Scrutable

TopBadger wrote: Wed Dec 14, 2022 6:01 pm Is Belarus about to enter the war? This article believes so...

https://worldcrunch.com/in-the-news/bel ... kraine-war

I'm not certain on this one at all. On the one hand, an invasion through Belarus would be mad, and if Lukashenko's regime were to take part, it could result in their fall. In addition, the troop movements we've seen so far aren't particularly major.

On the other, Russia has enough power of Lukashenko and enough troops in Belarus to force the issue, at least in the short term. And pontoon bridges popping up were one of the signs before the February escalation.

The answer, as always, is to put pressure on Lukashenko's regime. To make it clear that Belarusian territory will not be protected in any way from response, including potentially by NATO directly, and that arms will reach the Belarusian resistance, and Belarusians fighting for Ukraine - there's enough to form multiple battalions there - may be used on Belarusian soil too. It shouldn't be too specific - the point is to make it clear to Lukashenko and Putin that there will be a cost, the cost will be high to both the illegitimate Belarusian regime and Russia, and that they won't know in advance what it will be and cannot price it in, so to speak.

On the one hand, I am terribly impressed by the ingenuity of the Ukrainians who managed to improvise an infantry fighting vehicle.

Infantry fighting vehicles are one of the most important things on the battlefield right now, able to move infantry safely to the frontline, then support them with autocannon or low-velocity large calibre fire after they have dismounted. They are something Ukraine desperately needs, despite having a reasonable number, improvised vehicles like this, and numerous captures. There's footage doing the rounds of British supplied Wolfhounds standing in for IFVs, and in some cases even Humvees. On roads, it sort of works, but it's far from ideal. The gunners are exposed, the guns are, at most, 12.7mm, the armour is thin - or just not there at all - and the offroad mobility is limited. IFVs combine mobility and armour with firepower in the 20-40mm class, which is much more capable than 12.7/7.62mm machine guns as they can shoot explosive shell rather than just bullets.

Compare and contrast to the mobility of this MT-LB and consider how any wheeled vehicle would cope in that muck. The twin 23mm anti-aircraft cannon also turn the MT-LB into another stand in for an IFV, and there's various MT-LB conversions adding 14.5mm very heavy machine guns. Another trend is to fit 100mm anti-tank guns to MT-LBs for relatively close range fire support.. None of these are optimal compared to a proper IFV.

Put simply infantry need fire support, and they need it as close to them in the chain of command as possible. IFVs do that. They aren't the only solution - mixing in light tanks would also work in theory* - but the main way it is done in most militaries is IFVs, which means the vehicles that NATO members have in stock are mostly IFVs. Additionally, Ukraine successfully operates the M270 MLRS, which is built on the running gear of the American M2 Bradley.

Given the current situation, if there was a choice to send tanks or IFVs, IFVs would be the higher priority.


*The UK reportedly sent some Scimitars ages ago, but I've seen no evidence of them in Ukrainian service yet and it's possible it was a mix-up with other similar vehicles.

EACLucifer wrote: Mon Dec 19, 2022 5:13 am Ship launched can be converted to land launched relatively easily, and I cited an example of a ship launched example - the MdCN - though Tomahawks are also capable of being land launched, and have been in the past.

Yes, if Ukraine were to be supplied with cruise missiles one part of the decision would be balancing converting its aircraft to fire an air-launched missile or converting a sea launched missile to be fired from the ground.

EACLucifer wrote: Mon Dec 19, 2022 5:13 am And for weapons like Storm Shadow/SCALP EG, it doesn't really matter what the Russian airforce and air defences can achieve at or near the line of contact. They can't operate far beyond it, Ukrainian planes fly over Ukranian territory behind the lines with apparent impunity, and with a range of 560km and low radar observability, it doesn't need to be launched near the front lines to do the job needed. A Storm Shadow launched over Cherkasy Oblast could accurately and reliably hit any part of occupied Ukraine. The American JASSM, meanwhile, which is roughly comparable in performance, is sufficiently independent of the launching aircraft it can even be launched by the crateload by dropping it out of a transport aircraft.

