate on their soil.

[Bird on a Fire]

But to describe the conflict as a whole as a Proxy War would be a grotesque example of prioritising western viewpoints, because it would be framing America or EU countries or Britain's involvement or whatever as the definitive aspect of the conflict, when it is, compared to Ukraine's involvement, a sideshow.

That is why I referred to it those using it as having an imperialist mentality.

And a definition in which one or both sides of conflict receiving military aid from a non-belligerent party makes it a proxy war means that proxy war is an utterly meaningless term. The Wars of the Roses were a proxy war. World War 2 was a proxy war for the first few years. Yom Kippur war? Not about Egypt and Syria and Israel, but about the Soviet Union and the USA? It ends up completely useless as a term if such a broad definition is used.

I can see this point of view for sure. What I'd counter is that, while people often like to dichotomize things into neat categories, many parts of the "real world" (especially macro-scale interactions between large numbers of cognitively complex organisms) tend to be analogue rather than digital.

The kinds of interactions you describe are indeed common, and I expect it's also common for entities lending support to take the opportunity to leverage their own interests, to some extent.

Under such a framework many conflicts would exist on a spectrum of proxiness, rather than a Boolean. We could then have a conversation about degrees of proxiness, how that proxiness is exercised and - most importantly - what the consequences are. I think that's the nub of the issue, rather than the precise terminology (we could perhaps agree to dub proxiness "influence" or something else inoffensive).

And yes, I agree that Ukraine should be centred in the conversation, rather than the entities doing the proxying/influencing.

[Bird on a Fire]

Afghanistan was the sort of thing NATO was designed to respond to, though - an attack on a member state.

Well sort of, except the attack was by Al Qaeda rather than Afghanistan or the Taliban, which again complicates the legal picture. (Yes I know they were helping to some extent.)

"To some extent" being they were close allies and the Taliban knowingly and willingly hosted them - in terms of Casus Belli, the Taliban government was responsible for the actions of their Al Qaeda allies they allowed to operate on their soil.

Yes, I understand the argument, but it has been disputed by people who seem reasonably sensible. I don't have a strong opinion, as my limited thoughts on the conflict are largely coloured by the catastrophic execution (which seems to have been somewhat predictable). Happy to agree to disagree on whether Afghanistan attacked the US (by proxy? ).

When did Libya attack a NATO Ally?

[Bird on a Fire]

This is false. Some European countries may support some US misadventures, but NATO generally does not.

Countries can do things with other NATO countries without it being a NATO thing.

This is getting a bit "semantic" again, and not necessarily usefully. The examples of Afghanistan and Libya have already been given, for instance, and it seems fair to describe both as NATO things.

I've given a multipart test for determining if something is a NATO thing, so no, it's not semantic games on my part. The semantic games are being played by those that insist that things they don't like are NATO things without testing whether they actually are.

If you want to be taken seriously, try to show that what you are talking about actually is a NATO thing.

Here's NATO describing both as NATO things:

For nearly 20 years, NATO Allies and partner countries had military forces deployed to Afghanistan under a United Nations (UN) Security Council mandate. NATO Allies went into Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, to ensure that the country would not again become a safe haven for international terrorists to attack NATO member countries. Over the last two decades, there have been no terrorist attacks on Allied soil from Afghanistan.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm

Following the Qadhafi regime’s targeting of civilians in February 2011, NATO answered the United Nations’ (UN) call to the international community to protect the Libyan people. In March 2011, a coalition of NATO Allies and partners began enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone and protecting civilians and civilian populated areas from attack or the threat of attack in Libya under Operation Unified Protector (OUP). OUP successfully concluded on 31 October 2011.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm

Hadn't realised either was remotely up for discussion tbh.

[Bird on a Fire]

And just to continue with the semantics, because they are clearly important, here's a critical piece giving an overview of the academic debate, but ultimately agreeing closely with EACL's post above:

But the question of whether the war in Ukraine is a proxy one is not only a Russian government propaganda claim: it’s but also a subject of genuine academic debate.

In my opinion, is the term ‘proxy war’ is applicable to what is happening in Ukraine? In short, no. While it does fit Putin’s role in provoking an insurgency in the Donbas and the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), it fails to properly describe the inter-state war that is currently raging. More damning still, it denies the Ukrainians their own agency and belittles their own right to self-defence.

What is a proxy war?

One of the problems with studies of proxy warfare is that there is no agreed definition. That includes any consensus on whether a proxy war relationship can only involve states (sponsors) supporting non-state proxies, or whether state actors can themselves be proxies of other states or non-state groups.

