Blyatskrieg

[EACLucifer]

Another train derailed in Bryansk oblast, another report of it being an IED. Evidently Budanov is doing things

[Woodchopper]

On Panzerhaubitze 2000s:

In the right conditions, the Panzer is fast and maneuverable, allowing soldiers to fire off a few rounds and then scoot away before the Russian side returns fire. A howitzer commander who uses the call sign Boychik said it was “like the difference between a Zhiguli and a Mercedes,” referring to a cheap, Soviet-era car.

But the howitzer is also delicate. Its sensitive electronics go haywire when exposed to moisture or dirt. The soldiers have to put on special booties or slippers when they go inside to avoid tracking in mud, and each vehicle comes with its own vacuum cleaner. In Germany, soldiers said, the howitzers had their own climate-controlled garages where they were stored when not in use — conditions clearly not available on the Ukrainian battlefield.

“The Panzer really loves cleanliness,” said Mykola, a young artillery commander. He and his men were struggling to clean out the barrel of their mud-encrusted howitzer with a long metal brush like a chimney sweep. “If you fire off two full loads of ammunition, you need to spend a day servicing it,” he added.

On the battlefield, the Panzers have performed well so far, the muddy conditions notwithstanding. The day before they were called to their rear base because of the weather, Mykola said his team had scored two direct hits on a Russian tank and taken out some infantry.

Russian forces typically blanket an area with artillery fire, he said, hoping to hit something in a massive barrage. His team often achieves better results with fewer shells, he said.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/worl ... apons.html

[EACLucifer]

On Panzerhaubitze 2000s:

In the right conditions, the Panzer is fast and maneuverable, allowing soldiers to fire off a few rounds and then scoot away before the Russian side returns fire. A howitzer commander who uses the call sign Boychik said it was “like the difference between a Zhiguli and a Mercedes,” referring to a cheap, Soviet-era car.

But the howitzer is also delicate. Its sensitive electronics go haywire when exposed to moisture or dirt. The soldiers have to put on special booties or slippers when they go inside to avoid tracking in mud, and each vehicle comes with its own vacuum cleaner. In Germany, soldiers said, the howitzers had their own climate-controlled garages where they were stored when not in use — conditions clearly not available on the Ukrainian battlefield.

“The Panzer really loves cleanliness,” said Mykola, a young artillery commander. He and his men were struggling to clean out the barrel of their mud-encrusted howitzer with a long metal brush like a chimney sweep. “If you fire off two full loads of ammunition, you need to spend a day servicing it,” he added.

On the battlefield, the Panzers have performed well so far, the muddy conditions notwithstanding. The day before they were called to their rear base because of the weather, Mykola said his team had scored two direct hits on a Russian tank and taken out some infantry.

Russian forces typically blanket an area with artillery fire, he said, hoping to hit something in a massive barrage. His team often achieves better results with fewer shells, he said.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/worl ... apons.html

The PzH2000 is exceptionally capable on paper. I'm often surprised by how fragile it is described as being compared to other systems - almost as if it was designed around the idea of winning defence contracts with little thought to being used for serious fighting. That said, as long as it can be kept in working order, it is remarkably capable, with a long barrel for extra range, and the ability to fire fast. Videos occasionally turn up of shelling that is almost certainly PzH2000s, including one on (IIRC) a command and radar post a while back, with a guided airburst shell hitting at about the same time that a pair of guided submunitions from an anti-armour round launch their EFPs, followed up moments later by a couple of conventional rounds in quick succession that are only a bit less accurate than the (presumably guided) airburst. Like a lot of modern systems, it can use varied charges and trajectories to deliver multiple rounds on target with simultaneous or near simultaneous impact. Also, while fragile internally, it copes with the mud better than than most wheeled systems.

There's been various bits of news over night. Fuel depot attacked at Taman, near the Kerch bridge, by Ukrainian drone. Less dramatic than Sevastopol, but one oil tank was still set on fire. Also reports of Ukrainian UAVs damaging an Antonov-124 in the Bryansk region, and a fire in a helicopter hangar in Leningrad Oblast.

[Woodchopper]

On Panzerhaubitze 2000s:

In the right conditions, the Panzer is fast and maneuverable, allowing soldiers to fire off a few rounds and then scoot away before the Russian side returns fire. A howitzer commander who uses the call sign Boychik said it was “like the difference between a Zhiguli and a Mercedes,” referring to a cheap, Soviet-era car.