Yes, a low flying Ukrainian aircraft flying out of range of Russian short range air defense would be at low risk of being shot down.

EACLucifer wrote: Mon Dec 19, 2022 5:13 am I don't think they'll be sent, but that's due to timidity and self-deterrence, not because there isn't a good use-case for them. Britain's been ahead of some nations on sending advanced kit - notably Brimstone 1 and 2 - but it is unlikely Britain would be willing to go so far out in front of the others in supplying something so capable.

There is fear of escalation. I think the UK is also concerned with how to provide the most effective assistance within a limited budget.

Woodchopper wrote: Mon Dec 19, 2022 10:05 amThere is fear of escalation. I think the UK is also concerned with how to provide the most effective assistance within a limited budget.

I'm not advocating a free-for all. I'm advocating salami slicing, but moving much, much faster, and not stalling for long periods. The risk of escalation from arms that, by agreement, could be limited to targets on Ukrainian soil, or to targets on Ukrainian soil and specific military targets (ie airbases only), is low, what with Russia not wanting to write a gold-edged invitation for a formiddable military alliance of thirty nations - soon to be thirty two - to join the Ukrainian side as belligerents.

Russian armour reportedly captured in Ukraine. Specifically, aluminium armour designed to resist stabbing.



I'm beginning to wonder if there was some sort of comic misunderstanding of a report that the Ukrainians are armed with a lot of Javelins.

Ukrainian forces closing in on Kreminna. Via DefMon3, the movements are visually confirmed. Estimate of advance below.





Russians have dug in in this area, so advances are likely to be slow and much of the fighting is attritional. However, Ukraine's forces continue to slowly advance on this front north of the Seversky Donets river.

ETA: added a line between the images so they are more distinct.

The Kutzenov is on fire again. It's probably not to do with the war, though, just the Kutzenov being the Kutzenov.

How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success
https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/12/ho ... s-success/

Woodchopper wrote: Fri Dec 23, 2022 6:34 pm How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success
https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/12/ho ... s-success/

In other words, not that Ukraine is so good, but that Russian army is so bad. Especially tactically. Tactics can change, people learn. Even Russians.

Herainestold wrote: Fri Dec 23, 2022 11:12 pm

Woodchopper wrote: Fri Dec 23, 2022 6:34 pm How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success
https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/12/ho ... s-success/

In other words, not that Ukraine is so good, but that Russian army is so bad. Especially tactically. Tactics can change, people learn. Even Russians.

This take is absolute and complete b.llsh.t. That's really all there is to it.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2 ... dee97f6c59

How Ukraine’s 1st Tank Brigade Fought A Russian Force Ten Times Its Size—And Won

The 1st Tank Brigade’s six-week defense of the city of Chernihiv, near the border with Belarus just 60 miles north of Kyiv, already was the stuff of legend when analysts Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds revealed incredible new details in a study for the Royal United Services Institute in London.

Engels-2 got hit again. Russian sources claim they deflected the munition at the last moment, but that it still killed three pilots. Engels-2 is a strategic bomber base used by bombers that launch missiles at Ukraine. It's many hundreds kilometres from Ukraine.

So again the question is "what airdefence doing?"

EACLucifer wrote: Fri Dec 23, 2022 11:20 pm

Herainestold wrote: Fri Dec 23, 2022 11:12 pm

Woodchopper wrote: Fri Dec 23, 2022 6:34 pm How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success
https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/12/ho ... s-success/

In other words, not that Ukraine is so good, but that Russian army is so bad. Especially tactically. Tactics can change, people learn. Even Russians.

This take is absolute and complete b.llsh.t. That's really all there is to it.

Yes, that isn’t what’s argued in the article.

