El Pollo Diablo wrote: Sat Mar 05, 2022 11:44 am
My mum told me the other day that apparently my dad's opinion on nuclear war during Cold War I was that it'd be better to be outdoors and obliterated straight away than trying to hide and dealing with fallout, both societal and radioactive.
This is 100% my approach. Better to be standing under it than 20 miles away.
Been there, sort of . . .
back in the 70s when nukes were considered a real possibility, the papers always used St Pauls, London as a target to map effects at distances from there. I then lived in a bedsit in the Barbican. You could see St Pauls from my balcony. So that would've been me then !!
Let’s play Scenario and see if we can get to a point when Barcelona gets nuked.
Things continue to go badly for Russian armour. The West’s anti-tank weapons pour into Ukraine by land and they make good use of them. The Russians attempt an amphibious landing at Odesa and without air cover it’s a disaster. Bodies litter the beaches, ships burn and hundreds are captured.
The hits on the supply lines increase. The cities can’t be taken because Russian supplies aren’t reaching the front line. The world is outraged by pictures of indiscriminate razing of cities and sanction tighten another notch.
Russia captures some Nato special forces inside Ukraine for “training” purposes. It’s a propaganda gift and Russian TV makes the most of it.
Russia assembles a fresh invasion force at Kursk. But Nato aircraft have been given to Ukraine. They cross the border and destroy Russian forces in a pre-emptive strike. The Russian people are outraged and unite behind Putin. Propaganda goes on about the build up of Nato forces in Poland and the Balts.
The war of attrition inside Ukraine frustrates Russian commanders and chemical weapons are used against civilians in Kharkiv. The world is in shock. China gets told to pick a side, even Eritrea votes against Russia in the UN.
The pressure breaks Belarus first. Lukashenko falls out of a high window and there’s a brief civil war as different generals try to seize power.
An eastern Russian division is ordered to head to the Ukraine border. They mutiny and refuse to travel. Inside Ukraine forces surrender and mutiny. Peace protests in Moscow overwhelm the police. Counter protests by Putin loyalists lead to fighting on the streets.
Putin blames the west for the economic collapse and blames Nato for actively participating in Ukraine. He claims Nato has invaded Belarus. He claims Russia is about to be extinguished.
All this is pretty unlikely in the first place. But what unlikely events then lead to a nuclear exchange? What is Putin’s target and why? What does it get him, what does it get his generals? If he nukes Kyiv, why does the USA nuke Russia? What’s in it for America? If he nukes the North Sea, why does Nato respond?
Irrational actions are fine as an assumption. But they have to be real world irrational actions. You can't just say the word "irrational" and then claim it means nuclear war is likely.
bjn wrote: Sat Mar 05, 2022 12:00 pm
Speculation, does Russia want NATO to send in troops? It gives a post-hoc "Told you so!" justification domestically, and it can then get on and invade the Baltics in 'retaliation'.
At which point we are probably f.cked as it all goes sideways very very quickly.
Putin really needs to fall off a balcony onto some bullets.
If Putin is assassinated it would make things worse, not better.
I disagree. An assassination as part of a palace coup could bring in another leader who would have no reason to continue that policy, and every reason to pull back as a repudiation of the foolishness of their (his almost certainly) predecessor.
bjn wrote: Sat Mar 05, 2022 12:00 pm
Speculation, does Russia want NATO to send in troops? It gives a post-hoc "Told you so!" justification domestically, and it can then get on and invade the Baltics in 'retaliation'.
At which point we are probably f.cked as it all goes sideways very very quickly.
Putin really needs to fall off a balcony onto some bullets.
If Putin is assassinated it would make things worse, not better.
I disagree. An assassination as part of a palace coup could bring in another leader who would have no reason to continue that policy, and every reason to pull back as a repudiation of the foolishness of their (his almost certainly) predecessor.
And it doesn't even have to called going back on the policy, it can sold as "a withdrawal to reevaluate the methods in use after the previous regimes tactical errors".
