Woodchopper wrote: ↑Mon Sep 19, 2022 11:30 am
EACLucifer wrote: ↑Mon Sep 19, 2022 10:04 am
TopBadger wrote: ↑Mon Sep 19, 2022 8:25 am
Shows how long the stalemate lasted after the initial battle for the north - that map doesn't change for a long time - but during that time the Russian forces and logistics were be degraded.
The losses suffered by the Russians as they repeatedly assaulted defended positions in the Donbas left them with insufficient manpower to hold the entire line even before significant numbers of troops were lured across the Dnipro. That inevitably means there will be areas held too lightly, and in Kharkiv oblast, the Ukrainians found one.
An interesting question for the historians is whether this was part of a preplanned strategy, or whether Ukraine took the opportunities offered to it by Russia. In particular I'm thinking of the first use of HIMARS. That happened soon after Russia had exhausted its self in the Donbas attacks. Its possible that the Ukrainians didn't use HIMARS earlier so as to avoid giving Russia a reason not to exhaust its self and hold forces in reserve.
It's hard to say. I think it's mostly likely that Ukraine's leaders are exploiting Russia's poor strategy and poor operational execution.
Ukraine couldn't really force Russia into a series of costly frontal assaults against prepared positions - characterised by a certain Russian war criminal as beating their heads against a wall to knock it down. Obviously Ukraine's armed forces put a lot of work into prepared positions, but that's because they are useful to have regardless - this is an area where the post WWII orthodoxy is dead wrong.
We can see decisions made with the aim of maximising attrition, though. A good example was the counter-attack in Severodonetsk. If maximising territory held was the aim, those reserves would have gone to the area south of Lysychans'k, to hold there and allow the frontline to stabilise on the Severskyi Donets river. On the other hand, sending the reserves, including the Internationals, into Severodonetsk forced the Russians into an extended urban battle in an evacuated city against veteran light infantry. The close proximity of the opposing forces meant the Russians could not use their substantial artillery advantage, and over a period of a few weeks, Russian losses were enormous. By the time the attack south of Lysychans'k finally forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw - which they did in good order - multiple Russian brigades had to be pulled back for replenishment.
However, while Ukrainian troops inflicted very heavy losses on Russian troops in this period, it was also the worst period for Ukrainian losses. That changed with the introduction of HIMARS and the crippling of the Russian logistics system. Ukraine wouldn't have wanted to wait for that to happen, and from what I can tell about when training started on the system and so on, I think HIMARS went into action the moment the first launchers reached Ukrainian soil. Ukraine's multiple and public requests for western MLRS before this point make it quite clear they wanted those launchers and rockets as soon as they could get them. The American delay - though M270s were provided by Britain and Germany, it took American permission to provide them and the ammunition - on providing that system cost Ukraine heavily, both in the lives of their soldiers and civilians, and in the territory and cities that had to be evacuated and were destroyed by the Russian way of war.