Hamas attack on Israel

[Gfamily]

You also thought things the Arab League and AHC did in late 1947 were a response to things the Haganah didn't do until April 1948.

I have no idea what you are talking about. I can't believe I mentioned the Arab League and AHC (who they?). I don't know specifically what they did in 1947, and wouldn't have said so without knowing that. I make no claim to have attempted to set out a specific detailed history of that period. I don't recall saying anything much more specific than the partition plan was rejected - but by people such as the Grand Mufti rather than "the Palestinian people", who were hardly asked.

I have half a memory you may have said something like this before, when it was then utterly mysterious to me, but I didn't react to it, as it seemed anyone could see it was a non sequitur. But there seems to be something there you have taken to heart, which I don't understand. And if some error of detail was made, which you have interpreted as meaning that, can you explain that, and what difference it makes to the point, probably a high level point, I was making? (And was probably my recollection of something I read in Ian Black's Enemies and Neighbours, which I don't have to hand as my father took it.)

On this more recent occasion, I did check my facts and quote sources for them.

I don't think you're (in the) wrong here. I was interested to know in which post you'd said something that was as explicit as the comment warranted, but there wasn't anything (relatively recent) that fitted.

[EACLucifer]

You also thought things the Arab League and AHC did in late 1947 were a response to things the Haganah didn't do until April 1948.

I have no idea what you are talking about. I can't believe I mentioned the Arab League and AHC (who they?). I don't know specifically what they did in 1947, and wouldn't have said so without knowing that.

The quote was "Well, if they thought they could get away with what they did in 1947 without much fighting, they were exceedingly naive. So, I don't believe you."

The thing is Israel/The Haganah didn't do anything aggressive in 1947. They didn't go on the offensive until spring 1948, long after the AHC and Arab League had attacked, with the AHC's Arab Holy War Army getting going in December 1947 and the Arab League's Arab Liberation Army crossing into the Mandate en masse in January 1948.

It's not just that you got the dates wrong, though, you specifically framed the fact that Israel was attacked as a response to some nefarious thing they had done, and yet the Haganah didn't go on the offensive - and thus did not capture or displace any Arabs - until mid April 1948 with Operation Nachshon, a move to challenge stranglehold Arab* forces had maintained preventing supplies reaching the Jewish population of Jerusalem - not only did this postdate the use of force by the Arab militias, it was only necessary because of this.

And that's why I don't take you very seriously on this issue.

Of course it shouldn't be controversial that the Arab side attacked first in 47, given that they stated as such to the UN, Jamal Al-Husseini stating "The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight".


*For those unfamiliar with the history of the region, you can read "Arab" and "Palestinian" interchangeably here, as long as you remember that that's the modern sense of the latter word; period sources especially ones predating the founding of Israel are quite likely to use the word Palestinian to refer to Jewish residents of the area, and this can cause some confusion.

[EACLucifer]

So while the stated goal is understandable (without getting into what Israel is currently doing to achieve it), it doesn't seem unreasonable to be concerned about what Israel would consider to be a success, and how it would respond if other options presented themselves and what its long term goal is, for the sake of everyone in the region.

Agreed. Unfortunately, getting a coherent plan beyond "try to somehow win the next election and stay out of jail" from Netanyahu will be difficult. On the other hand, there are no good long term outcomes if the short term goal of destroying Hamas, forcing them to relinquish power or somehow forcing them to utterly change their nature is not met.

[IvanV]

You also thought things the Arab League and AHC did in late 1947 were a response to things the Haganah didn't do until April 1948.

I have no idea what you are talking about. I can't believe I mentioned the Arab League and AHC (who they?). I don't know specifically what they did in 1947, and wouldn't have said so without knowing that.

The quote was "Well, if they thought they could get away with what they did in 1947 without much fighting, they were exceedingly naive. So, I don't believe you."

The thing is Israel/The Haganah didn't do anything aggressive in 1947. They didn't go on the offensive until spring 1948, long after the AHC and Arab League had attacked, with the AHC's Arab Holy War Army getting going in December 1947 and the Arab League's Arab Liberation Army crossing into the Mandate en masse in January 1948.

...It's not just that you got the dates wrong, though, you specifically framed the fact that Israel was attacked as a response to some nefarious thing they had done, ...