Stranger Mouse wrote: Fri Mar 04, 2022 5:47 pm
BBC leaving Russia due to new fake news law that will mean they can get 15 years in prison for calling the war a war or the invasion an invasion
BBC has got a broadcast on Tor and is promoting information about how to get an onion browser etc to access it, in order to get around the restrictions
Stranger Mouse wrote: Fri Mar 04, 2022 5:47 pm
BBC leaving Russia due to new fake news law that will mean they can get 15 years in prison for calling the war a war or the invasion an invasion
BBC has got a broadcast on Tor and is promoting information about how to get an onion browser etc to access it, in order to get around the restrictions
Suggest people share this as widely as possible on social media and encourage others to share it as well. Get the info out as widely as possible
CF
I don't think anyone else can see the images you link in from your own site.
tor BBC.jpg (51.8 KiB) Viewed 2500 times
having that swing is a necessary but not sufficient condition for it meaning a thing
@shpalman@mastodon.me.uk
@shpalman.bsky.social / bsky.app/profile/chrastina.net
threads.net/@dannychrastina
Putin may be threatened by democracy or a free press but the ordinary Russian has nothing to fear from NATO.
To fire a nuke will require a number of ordinary Russians in the chain of command to act on the words of a mobster and end their own lives and destroy the world.
I hope Putin isnt crazy enough to try to launch them, and even if he did try I hope his chain of command isn't crazy enough to obey.
If I were in Putin's position I would also think that giving a nuclear order might well be the tipping point for someone to plunge the knife in my back. No-ones loyalty is absolute, and self preservation is a powerful impulse.
All this talk about a "no-fly zone" - what is the point in risking a direct NATO vs Russia war when the Russian air force have hardly been involved in this campaign?
The overwhelming majority of damage (and deaths) has been inflicted by missiles and shelling - not things that would be stopped by enforcing a "no-fly zone"..
[…] Putin’s announcement on Sunday that he is raising the alert level of Russian nuclear weapons — an explicit threat to foreign powers who might be minded to intervene in Ukraine.
This was quite a moment. Sir David Manning, a former British ambassador to Washington, told me that: “As far as I can recall, this is the first time since the Cuba missile crisis [of 1962] that anyone has threatened the use of nuclear weapons as a war-fighting method” — as opposed to keeping nukes in the background, as a deterrent.
The White House is obviously taking the threat of nuclear escalation seriously. As the FT reported yesterday, the US has delayed a scheduled intercontinental ballistic missile test, apparently for fear that it would dangerously increase tensions with Russia. This highlights one of the main issues that is preoccupying those who need to think about this alarming topic: Putin’s state of mind.
Without wishing to sound too coolly analytical about Armageddon, the question of nuclear risks can be broken down into a few subsidiary questions. First, what kind of nuclear weapons are we talking about, and what could the targets be? Second, are we talking about a deliberate decision to go to war; an accident — or something in between, such as an escalation of tensions that gets out of control? Third, how much of this comes down to Putin’s state of mind? Fourth, are there any policies that the west can adopt to manage the risks? Fifth — and most important of all — how big is the risk?
On the type of nuclear threat that Putin was making, opinion is divided. Sir Lawrence Freedman, doyen of British strategic studies, told me in my podcast this week that he thought Putin’s implied threat was to use strategic weapons — that is, the intercontinental missiles that could be used to devastate foreign cities as far away as the US. Freedman thinks the idea of making this threat is to frighten the west off — in other words, this is much more likely to be about deterrence than any real plan.
By contrast, my friend Jeremy Shapiro, who used to work closely at the US state department with Jake Sullivan — now President Biden’s national security adviser — is more concerned about the use of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. Russia has a lot of these and, as he points out, Russian military doctrine foresees them being used as part of a war-fighting strategy. Jeremy does not think it likely that Russia would use these weapons on Ukrainian soil. The scenario he floats is that Russia might use them to attack a concentration of Nato troops in Poland or the Baltic states — believing that these forces might be about to attack Russia.
As Jeremy writes: “Nikolai Patrushev, a close adviser of Putin, said in 2009 that Russia might launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike ‘to repel an aggression with the use of conventional weapons not only in a large-scale [war] but also in a regional and even local war.’”