Woodchopper wrote: Mon Dec 26, 2022 5:23 pm

EACLucifer wrote: Fri Dec 23, 2022 11:20 pm

Herainestold wrote: Fri Dec 23, 2022 11:12 pm

In other words, not that Ukraine is so good, but that Russian army is so bad. Especially tactically. Tactics can change, people learn. Even Russians.

This take is absolute and complete b.llsh.t. That's really all there is to it.

Yes, that isn’t what’s argued in the article.

Indeed, the article is sound, and from two very good writers.

EACLucifer wrote: Mon Dec 26, 2022 2:03 pm Engels-2 got hit again. Russian sources claim they deflected the munition at the last moment, but that it still killed three pilots. Engels-2 is a strategic bomber base used by bombers that launch missiles at Ukraine. It's many hundreds kilometres from Ukraine.

So again the question is "what airdefence doing?"

Also perhaps signposts good Ukrainian intelligence, hitting possibly both times when a raid is being mounted with aircraft and crews exposed in predictable locations.

RUSI has a report out on what the Russians have been doing wrong.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/p ... -july-2022

Forbes has a bit of a puff piece on the defence of Chernihiv by the Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade early in the war.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2 ... ze-and-won

Matatouille wrote: Mon Dec 26, 2022 7:16 pm

EACLucifer wrote: Mon Dec 26, 2022 2:03 pm Engels-2 got hit again. Russian sources claim they deflected the munition at the last moment, but that it still killed three pilots. Engels-2 is a strategic bomber base used by bombers that launch missiles at Ukraine. It's many hundreds kilometres from Ukraine.

So again the question is "what airdefence doing?"

Also perhaps signposts good Ukrainian intelligence, hitting possibly both times when a raid is being mounted with aircraft and crews exposed in predictable locations.

Some geolocators have suggested the actual impact looked like it was on the apron, where one might expect bombers to be while awaiting a mission. Obviously it took place at night and without any good views of the actual point of impact. I'd be curious about satellite imagery, as that did reveal some details of the previous strikes on Russian strategic bomber bases. In addition, there's reports of Tu-95s being sent from Engelks to eastern Siberia, presumably to keep them out of harms way.

https://youtu.be/4fqHERDXVpk

Long video by Perun on Bakhmut and its implications.

jimbob wrote: Tue Dec 27, 2022 9:25 pm https://youtu.be/4fqHERDXVpk

Long video by Perun on Bakhmut and its implications.

Interesting, thanks. The argument that the Russian are making that Bakhmut is being used to attrition Ukraine forces seems an odd one... it seems to me that Ukrainians could make a stronger claim there, and it is they who have the Russians tied up, opening Russia up to losses elsewhere.

But anyway - it must be hell on earth there - so even more kudos to Zelensky for making that visit to the troops.

TopBadger wrote: Wed Dec 28, 2022 11:21 am

jimbob wrote: Tue Dec 27, 2022 9:25 pm https://youtu.be/4fqHERDXVpk

Long video by Perun on Bakhmut and its implications.

Interesting, thanks. The argument that the Russian are making that Bakhmut is being used to attrition Ukraine forces seems an odd one... it seems to me that Ukrainians could make a stronger claim there, and it is they who have the Russians tied up, opening Russia up to losses elsewhere.

In general I’d expect that an attacker would be attritted much more than a defender. The attacker has to move in the open.

Such an attrition strategy would still make sense if the attacker believes that they have far more absolute resources (for example Soviet attacks against German forces in the Second World War).

Alternatively, it might not make sense. Perhaps they’ve been told to attack and that part of the front is easiest to attack from.

Woodchopper wrote: Wed Dec 28, 2022 11:58 am

TopBadger wrote: Wed Dec 28, 2022 11:21 am

jimbob wrote: Tue Dec 27, 2022 9:25 pm https://youtu.be/4fqHERDXVpk

Long video by Perun on Bakhmut and its implications.

