Scrutable

More on the logistics of arms supply to Ukraine: https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/no- ... no-2-says/

Woodchopper wrote: Tue Apr 26, 2022 5:01 pm More on the logistics of arms supply to Ukraine: https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/no- ... no-2-says/

The question at this point is whether it makes sense to try and get Stingers back into production, or whether it would make more sense to licence production of a missile that's currently being made - Starstreak and/or Martlet would be one option.

lpm wrote: Tue Apr 26, 2022 1:03 pm Hmm.

It's all a bit McNamara.

War via quantification.

It's a basic fallacy. But at the same time it might be correct in this instance. Russia has a finite supply of non-conscript soldiers, and conscript soldiers are clearly inferior, which might not have been true in Vietnam.

The same applies to the death count of Ukraine soldiers, of course. They must be running low as well. Need to have a proper attrition model.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McNamara_fallacy

I know the McNamara fallacy, and it is correct to be wary of it, however, in attritional warfare, losses are significant.

Ukrainian losses are hard to quantify too, but one clue might be in equipment losses - the Oryxspioenkop list has Russian losses at three and a half times as much as Ukrainian losses, and every time I've checked lately, their Russian backlog is a lot larger than their Ukrainian one, so it could be even higher than that. IF troop losses are commensurate with equipment losses, Ukraine is a lot better off than Russia.

Warfare is never all about one metric, and its important to remember its not just equipment and personnel losses, but control of terrain and factors that are near impossible to quantify - cohesion, morale and will. One area Ukraine almost certainly has a significant advantage is that Ukraine can draw upon a population that is very motivated to fight and win to replenish their regular troops.

Overall, Russian losses are at the level where they are likely to matter. Russia's now lost at least a fifth of its pre-war active tank fleet, and total personnel losses could very plausibly be a quarter of the force they used to invade Ukraine. This is significant because it will be harder and harder for them to put a force in the field capable of the rapid advances that they achieved in the first week in the north and south of Ukraine, and also because these losses will be sapping morale and will to fight.

The truth is never going to be as simple as "Russia's winning as it has increased the territory it controls" or "Ukraines winning because they have inflicted greater materiel and personnel losses than they have suffered", but keeping an eye on those things that can be measured helps keep things in context.

Belgorod. Again. Ammo dump - secondary explosions in footage confirm that.

Interesting interview: https://twitter.com/dpatrikarakos/statu ... T4SUX060kw

Includes a claim that Starlink has been very important as it provided communications that didn’t rely upon infrastructure that could be attacked by Russia. P

Woodchopper wrote: Thu Apr 28, 2022 2:33 am Interesting interview: https://twitter.com/dpatrikarakos/statu ... T4SUX060kw

Includes a claim that Starlink has been very important as it provided communications that didn’t rely upon infrastructure that could be attacked by Russia. P

Really great if someone willing to spend more than forty billion dollars on his own vanity could donate the terminals, though, rather than getting USAID to foot the bill.

Bundestag has voted overwhelmingly to support sending heavy arms to Ukraine.

Bulgaria is voting soon, I gather, and likely to do similar, with the Russian decision to cut off gas likely affecting attitudes.

And in America the house has joined the senate in supporting Lend-Lease, with American military aid alone set to top twenty billion dollars.

It's getting hard to keep track of everything that's being sent. Many nations are sending APCs, Brazil has apparently donated ammunition to enable the German flakpanzers to operate. Nations have finally realised what they should have realised two months ago - Ukraine can win this, but they need enormous support.

By contrast Russian heavy arms manufacture looks to be at a standstill. They've lost a sizeable percentage of their forces - verified tank losses stand at nearly half the original invasion force and at least a fifth of their nominally active fleet - and they continue to expend PGMs they cannot replenish.

The long term situation does not appear to favour Russia at the moment.


In the short term they are advancing in the east, but very slowly, and at considerable cost.

https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/151 ... XT8pUqAAAA

Russian propaganda video talking about the knocked out Ukrainian tank in the video...

With the invasion "Z" markings very clear on it - especially the back

jimbob wrote: Fri Apr 29, 2022 6:05 am https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/151 ... XT8pUqAAAA

Russian propaganda video talking about the knocked out Ukrainian tank in the video...

With the invasion "Z" markings very clear on it - especially the back

One constant criticism of the Oryxspioenkop list from the supporters of Russian fascism is that the Russians supposedly don't photograph equipment as much as the Ukrainians do, and this leads to a bias.

Whereas in reality, they try to pass off destroyed Russian kit as Ukrainian - this is far from the only example - and photograph the same stuff from different angles and claim it as additional captures/destructions, and appear to even be re-using bits of Bayraktar TB2s and associated munitions to support their claims of shootdowns.

They've also been so desperate to show captured weapons they have at times shown NLAW and Javelin launchers after the missiles have been fired, meaning they have captured some useless discarded tubes.

