Russian Civil War

[jimbob]

A bit of a digression and potentially dodgy historical parallel, but there was an issue mid-late western Roman emperors had, where if army commanders were any good they were liable to build support for a coup. Gave the emperor the choice of campaigning with the army or trying to find commanders who were either loyal (tricky) or good-but-not-too-good.

If I have a point, its that in an imperial/warlord state power bases come in all shapes and sizes, but the armed forces are definitely one of the more potent ones.

It is a key point in The Prince, if I remember correctly.

Certainly about mercenaries. Generals are ambitious, else they wouldn't have become generals.

If they are clever they are a threat, if the system allows

[Tessa K]

A sensible warlord gives their generals enough rewards - gold, concubines, land, titles etc to keep them content. And keeps several spies in their close retinue.

[EACLucifer]

A sensible warlord gives their generals enough rewards - gold, concubines, land, titles etc to keep them content. And keeps several spies in their close retinue.

It is worth thinking of it in feudal terms like this. One reason that Prigozhin's thunder run got as far as it did is that much of the Russian armed forces, like the Stanleys at Bosworth Field, were waiting to see who was winning before joining in.

[TopBadger]

Not surprising that the Generals are unhappy though is it... their lives before invading Ukraine would have been much much nicer. Same goes for the oligarchs.

[Woodchopper]

Surovikin’s deputy Yudin has been fired from Russian army, says the well-connected Russian journalist Aleksey Venediktov

https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status ... 1zY-PW4R9w

[lpm]

What's happening with individuals gives a clue to the structural breakdown. But it's hard to unpick, bit like astronomy where you estimate the movement of bodies and try to figure out underlying forces.

Fundamentally, the dictator wants to supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to X, and tell X to defend such and such section or capture Bakhmut or whatever. But who is X? You obviously don't supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to mutineers or useless generals or untrusted good generals. And you will have advisers telling you to choose Y, but do they want it to be Y for their own underhand purposes?

Assuming Putin still wants to hold Ukraine territory, who does he pick who shares that objective? There's nobody. There is literally nobody in powerful positions in Russia who still want to fight in Ukraine, except those trying to suck up to Putin. No general wants to be X and go off to lose in Ukraine.

I'd also compare it to Rome's dying centuries. General X gets given a legion and is told to go off to Germania to finally wipe out the Goths. But what's in it for General X? He knows it's impossible to wipe out the Goths. All that will happen is his legion will get slaughtered or slowly eroded by raids. And once he hears the Emperor in Rome is ill it's obviously far better to retain the legion - either to have leverage in a succession struggle or to be defensive or to make a play himself. Who cares about never-ending conflict with Goths when power in Rome is precarious?

The structural failings of the Russian army still exist. Useless recruits and training, terrible morale, fragile supply lines. Now there's deeper structural failings to add to the mix. The underling forces must surely be a gravitational pull that's dragging resources out of the Ukraine occupied territories.

[jimbob]

What's happening with individuals gives a clue to the structural breakdown. But it's hard to unpick, bit like astronomy where you estimate the movement of bodies and try to figure out underlying forces.

Fundamentally, the dictator wants to supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to X, and tell X to defend such and such section or capture Bakhmut or whatever. But who is X? You obviously don't supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to mutineers or useless generals or untrusted good generals. And you will have advisers telling you to choose Y, but do they want it to be Y for their own underhand purposes?

Assuming Putin still wants to hold Ukraine territory, who does he pick who shares that objective? There's nobody. There is literally nobody in powerful positions in Russia who still want to fight in Ukraine, except those trying to suck up to Putin. No general wants to be X and go off to lose in Ukraine.

I'd also compare it to Rome's dying centuries. General X gets given a legion and is told to go off to Germania to finally wipe out the Goths. But what's in it for General X? He knows it's impossible to wipe out the Goths. All that will happen is his legion will get slaughtered or slowly eroded by raids. And once he hears the Emperor in Rome is ill it's obviously far better to retain the legion - either to have leverage in a succession struggle or to be defensive or to make a play himself. Who cares about never-ending conflict with Goths when power in Rome is precarious?

The structural failings of the Russian army still exist. Useless recruits and training, terrible morale, fragile supply lines. Now there's deeper structural failings to add to the mix. The underling forces must surely be a gravitational pull that's dragging resources out of the Ukraine occupied territories.

Yes, now is the time for another raid into Russia by the Free Russia Legio6

[IvanV]

Fundamentally, the dictator wants to supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to X, and tell X to defend such and such section or capture Bakhmut or whatever. But who is X? You obviously don't supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to mutineers or useless generals or untrusted good generals. And you will have advisers telling you to choose Y, but do they want it to be Y for their own underhand purposes?