But the howitzer is also delicate. Its sensitive electronics go haywire when exposed to moisture or dirt. The soldiers have to put on special booties or slippers when they go inside to avoid tracking in mud, and each vehicle comes with its own vacuum cleaner. In Germany, soldiers said, the howitzers had their own climate-controlled garages where they were stored when not in use — conditions clearly not available on the Ukrainian battlefield.

“The Panzer really loves cleanliness,” said Mykola, a young artillery commander. He and his men were struggling to clean out the barrel of their mud-encrusted howitzer with a long metal brush like a chimney sweep. “If you fire off two full loads of ammunition, you need to spend a day servicing it,” he added.

On the battlefield, the Panzers have performed well so far, the muddy conditions notwithstanding. The day before they were called to their rear base because of the weather, Mykola said his team had scored two direct hits on a Russian tank and taken out some infantry.

Russian forces typically blanket an area with artillery fire, he said, hoping to hit something in a massive barrage. His team often achieves better results with fewer shells, he said.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/worl ... apons.html

The PzH2000 is exceptionally capable on paper. I'm often surprised by how fragile it is described as being compared to other systems - almost as if it was designed around the idea of winning defence contracts with little thought to being used for serious fighting. That said, as long as it can be kept in working order, it is remarkably capable, with a long barrel for extra range, and the ability to fire fast. Videos occasionally turn up of shelling that is almost certainly PzH2000s, including one on (IIRC) a command and radar post a while back, with a guided airburst shell hitting at about the same time that a pair of guided submunitions from an anti-armour round launch their EFPs, followed up moments later by a couple of conventional rounds in quick succession that are only a bit less accurate than the (presumably guided) airburst. Like a lot of modern systems, it can use varied charges and trajectories to deliver multiple rounds on target with simultaneous or near simultaneous impact. Also, while fragile internally, it copes with the mud better than than most wheeled systems.

Its a general feature of Western defence production, which is in many ways closer to Formula 1 cars than the mass production of the past. It has been set up to produce small numbers of very high precision vehicles or aircraft. As far as I remember F35s need about 5-8 maintenance manhours per hour of flight, and that will need to be done at a bases where there is a controlled environment.

Of course industry lobbying plays a role and in many cases procurement decisions have been made to meet the needs of industry rather than the armed forces. Though that is partly a strategic goal as you probably wouldn't want to see even less industrial capacity then we have now.

But the most important explanation is that for 30 years the conventional wisdom was that there wouldn't be a major war against a state like Russia. The PzH2000 would probably work well in an environment where it was maintained and stored in secure long-term bases and used against insurgents like the Taliban or rogue states with no air force or long range strike capability.

[EACLucifer]

But the most important explanation is that for 30 years the conventional wisdom was that there wouldn't be a major war against a state like Russia. The PzH2000 would probably work well in an environment where it was maintained and stored in secure long-term bases and used against insurgents like the Taliban or rogue states with no air force or long range strike capability.

While that's likely a factor, some of its features - especially the high burst rate of fire and MRSI capability - are designed to enable fire and displace (aka shoot and scoot) type operations due to fear of counterbattery fire, something that also heavily informed the design of Archer.

Also, while the fragility is a concern, it is important to remember that PzH2000s are, for the most part, doing a very good job in Ukraine and to an extent taking over from the 203mm Pion that was the mainstay of Ukrainian heavy batteries at the start of the war and one of the main destroyers of Russian columns north of Kyiv. The PzH2000 might not have the same weight of shell, or quite the range of the Pion's longest range rounds, but it delivers more weight of shell per minute than the slow-firing Pion.

The Ukrainian version of events I've seen is that the PzH2000s had a defect that initially made them unreliable, but this was at some point remedied, in addition to the crews gaining experience using them. Even early on, though, they were still quite well liked pieces due to their range, accuracy and rate of fire.

It's a good design, but it's true that it wasn't built around the expectation of firing so many rounds as it is doing in Ukraine. It is a little like trying to adapt an assault rifle into a machine gun - you can do it as simply as by adding a heavy or quickly replacable barrel, bipod and either extended magazines or belt feed mechanism, but it doesn't work well in practise because it's too lightly built to endure that much sustained fire without wear and eventually part breakages. Another analogy might be to the German G36 rifle - it's cheap, very easy to disassemble and clean, and light, but it got a bad reputation for losing accuracy after a lot of rounds as overheating affected the polymer receiver. That's true, but the G36 wasn't ever designed with the intention of firing hundreds and hundreds of rounds through it in quick succession, and in that case, that's likely a reasonable assumption - soldiers only carry so many magazines, and real world combat isn't an eighties action film.