This kind of scenario is closer to a deliberate decision to go nuclear than an accident. But it contains elements of the accidental scenario because it involves a Russian misperception: a belief that Nato might be about to attack Russia — making a pre-emptive strike by Moscow defensive, at least in the Kremlin’s view.
Most people in the west regard that as an obviously ridiculous scenario — since Nato is not about to attack Russia. But that’s where we get to Putin’s state of mind. What if he is paranoid enough to believe that might be about to happen? What if he actually believes some of the stuff he’s been saying, about Nato being bent on Russia’s destruction? Or what if he interprets some of our actions as crossing the line into “Nato aggression”? After all, Nato countries are pouring lethal aid into Ukraine — which will be used to kill Russians. And western volunteers are lining up to fight in Ukraine — sometimes with the explicit encouragement of western leaders, such as Liz Truss, the UK foreign secretary.
So what policies can the west adopt to reduce the risks? Perhaps dial down the rhetoric? Suggestions that we want Putin dead — such as the one made by the foreign minister of Luxembourg, are probably not a good idea. Trying to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine is a particularly dangerous idea and has been shot down (no pun intended) by Ben Wallace, Britain’s defence secretary.
So, finally, how big is the risk? Lawrie Freedman was quite reassuring on my podcast. He thinks nuclear deterrence worked throughout the cold war and will almost certainly work again. But he did accept that the one thing we can’t be sure about is Putin’s mentality and state of mind. The argument that, “he wouldn’t do that because it’s obviously crazy,” has not worked well for us, so far, during this crisis.
In the past decade, western analysts have worried that Russian military doctrine has become more dependent on nuclear weapons. Former Nato commander General Philip Breedlove often described a scenario wherein the Russians might attack one of the Baltic states, drop a tactical nuclear weapon on a Nato force concentration trying to counterattack and then negotiate a stand-down that secures their gains.
The current situation is obviously different, but it highlights that tactical nuclear weapons are probably not a weapon that would be used against the Ukrainians. It is not necessary to pay the price of crossing the nuclear threshold to achieve Russian goals in Ukraine. High-yield conventional weapons or the dreaded thermobaric bombs, which draw in oxygen to create an intense explosion, are more than sufficient for any effect they might want and don’t force them to bear the nuclear stigma.
Nato presents an altogether different kind of problem for Russia. Nikolai Patrushev, a close adviser of Putin, said in 2009 that Russia might launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike “to repel an aggression with the use of conventional weapons not only in a large-scale but also in a regional and even local war”. Patrushev was essentially outlining a scenario in which a superior conventional force such as Nato attacked Russia. Patrushev’s view did not in the end inform Russia nuclear doctrine. But his message remains and highlights that tactical nuclear weapons are intended to send the following message to Nato leaders: “You may have a more impressive military than I do, but I care a lot more and will kill us all if necessary.”
Now, the Russian military is heavily engaged in Ukraine and thus particularly vulnerable to a Nato conventional attack in Belarus and western Russia, as well as in Ukraine. So in the current scenario, Russian leaders are most likely to use a tactical nuclear weapon to prevent or put an end to Nato intervention. In theory, therefore, it should be straightforward to avoid that outcome by not intervening. The west, in the minds of its own leaders, has no intention of intervening so they may not feel there is much chance of nuclear escalation.
The problem is that, given the paranoia of Russian leaders, they probably expect Nato intervention, and may even believe it is already happening given European and American arms deliveries and Nato troop movements to eastern Europe. They may view Nato troop concentrations in states on Ukraine’s eastern flank as potential intervention forces and they may lack sufficient precision-guided weapons in their already very depleted inventory to attack them conventionally. They might also view weapons depots in neighbouring states that are supplying Ukrainian government forces as legitimate targets.
Russian attacks of these sorts are not likely, but they are possible. Beyond the horrible death and radioactive fallout they would cause, such attacks would cross the nuclear threshold for the first time since 1945 and thus open the path to further nuclear escalation to the strategic level (ie the end of the world). Given that we very much want to avoid that, western leaders might think about taking steps to make it even less likely.