It also includes disagreement on how much support is needed to qualify as a ‘proxy war’ – can it be purely financial or logistical, or does there need to be some degree of covert paramilitary involvement? Is proxy warfare an act of external policy or internal warfare, namely one in which governments employ militias or auxiliaries against insurgencies, potentially with external backing (as is the case with US and allied support for the Iraqis against Daesh since 2014)? And finally, there is now a debate as to whether ‘surrogate’ war can now include the use of drones, AI and other advanced technologies in addition to human warriors, or whether non-state groups can themselves engage others as proxies.

Rondeaux and David Sterman’s definition of ‘proxy war’ is useful for this article. It outlines ‘the direct or indirect sponsorship of third-party conventional or irregular forces that lie outside of the constitutional order of states engaged in armed conflict’. The author argues that the strategic objectives of sponsors involve a combination of coercion, disruption (weakening an enemy), and/or transformation (engineering a fundamental political transition in the target state).

There are some points of agreement for scholars of proxy warfare. The first is sponsors subcontracts the use of force as an alternative to direct military intervention in a conflict (which runs the risk of escalation into major war), domestic opposition to the involvement the armed forces, or geographical constraints such as distance from the war zone concerned.

Secondly, sponsors and proxies have a common enemy in the form of a target state and that, as was the case with the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s, proxies can have more than one sponsor backing them.

Thirdly, the sponsor-proxy relationship is usually a clandestine and undeclared one, although these links may well be ‘implausibly deniable’.

Fourthly, states subject to internal destabilisation may be quick to claim they are the victims of subversion (sometimes on spurious grounds), while proxies and their backers may seek to deny their relationship because foreign support could stigmatise them as puppet actors.

Fifthly, although proxy warfare contains superficially appealing benefits for all parties, there are several potentially negative implications for all involved, ranging from abandonment and faction-fighting for proxies, to exposure and escalation for the sponsors.

https://www.kcl.ac.uk/is-the-war-in-ukr ... y-conflict

Thanks bob for finding these - it's useful to see these arguments fleshed out.

[dyqik]

This is getting a bit "semantic" again, and not necessarily usefully. The examples of Afghanistan and Libya have already been given, for instance, and it seems fair to describe both as NATO things.

I've given a multipart test for determining if something is a NATO thing, so no, it's not semantic games on my part. The semantic games are being played by those that insist that things they don't like are NATO things without testing whether they actually are.

If you want to be taken seriously, try to show that what you are talking about actually is a NATO thing.

Here's NATO describing both as NATO things:

For nearly 20 years, NATO Allies and partner countries had military forces deployed to Afghanistan under a United Nations (UN) Security Council mandate. NATO Allies went into Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, to ensure that the country would not again become a safe haven for international terrorists to attack NATO member countries. Over the last two decades, there have been no terrorist attacks on Allied soil from Afghanistan.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm

Following the Qadhafi regime’s targeting of civilians in February 2011, NATO answered the United Nations’ (UN) call to the international community to protect the Libyan people. In March 2011, a coalition of NATO Allies and partners began enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone and protecting civilians and civilian populated areas from attack or the threat of attack in Libya under Operation Unified Protector (OUP). OUP successfully concluded on 31 October 2011.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm

Hadn't realised either was remotely up for discussion tbh.

I wasn't disputing any particular example, and not these in particular. I was asking for a bare modicum of critical thinking.

[dyqik]

And just to continue with the semantics, because they are clearly important, here's a critical piece giving an overview of the academic debate, but ultimately agreeing closely with EACL's post above:

But the question of whether the war in Ukraine is a proxy one is not only a Russian government propaganda claim: it’s but also a subject of genuine academic debate.

In my opinion, is the term ‘proxy war’ is applicable to what is happening in Ukraine? In short, no. While it does fit Putin’s role in provoking an insurgency in the Donbas and the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), it fails to properly describe the inter-state war that is currently raging. More damning still, it denies the Ukrainians their own agency and belittles their own right to self-defence.

What is a proxy war?

One of the problems with studies of proxy warfare is that there is no agreed definition. That includes any consensus on whether a proxy war relationship can only involve states (sponsors) supporting non-state proxies, or whether state actors can themselves be proxies of other states or non-state groups.

It also includes disagreement on how much support is needed to qualify as a ‘proxy war’ – can it be purely financial or logistical, or does there need to be some degree of covert paramilitary involvement? Is proxy warfare an act of external policy or internal warfare, namely one in which governments employ militias or auxiliaries against insurgencies, potentially with external backing (as is the case with US and allied support for the Iraqis against Daesh since 2014)? And finally, there is now a debate as to whether ‘surrogate’ war can now include the use of drones, AI and other advanced technologies in addition to human warriors, or whether non-state groups can themselves engage others as proxies.

Rondeaux and David Sterman’s definition of ‘proxy war’ is useful for this article. It outlines ‘the direct or indirect sponsorship of third-party conventional or irregular forces that lie outside of the constitutional order of states engaged in armed conflict’. The author argues that the strategic objectives of sponsors involve a combination of coercion, disruption (weakening an enemy), and/or transformation (engineering a fundamental political transition in the target state).