The dictator may take time to work it out. Stalin replaced the command of the army with politically reliable people. Then, when Germany invaded, he discovered they weren't very good militarily. He had to bring back some of the competent generals, and then the fight-back began

[Herainestold]

The constructed apathy of the Russian populace is both a help and a hindrance for Putin. Nobody rushed out into the streets to overthrow the regime. they know what side their bread is buttered, despite misgivings about their rulers. The Oligarchs and siloviki in Moscow may have been nervous, but their nerve held and their prosperity continues, at least for now. We keep hearing about how brittle the political structure is in Russia, but it held and Putin has neutralized his biggest potential adversary.
The saddest thing for the world is the lack of a left orientated opposition in Russia. Whatever happens we know that the result will be some variation of a fascist hyper capitalist state, much like the one that exists now.

[TopBadger]

The constructed apathy of the Russian populace is both a help and a hindrance for Putin. Nobody rushed out into the streets to overthrow the regime.

Of course those that might have rushed out to help overthrow the regime have already rushed out of the country to avoid being drafted, or are currently in jails.

But of those that were available for rushing out... none rushed out onto the streets to protect the regime either. I'm not sure its apathy per se... probably more the case that its dangerous to show support for movements that subsequently fail (as those in jail can attest to). A revolution needs to get much closer to the finishing line before people will support it. Now Putin looks weaker perhaps a subsequent attempt will be easier.

[dyqik]

The constructed apathy of the Russian populace is both a help and a hindrance for Putin. Nobody rushed out into the streets to overthrow the regime.

Of course those that might have rushed out to help overthrow the regime have already rushed out of the country to avoid being drafted, or are currently in jails.

At least, those that could did. And those that didn't avoid getting drafted may now have very different opinions to before.

[lpm]

Fundamentally, the dictator wants to supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to X, and tell X to defend such and such section or capture Bakhmut or whatever. But who is X? You obviously don't supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to mutineers or useless generals or untrusted good generals. And you will have advisers telling you to choose Y, but do they want it to be Y for their own underhand purposes?

The dictator may take time to work it out. Stalin replaced the command of the army with politically reliable people. Then, when Germany invaded, he discovered they weren't very good militarily. He had to bring back some of the competent generals, and then the fight-back began

I don't think there are any parallels with WW2 USSR.

More similar to USSR getting bogged down in Afghanistan - with ultimately the stresses on the economy and political leadership leading to disintegration of the country. No general could go to Afghanistan and win, no matter how competent, but because the Politburo refused to recognise that basic fact there was an endless cycle of surge and retreat.

Or Russia's defeat vs Japan 1905 leading to the first attempted revolution. Russia kept thinking it could win, even after it kept losing naval battles, and kept going and worsening the situation. The Tsar had to admit defeat once he was worried enough about domestic crises.

When foreign military attacks go awry there tends to be a denial of reality by all involved, worsening the eventual domestic rebound. One week on we are in this weird limbo where nothing has changed on the surface, domestic peace appears to reign, but in reality the structural failure has worsened.

[jimbob]

Fundamentally, the dictator wants to supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to X, and tell X to defend such and such section or capture Bakhmut or whatever. But who is X? You obviously don't supply a bunch of tanks and sh.t to mutineers or useless generals or untrusted good generals. And you will have advisers telling you to choose Y, but do they want it to be Y for their own underhand purposes?

The dictator may take time to work it out. Stalin replaced the command of the army with politically reliable people. Then, when Germany invaded, he discovered they weren't very good militarily. He had to bring back some of the competent generals, and then the fight-back began

I don't think there are any parallels with WW2 USSR.

More similar to USSR getting bogged down in Afghanistan - with ultimately the stresses on the economy and political leadership leading to disintegration of the country. No general could go to Afghanistan and win, no matter how competent, but because the Politburo refused to recognise that basic fact there was an endless cycle of surge and retreat.

Or Russia's defeat vs Japan 1905 leading to the first attempted revolution. Russia kept thinking it could win, even after it kept losing naval battles, and kept going and worsening the situation. The Tsar had to admit defeat once he was worried enough about domestic crises.

When foreign military attacks go awry there tends to be a denial of reality by all involved, worsening the eventual domestic rebound. One week on we are in this weird limbo where nothing has changed on the surface, domestic peace appears to reign, but in reality the structural failure has worsened.

Yes, the Russian people know that it's not really an existential threat to the Russian people and any existential threat is to the remnants of the Russian Empire. If they are male and of draft age, they are possibly thinking that the war might be an existential threat to them. Looking at wikipedia, the Russian casualties are probably of a similar level to the Americans in Western Europe between 1944 and 1945 and for a country with a similar population.

The stress on the country is going to be far greater than Afghanistan - not just because the casualties are far higher, but because there is far more information than in the USSR.

[dyqik]

Russia has a demographic crisis as well, with very few young men of typical military service age, and a rapidly declining population.

see e.g. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions ... sis-putin/ (not paywalled this week)

[Imrael]

...
The dictator may take time to work it out. Stalin replaced the command of the army with politically reliable people. Then, when Germany invaded, he discovered they weren't very good militarily. He had to bring back some of the competent generals, and then the fight-back began

Western logistical support was enormously important to the fight back. A couple of random examples

Despite the fame (and in its way excellence) of the T-34 tank, the first Soviet armoured units to enter Berlin had Shermans
The west - mostly the US - supplied nearly half a million trucks and jeeps to the Sovient Union.