Such steps would involve thinking carefully about how the Russians understand “intervention”. Russian leaders, for example, might see volunteers from Nato countries filtering into Ukraine as covert advance guards for a full-scale intervention. They might regard arms convoys coming to Ukraine from Nato states as the functional equivalent of intervention. And, depending on their orientation, they might see troop dispositions in eastern flank states or troop movements to, say, help manage refugee flows at the border as a precursor to intervention.
If it is truly not the intention of western leaders to intervene, they should make sure that their forces act in ways that will convince Russian leaders of that. The world may depend on it.
The author works at both at the Brookings Institution and at the European Council on Foreign Relations. So he’s pretty much in the middle of policy discussions in Brussels and Washington.
The good thing is that as far as I can tell NATO is trying to avoid doing anything that would involve attacking Russian forces. The bad news is that they need to be concerned.
If Putin is assassinated it would make things worse, not better.
I disagree. An assassination as part of a palace coup could bring in another leader who would have no reason to continue that policy, and every reason to pull back as a repudiation of the foolishness of their (his almost certainly) predecessor.
And it doesn't even have to called going back on the policy, it can sold as "a withdrawal to reevaluate the methods in use after the previous regimes tactical errors".
Depends how many people have swallowed his lies and whether there is someone waiting in the wings who is of the same mindset as him.
where once I used to scintillate
now I sin till ten past three
The nuclear option that has been most frequently discussed in the past few days involves Russia using a small nuclear weapon (a “non-strategic nuclear weapon”) against a specific military target in Ukraine. Such a strike might have a military purpose, such as destroying an airfield or other military target, but it would mainly be aimed at demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons, or “escalating to de-escalate,” and scaring the West into backing down.
Some analysts have questioned Russia’s ability to actually carry out such an operation, given its lack of practice. Unfortunately, this isn’t the only or even the most likely option available to the Kremlin. Based on war games I ran in the wake of Putin’s 2014 invasion, a more likely option would be a sudden nuclear test or a high-altitude nuclear detonation that damages the electrical grid over a major Ukrainian or even NATO city. Think of an explosion that makes the lights go out over Oslo.
Those war games indicated that the best U.S. response to this kind of attack would be first to demonstrate U.S. resolve with a response in kind, aimed at a target of similar value, followed by restraint and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate. In most games, Russia still responds with a second nuclear attack, but in the games that go “well,” the United States and Russia manage to de-escalate after that, although only in circumstances where both sides have clear political off-ramps and lines of communication between Moscow and Washington have remained open. In all the other games, the world is basically destroyed.
Even in the better case where both sides take their fingers off the triggers, the nuclear taboo has been broken, and we are in an entirely new era: two nuclear superpowers have used their nuclear weapons in a war. The proliferation consequences alone would be far-reaching, as other countries accelerate their nuclear weapons programs. The very fact that the nuclear taboo had been broken increases the odds that the nuclear threshold is crossed again in future conflicts, not just between Russia and America, but also with China, between India and Pakistan, in the Middle East, or elsewhere. Even this outcome in which the world is “saved,” the United States is far worse off than it was before the war in Ukraine broke out last month.
What is the alternative? Once again, infinite scenarios and branches are possible, but there is a single basic one that helps to simplify thinking. It begins with an effort to avoid further escalation today. So far, the Biden administration has wisely restrained direct U.S. military involvement in the conflict, but holding off against the rising chorus of voices pushing for escalation may be hard in the coming days if Russian forces brutally devastate Ukraine’s cities. But the most difficult challenge lies a little further down the road with the scenario described above: how to respond if Russia imposes a puppet regime in Ukraine. This would put the United States in the near-impossible position of having to choose between further escalation and compromising on the very principles that drove it toward the war in the first place—the right of a nation like Ukraine to be free and independent of subjugation to foreign rule.
In this scenario, the Biden administration would have to show extraordinary leadership and strength to hold together its coalition and steer it toward restraint. It would face extremely high levels of pressure from European capitals, Ukrainian lobbies, and others to reject the puppet government and fight on, perhaps by recognizing a Ukrainian government-in-exile. The administration is already facing calls from hawkish corners of Washington to preempt any negotiated settlement to this war. Emotions are likely to have a much greater effect on the free democracies fighting for Ukraine than on the autocrat sitting in the Kremlin, but they will affect both sides. As they escalate, the prospects of negotiation diminish further.