There are some points of agreement for scholars of proxy warfare. The first is sponsors subcontracts the use of force as an alternative to direct military intervention in a conflict (which runs the risk of escalation into major war), domestic opposition to the involvement the armed forces, or geographical constraints such as distance from the war zone concerned.

Secondly, sponsors and proxies have a common enemy in the form of a target state and that, as was the case with the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s, proxies can have more than one sponsor backing them.

Thirdly, the sponsor-proxy relationship is usually a clandestine and undeclared one, although these links may well be ‘implausibly deniable’.

Fourthly, states subject to internal destabilisation may be quick to claim they are the victims of subversion (sometimes on spurious grounds), while proxies and their backers may seek to deny their relationship because foreign support could stigmatise them as puppet actors.

Fifthly, although proxy warfare contains superficially appealing benefits for all parties, there are several potentially negative implications for all involved, ranging from abandonment and faction-fighting for proxies, to exposure and escalation for the sponsors.

https://www.kcl.ac.uk/is-the-war-in-ukr ... y-conflict

Thanks bob for finding these - it's useful to see these arguments fleshed out.

This is what people here have been saying was obvious from the get go, and why Ukraine could not be described as a US or NATO proxy. It's telling that the only academic source in bob's list is stating the same arguments made here.

[Stephanie]

It's interesting that no one picked that out until boaf actually laid it out in a post - almost like no one bothered clicking on them, assumed that anyone talking about "debate" was doing so in bad faith, etc.

[noggins]

The debate is whether "proxy war" means "aiding one side" or "engineering a conflict then aiding one side". Academics use the first meaning. Putinpoligists use the second.

[EACLucifer]

The debate is whether "proxy war" means "aiding one side" or "engineering a conflict then aiding one side". Academics use the first meaning. Putinpoligists use the second.

I agree on the differing usage by Putin apologists and those who have been influenced by them, but the first use is not universally used by academics, and is heavily criticised by many within academia, because, among other reasons, it downplays the agency of smaller nations and can lead to most conflicts being described by the term.

Context also colours every debate, and in this particular discussion (Across the original thread and this one), the term was introduced by someone who also described the Euromaidan/Revolution of Dignity as a coup, which usually means someone who has been influenced - probably unwittingly - by Russian propaganda.

I'd go so far as to say I think the term should be restricted to conflicts where the outside power exercises some meaningful degree of control over the proxy's actions.

[dyqik]

It's interesting that no one picked that out until boaf actually laid it out in a post - almost like no one bothered clicking on them, assumed that anyone talking about "debate" was doing so in bad faith, etc.

That's because that was the first time that arguments in those links were actually referenced.

Before that, only the existence of the links were discussed.

Just linking to a bunch of stuff is not an argument worth engaging with, unless you explain what each link brings to the discussion.

[Stephanie]

It's interesting that no one picked that out until boaf actually laid it out in a post - almost like no one bothered clicking on them, assumed that anyone talking about "debate" was doing so in bad faith, etc.

That's because that was the first time that arguments in those links were actually referenced.

Before that, only the existence of the links were discussed.

Just linking to a bunch of stuff is not an argument worth engaging with, unless you explain what each link brings to the discussion.

They weren't making an argument, they were linking to things to help the discussion from my read. Too many of you are bringing unnecessary heat, imo.

[jdc]

Some feel more comfortable next to Russia (Georgia, Kazakhstan, etc.)

LOL.

This would be the reason why Georgia has been trying to join NATO for the last 20 years.

The current Georgian government is pro Russia and looks to Russia for security guarantees.

Is this really true? The PM seems to be Garibashvili who looks pretty pro-EU to me and the President has made pro-EU and pro-NATO statements.

President Zurabishvili:

During an interview with DW News in May 2022, Zourabichvili stated that Georgia was in full compliance with the international financial sanctions on Russia and wanted a "quicker and shorter path towards integration" into NATO and the EU.

First Garibashvili government in 2013:

Garibashvili promised economic improvement and stressed that Georgia's EU and NATO aspiration would remain his foreign priorities.

During his tenure, Garibashvili visited the neighboring countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, several European nations, the United States, Israel, the People's Republic of China, and participated in several international summits and forums. While relations to Russia improved, there was no state visits to and from Russia.

And the 2nd:

As a result of the outbreak of the 2022 Russian invasion in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and fears that Russia might once again invade Georgia as it did in 2008, on 3 March 2022, Prime Minister Garibashvili signed the letter with which the country officially applied for membership in the European Union (EU).