We'll never know if the USSR could have fought back without the aid, but pretty sure it would have taken longer.

IMO this has 2 lessons for the current situation
Support for Ukraine certainly needs the headline-grabbing weapons, but the small stuff may also be important.
Generals win battles but industrial power wins wars.

[dyqik]

Generals win battles but industrial power wins wars.

Generals avoiding battles that they don't have the logistical support for can stop you losing wars though.

[Herainestold]

The constructed apathy of the Russian populace is both a help and a hindrance for Putin. Nobody rushed out into the streets to overthrow the regime.

Of course those that might have rushed out to help overthrow the regime have already rushed out of the country to avoid being drafted, or are currently in jails.

But of those that were available for rushing out... none rushed out onto the streets to protect the regime either. I'm not sure its apathy per se... probably more the case that its dangerous to show support for movements that subsequently fail (as those in jail can attest to). A revolution needs to get much closer to the finishing line before people will support it. Now Putin looks weaker perhaps a subsequent attempt will be easier.

Anybody who has anti-regime views has either left the country, is in prison, or is keeping a very low profile. That is precisely what Putin wants.
Those that are left have no illusions about what kind of country they live in, but they have made their accomodations with it, its not an unreasonable point of view.

Putin didn't look strong or decisive in this situation, but he is still in charge, he knows who his enemies are, and he must be very satisfied that there is no credible mass popular movement against him and no chances of leftist or moderate insurrection.

[Formerly AvP]

Prigozhin may be back in Russia...

I can only accord with that Russian car driver. WTF IGO?

[TopBadger]

Prigozhin may be back in Russia...

I can only accord with that Russian car driver. WTF IGO?

Yes - BBC reporting he's in St Petersburg... so what is going on?

1) Short exile and all back to before?
2) Putin has decided he has some high windows he needs Prigozhin to inspect?
3) Another coup being planned?

Those seem to be the only options. Place your bets...

[lpm]

It's all very strange.

[jimbob]

Prigozhin may be back in Russia...

I can only accord with that Russian car driver. WTF IGO?

Yes - BBC reporting he's in St Petersburg... so what is going on?

1) Short exile and all back to before?
2) Putin has decided he has some high windows he needs Prigozhin to inspect?
3) Another coup being planned?

Those seem to be the only options. Place your bets...

2b) Prigozhin has discovered that Putin has some really good kompromat on him so he feels he has to throw himself on Putin's mercy?

Also what was happening with the fortune that was confiscated and then seemingly returned?

[dyqik]

Prigozhin may be back in Russia...

I can only accord with that Russian car driver. WTF IGO?

Yes - BBC reporting he's in St Petersburg... so what is going on?

1) Short exile and all back to before?
2) Putin has decided he has some high windows he needs Prigozhin to inspect?
3) Another coup being planned?

Those seem to be the only options. Place your bets...

2b) Prigozhin has discovered that Putin has some really good kompromat on him so he feels he has to throw himself on Putin's mercy?

Also what was happening with the fortune that was confiscated and then seemingly returned?

2b) can really only be the other way round. Thanks fo the mutiny, Putin doesn't need kompromat to sink, arrest or kill Prigozhin, and Prigozhin is already unacceptable outside of Russia. Prigozhin having the ability to sink Putin and his regime is the only lever between them that makes sense.

[tenchboy]

You must send for shepherd Prigozhin M'm.
I will not!
Without him we will lose the lot: 'ee's the only one who knows the way.
...

<Don't desert me Gabriel>

[Martin Y]

You must send for shepherd Prigozhin M'm.
I will not!
Without him we will lose the lot: 'ee's the only one who knows the way.
...

<Don't desert me Gabriel>

I'm grasping for a Goon Show style "shepherd spy" joke, but failing. In my imagination it would have been a cracker.

[IvanV]

2b) Prigozhin has discovered that Putin has some really good kompromat on him so he feels he has to throw himself on Putin's mercy?

In Catherine Belton's book Putin's People, she said that many of the people who had substantial "business relationships" with Putin during his St Petersburg period ended up quietly dead a long time ago. The implication, as she interpreted it, was that they had good kompromat on Putin and needed getting rid of. If he also had good kompromat on them, he couldn't use it without exposing the reverse situation.

Putin was a senior official in the Mayor's office in St P from 1990-96. He had some anodyne title like Head of the Committee for External Relations, with responsibility for business registration, trade and foreign inward investment. But according to Belton, an important part of that was being the main man in the interface between the Mayor and organised crime. He was probably extracting money from them in return for letting them trade in an agreed scope of "business", keeping their rivals out, keeping the gang fights down, etc. This is working from memory as I gave my copy of the book away, so sorry in advance if my memory has distorted that.

That's why I was somewhat interested when I learned that Prigozhin knew Putin through business relations in his St P period, because most people like that fell out of a window 25 years ago, or whatever was the method at that time. Clearly they developed a mutually useful relationship such that Prigozhin was more useful alive than dead.