Those articles illustrate part of the reason why people here are over estimating so badly. You can't ignore how the USA will respond by de-escalating and flexing their position. It's not just an irrational and stupid Moscow that's needed, also need an incompetent Washington.
bob sterman wrote: Sat Mar 05, 2022 7:55 pm
All this talk about a "no-fly zone" - what is the point in risking a direct NATO vs Russia war when the Russian air force have hardly been involved in this campaign?
The overwhelming majority of damage (and deaths) has been inflicted by missiles and shelling - not things that would be stopped by enforcing a "no-fly zone"..
The Russian airforce has been more involved lately in the last day or so, and in so doing has suffered more losses than any airforce has in decades. They haven't got much in the way of guided weapons, and to aim unguided bombs they have to fly low, low enough to be within reach of the Stingers, Iglas and Pioruns. Losses in the last day are five jets and four helicopters.
lpm wrote: Sat Mar 05, 2022 10:15 pm
Thanks Woodchopper.
Those articles illustrate part of the reason why people here are over estimating so badly. You can't ignore how the USA will respond by de-escalating and flexing their position. It's not just an irrational and stupid Moscow that's needed, also need an incompetent Washington.
Which makes me wonder how much of this is a plan that was supposed to be carried out last winter, with Trump recently reelected.
bob sterman wrote: Sat Mar 05, 2022 7:55 pm
All this talk about a "no-fly zone" - what is the point in risking a direct NATO vs Russia war when the Russian air force have hardly been involved in this campaign?
The overwhelming majority of damage (and deaths) has been inflicted by missiles and shelling - not things that would be stopped by enforcing a "no-fly zone"..
The Russian airforce has been more involved lately in the last day or so, and in so doing has suffered more losses than any airforce has in decades. They haven't got much in the way of guided weapons, and to aim unguided bombs they have to fly low, low enough to be within reach of the Stingers, Iglas and Pioruns. Losses in the last day are five jets and four helicopters.
bob sterman wrote: Sat Mar 05, 2022 7:55 pm
All this talk about a "no-fly zone" - what is the point in risking a direct NATO vs Russia war when the Russian air force have hardly been involved in this campaign?
The overwhelming majority of damage (and deaths) has been inflicted by missiles and shelling - not things that would be stopped by enforcing a "no-fly zone"..
The Russian airforce has been more involved lately in the last day or so, and in so doing has suffered more losses than any airforce has in decades. They haven't got much in the way of guided weapons, and to aim unguided bombs they have to fly low, low enough to be within reach of the Stingers, Iglas and Pioruns. Losses in the last day are five jets and four helicopters.
The Russian airforce has been more involved lately in the last day or so, and in so doing has suffered more losses than any airforce has in decades. They haven't got much in the way of guided weapons, and to aim unguided bombs they have to fly low, low enough to be within reach of the Stingers, Iglas and Pioruns. Losses in the last day are five jets and four helicopters.
OSINT people reporting on a big train of mixed civilian trucks and vans moving through Rostov-on-Don with Z-marks on them, which doesn't say anything good about Russian logistics.
I'm sure they'll do just fine on broken and unpaved roads and among deliberately flooded fields in the muddiest months of the year.
EACLucifer wrote: Sun Mar 06, 2022 10:34 am
OSINT people reporting on a big train of mixed civilian trucks and vans moving through Rostov-on-Don with Z-marks on them, which doesn't say anything good about Russian logistics.
I'm sure they'll do just fine on broken and unpaved roads and among deliberately flooded fields in the muddiest months of the year.
Less than a fortnight in and they are already resorting to co-opting civilian equipment to military use.
Apparently they have military equipment and units have been put on trains in Vladivostok and are being shipped west. Hopefully to get stuck in the mud.
Russians also now spreading propaganda that the Ukrainians are trying to build a plutonium based dirty bomb.