OK, I see the misunderstanding now. My apologies, I wrote 1947 when I should have said 1948. But you have read more than I intended into what was intended to be simple statement. Which is what often happens in these cases.

I was well aware that the Arabs were the first to set out to achieve military control of Palestine and were first to mobilise extensively to achieve that, soon after the UN plan was announced. The Jewish response to that was more militarily successful, and it was they who achieved control. At that point, they made a choice to declare a Jewish state and on that extent of land. All I was saying is that was bound to be subsequently resisted. And they knew that perfectly well.

We can argue, as many did, about what was necessary to achieve a minimum acceptable level of security. Which is why I have not sought to paint that decision in any further light beyond, would be resisted. As I have also said, the more fateful decisions came later, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, which it turned out it could not as easily reverse as its occupation of Sinai.

[IvanV]

So while the stated goal is understandable (without getting into what Israel is currently doing to achieve it), it doesn't seem unreasonable to be concerned about what Israel would consider to be a success, and how it would respond if other options presented themselves and what its long term goal is, for the sake of everyone in the region.

Agreed. Unfortunately, getting a coherent plan beyond "try to somehow win the next election and stay out of jail" from Netanyahu will be difficult. On the other hand, there are no good long term outcomes if the short term goal of destroying Hamas, forcing them to relinquish power or somehow forcing them to utterly change their nature is not met.

Agree absolutely with the first point, it's aligned with what I have been saying.

The difficulty that many have with your second point is that they do not believe that the removal or transformation of Hamas is a sufficient condition for a good long term outcome. I think that is what motivates Disco's concern.

[discovolante]

So while the stated goal is understandable (without getting into what Israel is currently doing to achieve it), it doesn't seem unreasonable to be concerned about what Israel would consider to be a success, and how it would respond if other options presented themselves and what its long term goal is, for the sake of everyone in the region.

Agreed. Unfortunately, getting a coherent plan beyond "try to somehow win the next election and stay out of jail" from Netanyahu will be difficult. On the other hand, there are no good long term outcomes if the short term goal of destroying Hamas, forcing them to relinquish power or somehow forcing them to utterly change their nature is not met.

Agree absolutely with the first point, it's aligned with what I have been saying.

The difficulty that many have with your second point is that they do not believe that the removal or transformation of Hamas is a sufficient condition for a good long term outcome. I think that is what motivates Disco's concern.

Kind of, my first question (or the first part of my question) has been how do you define the 'defeat' of Hamas, which I suppose is another way of saying two things: how can you be sure the threat of Hamas or similar organisations has been removed, and how do you decide when to stop. It seems to be in both Israel and Gaza's interests to be able to determine that.

[Woodchopper]

Agreed. Unfortunately, getting a coherent plan beyond "try to somehow win the next election and stay out of jail" from Netanyahu will be difficult. On the other hand, there are no good long term outcomes if the short term goal of destroying Hamas, forcing them to relinquish power or somehow forcing them to utterly change their nature is not met.

Agree absolutely with the first point, it's aligned with what I have been saying.

The difficulty that many have with your second point is that they do not believe that the removal or transformation of Hamas is a sufficient condition for a good long term outcome. I think that is what motivates Disco's concern.

Kind of, my first question (or the first part of my question) has been how do you define the 'defeat' of Hamas, which I suppose is another way of saying two things: how can you be sure the threat of Hamas or similar organizations has been removed, and how do you decide when to stop. It seems to be in both Israel and Gaza's interests to be able to determine that.

Its feasible to locate and destroy the great majority, if not all, of Hamas' infrastructure and military equipment. IDF troops can search street by street and locate tunnels and equipment stored within. It will also be possible for Israel to identify the senior leadership and have a good idea as to how many have been killed or imprisoned.

Similar battles were fought against IS during 2015-2017, particularly to retake the cities of Mosul and Raqqah. The campaign against IS was successful in that it is far less powerful than before.

That said, the war isn't over and IS is still active in Syria and Iraq, and it has adherents around the world, especially in North Africa. The Taliban was successfully removed from power in Afghanistan in 2001, only to return years later. Historians can debate as to whether that was due to the enduring strength of the Taliban, or because the US and allies lost the plot and were distracted by the invasion of Iraq.