Interesting, thanks. The argument that the Russian are making that Bakhmut is being used to attrition Ukraine forces seems an odd one... it seems to me that Ukrainians could make a stronger claim there, and it is they who have the Russians tied up, opening Russia up to losses elsewhere.

In general I’d expect that an attacker would be attritted much more than a defender. The attacker has to move in the open.

Such an attrition strategy would still make sense if the attacker believes that they have far more absolute resources (for example Soviet attacks against German forces in the Second World War).

Alternatively, it might not make sense. Perhaps they’ve been told to attack and that part of the front is easiest to attack from.

I've been saying for some time that it does make sense for Prigozhin as a manouver against the enemies that are dangerous to him, and which are also jockeying for position after Putin goes.

I was saying that without Bakhmut, and without Kherson, Kharkiv would not have been relieved, and without Kharkiv, Kherson would not have been liberated.


Ukraine was fighting where it was militarily important. Russian was concentrating where it was important for internal palace politics, even (especially?) where it hindered the wider war effort and that performed by rival powerbrokers.

Woodchopper wrote: Wed Dec 28, 2022 11:58 am

TopBadger wrote: Wed Dec 28, 2022 11:21 am

jimbob wrote: Tue Dec 27, 2022 9:25 pm https://youtu.be/4fqHERDXVpk

Long video by Perun on Bakhmut and its implications.

Interesting, thanks. The argument that the Russian are making that Bakhmut is being used to attrition Ukraine forces seems an odd one... it seems to me that Ukrainians could make a stronger claim there, and it is they who have the Russians tied up, opening Russia up to losses elsewhere.

In general I’d expect that an attacker would be attritted much more than a defender. The attacker has to move in the open.

Such an attrition strategy would still make sense if the attacker believes that they have far more absolute resources (for example Soviet attacks against German forces in the Second World War).

Alternatively, it might not make sense. Perhaps they’ve been told to attack and that part of the front is easiest to attack from.

A couple of things to note about Bakhmut. Firstly, it's Wagner Group there mostly. I agree with Jimbob's view that internal politics are a major driver, with the rivalry between Prigozhin and the existing defence establishment coming into play.

This is also the area where convicts are most often deployed. Wagner group views these people as disposable, and drives them forward to probe Ukrainian positions, directed by established members of the group who do not go into the line of fire with them. This might be them believing they have more resources, as they do not care about the deaths of the convicts.

Another possibility is that Wagner Group isn't able to function as a conventional military. If they rely on interpersonal relationships and threats - as smaller armed groups and especially organised criminal groups often do - then it is hard to scale that up to combined arms operations. They may well lack the command infrastructure to conduct the sort of combined arms operations needed to attack a well defended position like Bahkmut.

TopBadger wrote: Wed Dec 28, 2022 11:21 am

jimbob wrote: Tue Dec 27, 2022 9:25 pm https://youtu.be/4fqHERDXVpk

Long video by Perun on Bakhmut and its implications.

Interesting, thanks. The argument that the Russian are making that Bakhmut is being used to attrition Ukraine forces seems an odd one... it seems to me that Ukrainians could make a stronger claim there, and it is they who have the Russians tied up, opening Russia up to losses elsewhere.

But anyway - it must be hell on earth there - so even more kudos to Zelensky for making that visit to the troops.

Offensives seeking to attrit the defenders are very difficult. More often, the attackers suffer greater losses, with the archetypal example being Verdun in 1916. It can be done, but it requires care and planning, and tactics radically different to those Russia is using. It is almost certain that Russia is taking substantially greater losses in the Bakhmut offensive than Ukraine is.

It's also not entirely clear what their ultimate goal is. The attacks on Bakhmut have lasted for five months now. There isn't much opportunity for a breakout, as there are additional lines of defence behind Bahkmut that mean that even if the Russians took the town, they'd still be up against a continuous line of well dug-in defenders. It's possible they are trying to make it harder to outflank Russian positions in the Donbas by attacking eastwards into northern Luhansk oblast, but it's unlikely to make a huge difference there as the Ukrainians don't actually need right bank positions to continue that advance, and there is an ideal spot for crossing the Seversky Donets at Privilya. More likely, it's command dysfunction, still trying to continue the Popasna breakout long after the circumstances that enabled it have ceased to exist.