[Woodchopper]

But the most important explanation is that for 30 years the conventional wisdom was that there wouldn't be a major war against a state like Russia. The PzH2000 would probably work well in an environment where it was maintained and stored in secure long-term bases and used against insurgents like the Taliban or rogue states with no air force or long range strike capability.

While that's likely a factor, some of its features - especially the high burst rate of fire and MRSI capability - are designed to enable fire and displace (aka shoot and scoot) type operations due to fear of counterbattery fire, something that also heavily informed the design of Archer.

Certainly, though counter battery fire would have been useful against states like Iraq, and even non-state entities like the Taliban or IS which used artillery (albeit not very much).

Also, while the fragility is a concern, it is important to remember that PzH2000s are, for the most part, doing a very good job in Ukraine and to an extent taking over from the 203mm Pion that was the mainstay of Ukrainian heavy batteries at the start of the war and one of the main destroyers of Russian columns north of Kyiv. The PzH2000 might not have the same weight of shell, or quite the range of the Pion's longest range rounds, but it delivers more weight of shell per minute than the slow-firing Pion.

Certainly, its an incredible piece of technology. As is a Formula 1 car. The issues are whether its so complex and expensive that it can't be produced in enough numbers, and whether its sufficiently rugged to be useful in battlefields like Ukraine.

The Ukrainian version of events I've seen is that the PzH2000s had a defect that initially made them unreliable, but this was at some point remedied, in addition to the crews gaining experience using them. Even early on, though, they were still quite well liked pieces due to their range, accuracy and rate of fire.

Yes, the Ukrainians have been very good at adapting what they've been given.

It's a good design, but it's true that it wasn't built around the expectation of firing so many rounds as it is doing in Ukraine. It is a little like trying to adapt an assault rifle into a machine gun - you can do it as simply as by adding a heavy or quickly replacable barrel, bipod and either extended magazines or belt feed mechanism, but it doesn't work well in practise because it's too lightly built to endure that much sustained fire without wear and eventually part breakages. Another analogy might be to the German G36 rifle - it's cheap, very easy to disassemble and clean, and light, but it got a bad reputation for losing accuracy after a lot of rounds as overheating affected the polymer receiver. That's true, but the G36 wasn't ever designed with the intention of firing hundreds and hundreds of rounds through it in quick succession, and in that case, that's likely a reasonable assumption - soldiers only carry so many magazines, and real world combat isn't an eighties action film.

On the bolded bit, yes, a soldier out on patrol can only carry so much ammunition. But one ensconced in a trench doesn't have that limitation. From your description the basic assumptions around use appear to be based upon combat taking place while on patrol (characteristic of counter-insurgency) rather than trench warfare as we've seen in Ukraine for the last seven years or so (and saw to a certain extent in Syria).

[EACLucifer]

Another analogy might be to the German G36 rifle - it's cheap, very easy to disassemble and clean, and light, but it got a bad reputation for losing accuracy after a lot of rounds as overheating affected the polymer receiver. That's true, but the G36 wasn't ever designed with the intention of firing hundreds and hundreds of rounds through it in quick succession, and in that case, that's likely a reasonable assumption - soldiers only carry so many magazines, and real world combat isn't an eighties action film.

On the bolded bit, yes, a soldier out on patrol can only carry so much ammunition. But one ensconced in a trench doesn't have that limitation. From your description the basic assumptions around use appear to be based upon combat taking place while on patrol (characteristic of counter-insurgency) rather than trench warfare as we've seen in Ukraine for the last seven years or so (and saw to a certain extent in Syria).

Well yes, but to give the G36 the ability to fire that much that quickly would mean having to make it heavier - to deal with the heat buildup, it would need a heavier barrel, and perhaps a metal receiver instead of a polymer one. That compromises its other functions. The Germans obviously thought it better to issue G36s and machine guns rather than making an assault rifle to do a machine gun's job. Likewise, it was largely assumed that water cooling machine guns is a horribly obsolete concept, yet the PM1910 Maxim is proving very useful in Ukraine. The assumption was that the extra weight was too much of a burden, and that a machine gun wouldn't be emplaced in one place for that long to need the water cooling anyway as machine gun nests would be targetted by mortars. That didn't turn out to be the case. Everything is tradeoffs. Perhaps a ruggedised PzH2000 would be even heavier, or require more time and expense to develop.