So a realistic objective may be to reduce the level of threat rather than end the war.

The other side of the equation is obviously Hamas. To recap, my assumption soon after 7 October was that they carried out the massacres in an attempt to start a war which would a) involve other regional states and actors that have traditionally supported the Palestinian cause; and b) lead to the Israeli armed forces being weakened by a lengthy urban war in Gaza.

If those were Hamas' objectives then it looks as if the the war since October 7 has been a disaster. The IDF appears to have few casualties. Leaders of Arab states have of course stated their disapproval, but beyond that the governments have offered little more than thoughts and prayers. States like Saudi Arabia could have initiated economic sanctions etc, but they have done nothing. It looks like they are content to see the IDF attack Hamas (who they dislike far more than they dislike Israel). The only party that has offered more than thoughts and prayers has been the Iranian backed Houthi Movement in Yemen. But their involvement isn't going to result in much stress and lost sleep in Jerusalem.

It remains to be seen how the evident lack of international support might affect Hamas' strategies.

[discovolante]

Agree absolutely with the first point, it's aligned with what I have been saying.

The difficulty that many have with your second point is that they do not believe that the removal or transformation of Hamas is a sufficient condition for a good long term outcome. I think that is what motivates Disco's concern.

Kind of, my first question (or the first part of my question) has been how do you define the 'defeat' of Hamas, which I suppose is another way of saying two things: how can you be sure the threat of Hamas or similar organizations has been removed, and how do you decide when to stop. It seems to be in both Israel and Gaza's interests to be able to determine that.

Its feasible to locate and destroy the great majority, if not all, of Hamas' infrastructure and military equipment. IDF troops can search street by street and locate tunnels and equipment stored within. It will also be possible for Israel to identify the senior leadership and have a good idea as to how many have been killed or imprisoned.

Similar battles were fought against IS during 2015-2017, particularly to retake the cities of Mosul and Raqqah. The campaign against IS was successful in that it is far less powerful than before.

That said, the war isn't over and IS is still active in Syria and Iraq, and it has adherents around the world, especially in North Africa. The Taliban was successfully removed from power in Afghanistan in 2001, only to return years later. Historians can debate as to whether that was due to the enduring strength of the Taliban, or because the US and allies lost the plot and were distracted by the invasion of Iraq.

So a realistic objective may be to reduce the level of threat rather than end the war.

The other side of the equation is obviously Hamas. To recap, my assumption soon after 7 October was that they carried out the massacres in an attempt to start a war which would a) involve other regional states and actors that have traditionally supported the Palestinian cause; and b) lead to the Israeli armed forces being weakened by a lengthy urban war in Gaza.

If those were Hamas' objectives then it looks as if the the war since October 7 has been a disaster. The IDF appears to have few casualties. Leaders of Arab states have of course stated their disapproval, but beyond that the governments have offered little more than thoughts and prayers. States like Saudi Arabia could have initiated economic sanctions etc, but they have done nothing. It looks like they are content to see the IDF attack Hamas (who they dislike far more than they dislike Israel). The only party that has offered more than thoughts and prayers has been the Iranian backed Houthi Movement in Yemen. But their involvement isn't going to result in much stress and lost sleep in Jerusalem.

It remains to be seen how the evident lack of international support might affect Hamas' strategies.

Sorry for the slow response, I got a sudden bout of posting fatigue (good news for all). I guess it seems to me that reducing the situation in those countries to those two periods (although I understand why you did) isn't particularly compelling.

[IvanV]

...If those were Hamas' objectives then it looks as if the the war since October 7 has been a disaster. The IDF appears to have few casualties. Leaders of Arab states have of course stated their disapproval, but beyond that the governments have offered little more than thoughts and prayers.
...
It remains to be seen how the evident lack of international support might affect Hamas' strategies.

On the one hand, the BBC was reporting yesterday that Hamas has never been as popular among young Palestinians, at least in the West Bank where they can be asked. Which might be seen as a degree of success for Hamas despite the strong point you make.

On the other hand, it has also been reporting people from Gaza wishing they could live anywhere-but-Gaza. That is only anecdotal, so hard to know how widespread that view is. If it was common, it would doubtless be convenient for Israel's rulers, though I doubt they would admit that is what they are trying to achieve.