It is, in some ways, reminiscent of the Russian advances in Luhansk oblast in early summer, where they suffered severe casualties with frontal assault after frontal assault, supported by massive quantities of artillery. The difference now, though, is that artillery advantage is much reduced. While nobody has forced Russia to waste troops and equipment in such costly attacks, Ukraine have done very well to deny Russia other opportunities to advance. By contrast, Ukraine aren't taking many positions by assault. By working their way around settlements and attacking logistics, they are forcing the Russians back and gaining large amounts of territory without having to win it by direct assault. This is likely why Russian advances have been glacial - tens of metres a day on average around Bakhmut - while Ukraine have liberated large amounts of territory in the same time period.

To put the Russian Donbas advance into perspective, here's a map from Andrew Perpetua (it's actually illustrating Ukrainian operations in Bilohorivka, hence the emphasis on the map, so the emphasis is not relevant to what I'm using it for)



Popasna fell on the eighth of May after it was totally destroyed by Russian artillery. The distance from the centre of Popasna to Bakhmut is 28km. 235 days later, and Russia has yet to advance beyond the eastermost margins of Bakhmut.

EACLucifer wrote: Mon Dec 19, 2022 9:36 am On the one hand, I am terribly impressed by the ingenuity of the Ukrainians who managed to improvise an infantry fighting vehicle.

Infantry fighting vehicles are one of the most important things on the battlefield right now, able to move infantry safely to the frontline, then support them with autocannon or low-velocity large calibre fire after they have dismounted. They are something Ukraine desperately needs, despite having a reasonable number, improvised vehicles like this, and numerous captures. There's footage doing the rounds of British supplied Wolfhounds standing in for IFVs, and in some cases even Humvees. On roads, it sort of works, but it's far from ideal. The gunners are exposed, the guns are, at most, 12.7mm, the armour is thin - or just not there at all - and the offroad mobility is limited. IFVs combine mobility and armour with firepower in the 20-40mm class, which is much more capable than 12.7/7.62mm machine guns as they can shoot explosive shell rather than just bullets.

Compare and contrast to the mobility of this MT-LB and consider how any wheeled vehicle would cope in that muck. The twin 23mm anti-aircraft cannon also turn the MT-LB into another stand in for an IFV, and there's various MT-LB conversions adding 14.5mm very heavy machine guns. Another trend is to fit 100mm anti-tank guns to MT-LBs for relatively close range fire support.. None of these are optimal compared to a proper IFV.

Put simply infantry need fire support, and they need it as close to them in the chain of command as possible. IFVs do that. They aren't the only solution - mixing in light tanks would also work in theory* - but the main way it is done in most militaries is IFVs, which means the vehicles that NATO members have in stock are mostly IFVs. Additionally, Ukraine successfully operates the M270 MLRS, which is built on the running gear of the American M2 Bradley.

Given the current situation, if there was a choice to send tanks or IFVs, IFVs would be the higher priority.


*The UK reportedly sent some Scimitars ages ago, but I've seen no evidence of them in Ukrainian service yet and it's possible it was a mix-up with other similar vehicles.

Bloomberg is reporting US considering sending Bradley IFVs to Ukraine. Article is paywalled, so I've not read it, but as I understand it, no decision has been taken yet. The Bradley is exactly the sort of vehicle I was talking about in the above post, though, and indeed it is mentioned specifically. Bradleys would likely make a bigger difference alone than Western tanks, especially if they prompted the transfer of Marders, CV90s, Warriors etc from European nations. In addition, some Ukrainian maintenance crews can already handle the Bradley's running gear, as it's also used for the M270 which has been in service with Ukraine since the summer.