Artillery is something the west have neglected for too long, which is a mistake, as more modern artillery equipped with modern navigation to know where it is and supported by modern reconnaissance to know where the target is both effective and cost effective. If the accuracy of a base-bleed round isn't good enough, guided shells still cost less than guided rockets. That said, to get the best of artillery, western nations need to accept that it is going to be large and it is going to be moderately heavy. Guided shells could potentially hit out to 70km or more if L60+ barrels were adopted, or even more if a heavier calibre was adopted. The USA is beginning to take the issue more seriously, at least, and even experimenting with using SPGs as long range air defence - again a guided shell is cheaper than a guided missile, and potentially very fast. Another possibility would be moving away from 155mm rifled artillery to a smoothbore, which would allow for higher velocities with less barrel wear and additionally a much greater variation in projectile weight and velocity - rifling rate has to be optimised for the length and weight of the projectile, but a smoothbore using fin stabilised shells as it's basic ammunition doesn't have that issue, and smaller rounds can be carried in discarded sabots, a mature technology used in tank guns.

Anyway, the PzH2000 is a very good SPG, despite it's issues, but it's important to understand those issues to put the performance of Ukrainian crews into context. It's also worth noting that, after some teething troubles, Ukrainian crews are doing very well with them, and if they can use PzH2000s successfully, it's hard to think of a land-warfare system they couldn't use.

[EACLucifer]

Footage of the Ukrainian drone strike in Krasnodar Krai

One drone is shot down, the other gets through and destroys an oil tank. These drones are cheap, and it's likely Russian air defence wasn't able to handle two (or possibly more, more might have been shot down before the start of this footage) at once. That's the thing with missile defence - interceptors are always expensive. The things to intercept often aren't. That's why the only sustainable missile defence at present is to destroy/suppress launching sites to stop them being launched in the first place. Some nations are working on directed energy systems to avoid this issue, but until they come into use, this will be true for all nations.

From a Ukrainian perspective, the munitions required to destroy the Black Sea Fleet at anchor are cheaper in the long run by far than the missiles required to shoot down the cruise missiles launched by the Black Sea Fleet.

[bjn]

It all depends on who has the deeper pockets and stockpile of weapons. A superpower (which Russia is not) me be able to pay that premium in expensive interceptors.

[TopBadger]

The Germans obviously thought it better to issue G36s and machine guns rather than making an assault rifle to do a machine gun's job.

This... and it's not just Germany. All western countries have assault rifles and machine guns as separate things for separate jobs, still, sounds like the G36 just wasn't up to the task of being an assault rifle in a prolonged firefight.

That's the thing with missile defence - interceptors are always expensive. The things to intercept often aren't. That's why the only sustainable missile defence at present is to destroy/suppress launching sites to stop them being launched in the first place. Some nations are working on directed energy systems to avoid this issue, but until they come into use, this will be true for all nations.

From a Ukrainian perspective, the munitions required to destroy the Black Sea Fleet at anchor are cheaper in the long run by far than the missiles required to shoot down the cruise missiles launched by the Black Sea Fleet.

Yep - still no sign of ATACMS (or GL-SDB)... what would be helpful would be for the US to supply ATACMS and Ukraine to use it ahead of their offensive to catch the Russians with their pants down. I can only hope.

[Woodchopper]

Another analogy might be to the German G36 rifle - it's cheap, very easy to disassemble and clean, and light, but it got a bad reputation for losing accuracy after a lot of rounds as overheating affected the polymer receiver. That's true, but the G36 wasn't ever designed with the intention of firing hundreds and hundreds of rounds through it in quick succession, and in that case, that's likely a reasonable assumption - soldiers only carry so many magazines, and real world combat isn't an eighties action film.

On the bolded bit, yes, a soldier out on patrol can only carry so much ammunition. But one ensconced in a trench doesn't have that limitation. From your description the basic assumptions around use appear to be based upon combat taking place while on patrol (characteristic of counter-insurgency) rather than trench warfare as we've seen in Ukraine for the last seven years or so (and saw to a certain extent in Syria).