[jdc]

Still, maybe it's all still going really well between Russia and Kazakhstan

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/sta ... 9944568833

[dyqik]

Still, maybe it's all still going really well between Russia and Kazakhstan

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/sta ... 9944568833

And Kazakhstan is Russia's space launch site. Without it being friendly, it's much harder for them to launch satellites and spacecraft

[Brightonian]

Still, maybe it's all still going really well between Russia and Kazakhstan

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/sta ... 9944568833

And Kazakhstan is Russia's space launch site. Without it being friendly, it's much harder for them to launch satellites and spacecraft

Was puzzled by this as Russia is so vast, but now I've looked at it I understand it's preferable to launch closer to the equator for the extra angular momentum, hence preferable to use somewhere south of Russia.

But I see that Baikonur is around 46° N, the same as Geneva. And there are places in Russia's Dagestan that are to the south of Baikonur (though those places do seem a bit hilly).

[dyqik]

Still, maybe it's all still going really well between Russia and Kazakhstan

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/sta ... 9944568833

And Kazakhstan is Russia's space launch site. Without it being friendly, it's much harder for them to launch satellites and spacecraft

Was puzzled by this as Russia is so vast, but now I've looked at it I understand it's preferable to launch closer to the equator for the extra angular momentum, hence preferable to use somewhere south of Russia.

But I see that Baikonur is around 46° N, the same as Geneva. And there are places in Russia's Dagestan that are to the south of Baikonur (though those places do seem a bit hilly).

You also want space to the east and south, for failures to land in.

Which is why the US launches from Florida and ESA for French Guyana (East North East in that case).

[Herainestold]

Of course whether or not we believe that NATO poses an objective threat, Russia might nonetheless feel threatened. Security combines a physical condition with a state of mind. Dictionary definitions of security refer on the one hand to being ‘the activities involved in protecting a country, building or person against attack, danger, etc.’ and on the other to ‘the state of feeling happy and safe from danger or worry’. Threats to a state are interpreted by those in charge and they decide how happy and safe a country should feel. The more authoritarian the system the more the issue becomes one of what makes the supreme leader insecure, which might be anything that threatens their personal position. If supreme leaders are paranoid, as they often are, this adds to what might prompt a feeling of insecurity. The desire of dictators to be left alone to do their dictating as they wish is why they cling to the principle of ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ as a vital principle in international affairs.

If you can make Putin feel secure, Ukraine and all of Europe is better off. Instead of constantly threatening Russia, the West should look at what make Russia feel secure. Not necessarily happy but at least not threatened.

https://samf.substack.com/p/who-can-gua ... n-security

[Grumble]

Of course whether or not we believe that NATO poses an objective threat, Russia might nonetheless feel threatened. Security combines a physical condition with a state of mind. Dictionary definitions of security refer on the one hand to being ‘the activities involved in protecting a country, building or person against attack, danger, etc.’ and on the other to ‘the state of feeling happy and safe from danger or worry’. Threats to a state are interpreted by those in charge and they decide how happy and safe a country should feel. The more authoritarian the system the more the issue becomes one of what makes the supreme leader insecure, which might be anything that threatens their personal position. If supreme leaders are paranoid, as they often are, this adds to what might prompt a feeling of insecurity. The desire of dictators to be left alone to do their dictating as they wish is why they cling to the principle of ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ as a vital principle in international affairs.

If you can make Putin feel secure, Ukraine and all of Europe is better off. Instead of constantly threatening Russia, the West should look at what make Russia feel secure. Not necessarily happy but at least not threatened.

https://samf.substack.com/p/who-can-gua ... n-security

If we can get rid of Putin then we might be more secure, depending who succeeds the bastard.

[Herainestold]

Of course whether or not we believe that NATO poses an objective threat, Russia might nonetheless feel threatened. Security combines a physical condition with a state of mind. Dictionary definitions of security refer on the one hand to being ‘the activities involved in protecting a country, building or person against attack, danger, etc.’ and on the other to ‘the state of feeling happy and safe from danger or worry’. Threats to a state are interpreted by those in charge and they decide how happy and safe a country should feel. The more authoritarian the system the more the issue becomes one of what makes the supreme leader insecure, which might be anything that threatens their personal position. If supreme leaders are paranoid, as they often are, this adds to what might prompt a feeling of insecurity. The desire of dictators to be left alone to do their dictating as they wish is why they cling to the principle of ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ as a vital principle in international affairs.

If you can make Putin feel secure, Ukraine and all of Europe is better off. Instead of constantly threatening Russia, the West should look at what make Russia feel secure. Not necessarily happy but at least not threatened.

https://samf.substack.com/p/who-can-gua ... n-security

If we can get rid of Putin then we might be more secure, depending who succeeds the bastard.

I agree.
In the short to medium term, Putin is not threatened. In the long term, we are all dead.
The trajectory of Russian history suggests Putin's successor will have similar aims, so we should be prepared for that