Well yes, but to give the G36 the ability to fire that much that quickly would mean having to make it heavier - to deal with the heat buildup, it would need a heavier barrel, and perhaps a metal receiver instead of a polymer one. That compromises its other functions. The Germans obviously thought it better to issue G36s and machine guns rather than making an assault rifle to do a machine gun's job. Likewise, it was largely assumed that water cooling machine guns is a horribly obsolete concept, yet the PM1910 Maxim is proving very useful in Ukraine. The assumption was that the extra weight was too much of a burden, and that a machine gun wouldn't be emplaced in one place for that long to need the water cooling anyway as machine gun nests would be targetted by mortars. That didn't turn out to be the case. Everything is tradeoffs. Perhaps a ruggedised PzH2000 would be even heavier, or require more time and expense to develop.

Yes, I agree. If the Ukraine War is to last many years and Russia threatens NATO members for decades to come then the tradeoffs between weight, portability and rate of fire might need to be re-thought.

A more rugged PzH2000 would probably have been simpler. Trading off capability for less need for maintenance and lower unit build costs.

[EACLucifer]

Two more Russian refineries/tank farms hit by drones overnight. Looks like aiming to cause a fuel shortage/forcing the withdrawal of air defence to protect infrastructure within Russia prior to an offensive is in full swing.

[EACLucifer]

A more rugged PzH2000 would probably have been simpler. Trading off capability for less need for maintenance and lower unit build costs.

A more rugged PzH2000 would look a lot like the Polish Krab - which deliberately combines a number of proven components to make an effective self-propelled gun. It uses an upgraded version of the AS-90's turret mounting a 52 calibre gun designed by Nexter (I don't know if it's directly related, but it's the same manufacturer and barrel length as the CAESAR) and, after problems with the domestically designed chassis, South Korean K9 chassis.

A significant number have been sent to Ukraine and are highly regarded there, and due to the long barrel and high maximum elevation, can hit out to 50km with M982 Excalibur rounds.

I've not got confirmation, but I've seen reports that a new production line is planned in order to increase deliveries to Ukraine.

[EACLucifer]

Two more Russian refineries/tank farms hit by drones overnight. Looks like aiming to cause a fuel shortage/forcing the withdrawal of air defence to protect infrastructure within Russia prior to an offensive is in full swing.

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/ ... bmtPQtAAAABig fire at an oil depot in Stavropol as well. Cause is unknown as of now, but not much further from the Ukrainian border than the known suicide drone strikes

Ukraine's doing a damn good job managing long range strike capability without proper supply of suitable munitions. However, these improvised cruise missiles built from commercial drones will probably struggle with more defended targets like warships and airbases, and have neither the ability to evade air defence nor the warhead required to knock out key strategic bridges.

[EACLucifer]

I'm not going to link the video, but Prigozhin is once again standing in front of a pile of corpses of his own "soldiers" and whining about ammo supplies. Previously he's quoted the number of dead for the metres of advance, which suggests that the "price of a mile" is about a thousand KIA. Obviously Prigozhin must never be trusted, but it's interesting to note he's still at odds with Gerasimov and Shoigu.

[TopBadger]

I'm not going to link the video, but Prigozhin is once again standing in front of a pile of corpses of his own "soldiers" and whining about ammo supplies. Previously he's quoted the number of dead for the metres of advance, which suggests that the "price of a mile" is about a thousand KIA. Obviously Prigozhin must never be trusted, but it's interesting to note he's still at odds with Gerasimov and Shoigu.

Apparently he's saying Wagner will unilaterally pull out of Bakhmut... I'm not sure what is to stop the Russian Army setting up a checkpoint and immediately serving them enlistment notices as they're pulling out though and packing them back off to the front. That would be kind of funny.

[Woodchopper]

I'm not going to link the video, but Prigozhin is once again standing in front of a pile of corpses of his own "soldiers" and whining about ammo supplies. Previously he's quoted the number of dead for the metres of advance, which suggests that the "price of a mile" is about a thousand KIA. Obviously Prigozhin must never be trusted, but it's interesting to note he's still at odds with Gerasimov and Shoigu.

Apparently he's saying Wagner will unilaterally pull out of Bakhmut... I'm not sure what is to stop the Russian Army setting up a checkpoint and immediately serving them enlistment notices as they're pulling out though and packing them back off to the front. That would be kind of funny.

Information here: https://twitter.com/wartranslated/statu ... 0069037057

Possibly a threat rather than a commitment.

[EACLucifer]

I'm not going to link the video, but Prigozhin is once again standing in front of a pile of corpses of his own "soldiers" and whining about ammo supplies. Previously he's quoted the number of dead for the metres of advance, which suggests that the "price of a mile" is about a thousand KIA. Obviously Prigozhin must never be trusted, but it's interesting to note he's still at odds with Gerasimov and Shoigu.

Apparently he's saying Wagner will unilaterally pull out of Bakhmut... I'm not sure what is to stop the Russian Army setting up a checkpoint and immediately serving them enlistment notices as they're pulling out though and packing them back off to the front. That would be kind of funny.

Information here: https://twitter.com/wartranslated/statu ... 0069037057

Possibly a threat rather than a commitment.

Prigozhin loves theatrics, and he's heavily into misinformation. This is probably for domestic consumption, but it is still interesting what he is trying to signal. He put out a version of events in which only his private army actually gets anything done on the Russian side, but doesn't succeed due to a stab in the back from the MOD. It seems he's setting up a dolchstosslegende to explain why, after so much posturing, they've not done better in Bakhmut, a battle that's somewhat longer now than the battle of Stalingrad was.

That said, it does appear that Bakhmut was prioritised compared to other fronts. It's the only place where the Russians advanced. In fact, they may have been pushed back a little from near Vuhledar and just east of Niu York.

[Woodchopper]

That said, it does appear that Bakhmut was prioritised compared to other fronts. It's the only place where the Russians advanced. In fact, they may have been pushed back a little from near Vuhledar and just east of Niu York.

If we are to draw a comparison with Stalingrad then an interesting question for the historians might be whether Ukraine let Russia take bits of Bakhmut slowly, so to encourage the Kremlin to keep throwing men and material at it.

[EACLucifer]

Last night, per UAWeaponsTracker a Kinzhal hypersonic missile, or possibly an Iskander SRBM (for all the fuss about hypersonics, a Kinzhal is what happens when you take an existing SRBM - an Iskander - and strap it to the underside of a jet - a MiG31 in the case of Kinzhals). It rather suggests western-supplied air defence is involved and also that it is effective.

It's another thing to consider for the idiots panicking about the possible use of nukes by the Kremlin. Though the cost benefit calculation is already massively stacked against their use, there are two further risks for Russia: firstly the risk that a nuke might not detonate. They need maintenance, and they probably can't rely on that maintenance being effective. While we in the west certainly cannot rely on the idea that they won't be effective, Putin probably can't rely on the idea that they will be, and an ineffective strike would a) come with more or less all the downsides of an effective one re:international response, b) it could radically weaken the deterrent effective of the remaining arsenal, and c) it might, in the worst case scenario for Russia, leave Ukraine in the possession of most of a nuclear warhead. We can now add the risk d) it might get shot down, which makes all of the above issues much more likely.

Bottom line is the calculus has never favoured tactical nuke use by Russia, and now it does so even less.

[jimbob]

Apparently he's saying Wagner will unilaterally pull out of Bakhmut... I'm not sure what is to stop the Russian Army setting up a checkpoint and immediately serving them enlistment notices as they're pulling out though and packing them back off to the front. That would be kind of funny.

Information here: https://twitter.com/wartranslated/statu ... 0069037057

Possibly a threat rather than a commitment.

Prigozhin loves theatrics, and he's heavily into misinformation. This is probably for domestic consumption, but it is still interesting what he is trying to signal. He put out a version of events in which only his private army actually gets anything done on the Russian side, but doesn't succeed due to a stab in the back from the MOD. It seems he's setting up a dolchstosslegende to explain why, after so much posturing, they've not done better in Bakhmut, a battle that's somewhat longer now than the battle of Stalingrad was.

That said, it does appear that Bakhmut was prioritised compared to other fronts. It's the only place where the Russians advanced. In fact, they may have been pushed back a little from near Vuhledar and just east of Niu York.

I hope either he or his rivals think he's crossed the Rubicon, and that the only way out is fighting him, or for he to think that he has to attack leaders of the MOD *physically*. Or end up suffering from windows.

[Grumble]

Information here: https://twitter.com/wartranslated/statu ... 0069037057

Possibly a threat rather than a commitment.

Prigozhin loves theatrics, and he's heavily into misinformation. This is probably for domestic consumption, but it is still interesting what he is trying to signal. He put out a version of events in which only his private army actually gets anything done on the Russian side, but doesn't succeed due to a stab in the back from the MOD. It seems he's setting up a dolchstosslegende to explain why, after so much posturing, they've not done better in Bakhmut, a battle that's somewhat longer now than the battle of Stalingrad was.

That said, it does appear that Bakhmut was prioritised compared to other fronts. It's the only place where the Russians advanced. In fact, they may have been pushed back a little from near Vuhledar and just east of Niu York.

I hope either he or his rivals think he's crossed the Rubicon, and that the only way out is fighting him, or for he to think that he has to attack leaders of the MOD *physically*. Or end up suffering from windows.

Is there a real risk of civil war in Russia? Just a little one maybe?

[EACLucifer]

Information here: https://twitter.com/wartranslated/statu ... 0069037057

Possibly a threat rather than a commitment.

Prigozhin loves theatrics, and he's heavily into misinformation. This is probably for domestic consumption, but it is still interesting what he is trying to signal. He put out a version of events in which only his private army actually gets anything done on the Russian side, but doesn't succeed due to a stab in the back from the MOD. It seems he's setting up a dolchstosslegende to explain why, after so much posturing, they've not done better in Bakhmut, a battle that's somewhat longer now than the battle of Stalingrad was.

That said, it does appear that Bakhmut was prioritised compared to other fronts. It's the only place where the Russians advanced. In fact, they may have been pushed back a little from near Vuhledar and just east of Niu York.

I hope either he or his rivals think he's crossed the Rubicon, and that the only way out is fighting him, or for he to think that he has to attack leaders of the MOD *physically*. Or end up suffering from windows.

If I were a betting man - I'm not, but if I were - I'd put serious money on his troops not withdrawing in the slightest. I think this is an information op for a domestic audience - he'll stay, claim some concession from the MOD so he can claim he got one over on them regardless of truth, but also get his excuses in early for not fully capturing Bakhmut by May the 9th and shift blame to the MOD.

[jimbob]

Prigozhin loves theatrics, and he's heavily into misinformation. This is probably for domestic consumption, but it is still interesting what he is trying to signal. He put out a version of events in which only his private army actually gets anything done on the Russian side, but doesn't succeed due to a stab in the back from the MOD. It seems he's setting up a dolchstosslegende to explain why, after so much posturing, they've not done better in Bakhmut, a battle that's somewhat longer now than the battle of Stalingrad was.

That said, it does appear that Bakhmut was prioritised compared to other fronts. It's the only place where the Russians advanced. In fact, they may have been pushed back a little from near Vuhledar and just east of Niu York.

I hope either he or his rivals think he's crossed the Rubicon, and that the only way out is fighting him, or for he to think that he has to attack leaders of the MOD *physically*. Or end up suffering from windows.

Is there a real risk of civil war in Russia? Just a little one maybe?

Authoritarian regimes seem to be almost immovable* until they shatter with few external signs beforehand. Remember how East Europe liberated itself, particularly Romania. Or indeed the failed 1991 Soviet Coup that led to the breakup of the USSR.


*I guess Baby Doc Duvalier in Haiti was an exception, as he tried to be less repressive than Papa Doc, and ended up just getting deposed.

[jimbob]

Prigozhin loves theatrics, and he's heavily into misinformation. This is probably for domestic consumption, but it is still interesting what he is trying to signal. He put out a version of events in which only his private army actually gets anything done on the Russian side, but doesn't succeed due to a stab in the back from the MOD. It seems he's setting up a dolchstosslegende to explain why, after so much posturing, they've not done better in Bakhmut, a battle that's somewhat longer now than the battle of Stalingrad was.

That said, it does appear that Bakhmut was prioritised compared to other fronts. It's the only place where the Russians advanced. In fact, they may have been pushed back a little from near Vuhledar and just east of Niu York.

I hope either he or his rivals think he's crossed the Rubicon, and that the only way out is fighting him, or for he to think that he has to attack leaders of the MOD *physically*. Or end up suffering from windows.

If I were a betting man - I'm not, but if I were - I'd put serious money on his troops not withdrawing in the slightest. I think this is an information op for a domestic audience - he'll stay, claim some concession from the MOD so he can claim he got one over on them regardless of truth, but also get his excuses in early for not fully capturing Bakhmut by May the 9th and shift blame to the MOD.

Oh I'd agree, but the trouble for Prigozhin is that he is still trying to use this to better his position relative to those he considers his rivals. And I hope they decide he's personally dangerous to them, or that he decides they're probably thinking that, so he needs to act.