EACLucifer wrote: Fri Apr 29, 2022 6:39 am

jimbob wrote: Fri Apr 29, 2022 6:05 am https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/151 ... XT8pUqAAAA

Russian propaganda video talking about the knocked out Ukrainian tank in the video...

With the invasion "Z" markings very clear on it - especially the back

One constant criticism of the Oryxspioenkop list from the supporters of Russian fascism is that the Russians supposedly don't photograph equipment as much as the Ukrainians do, and this leads to a bias.

Whereas in reality, they try to pass off destroyed Russian kit as Ukrainian - this is far from the only example - and photograph the same stuff from different angles and claim it as additional captures/destructions, and appear to even be re-using bits of Bayraktar TB2s and associated munitions to support their claims of shootdowns.

They've also been so desperate to show captured weapons they have at times shown NLAW and Javelin launchers after the missiles have been fired, meaning they have captured some useless discarded tubes.

I like the bricks they've used to prop up the tail to make it look bent.

I suppose it's not impossible they're showing off a KO'd Ukrainian tank which was until recently a Russian tank, but no. Following that train of thought the Ukrainians would most certainly have scrubbed off or painted over the Zs before fielding it as their own.

Oryx indicates transfers from Poland (it was on Polish radio this morning, so seems likely)

- 230+ T-72M(1) MBTs
- 40 BMP-1 IFVs
- 20+ 2S1 Goździk SPGs
- 20+ BM-21 Grad MRLs
- WB Electronics FlyEye reconnaissance UAVs
- 100 R-73 air-to-air missiles [For Su-27 and MiG-29

I understand Ukraine had 2 active and 4 reserve tank brigades at the start of the war, each with about 100 tanks. 230 T-72s is therefore a significant number

EACLucifer wrote: Thu Apr 28, 2022 3:53 am

Woodchopper wrote: Thu Apr 28, 2022 2:33 am Interesting interview: https://twitter.com/dpatrikarakos/statu ... T4SUX060kw

Includes a claim that Starlink has been very important as it provided communications that didn’t rely upon infrastructure that could be attacked by Russia. P

Really great if someone willing to spend more than forty billion dollars on his own vanity could donate the terminals, though, rather than getting USAID to foot the bill.

I think that article was posted before. As far as I can see, the majority of the terminals were donated. Some were paid for by the US government, which also covered transportation. (The overcharging claim is a bit of a red herring as the terminals are often sold at a substantial loss, depending on which package you buy. Also the cost of the service needs to be accounted for).

Kursk Oblast - railway bridge collapsed, local government blaming saboteurs.

Belgorod Oblast - looks to be an ammo dump gone up, based on secondary explosions on the video.


Within Russia, strategically important things in the vicinity of Ukraine are continuing to suffer from unexplained incidents.

The fire in the power plant in Sakhalin is very likely to be unrelated.

Something for the curious things that probably won't get explained any time soon;

Something was flying over Belgorod last night and dropping flares as it went. The engine was visible, indicating afterburners, and there's multiple recordings of an explosion, but no reported damage, suggesting a sonic boom. Who, what, and why?

EACLucifer wrote: Sun May 01, 2022 9:56 pm Kursk Oblast - railway bridge collapsed, local government blaming saboteurs.

Belgorod Oblast - looks to be an ammo dump gone up, based on secondary explosions on the video.


Within Russia, strategically important things in the vicinity of Ukraine are continuing to suffer from unexplained incidents.

The fire in the power plant in Sakhalin is very likely to be unrelated.

The fallen bridge is noted via Oryx as 'near Sudzha'.

Suggested as at 51.17047, 35.38533. It seems likely to be a significant supply route for the Russians, given the necessity for moving heavy weaponry by rail as much as possible. The photograph shown by Oryx looks very like ground level sabotage, rather than a missile.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/20 ... ult-boats/

Two Russian Raptor fast patrol launches hit by drone launched munitions very close to Snake Island. On March 22nd, Ukraine claimed to have sunk one of these previously, and the Russians admitted that one had been damaged. Wiki suggests that 4 of these craft were normally deployed in the Black Sea, but this may have changed prior to the invasion.

It's all going pretty well, isn't it?

And this is all before the western artillery arrives? With current resources they seem all square, but Russia is degrading while Ukraine is strengthening.

Kherson is interesting. How are the Russians entrenched north west of the Dnieper when there's literally only a couple of supply roads in? There must be a chance of a counter attack to retake.

lpm wrote: Mon May 02, 2022 4:47 pm It's all going pretty well, isn't it?

And this is all before the western artillery arrives? With current resources they seem all square, but Russia is degrading while Ukraine is strengthening.

Kherson is interesting. How are the Russians entrenched north west of the Dnieper when there's literally only a couple of supply roads in? There must be a chance of a counter attack to retake.

I assume that the Ukrainians don’t have enough forces to have an offensive around Kherson as they’ve been transferred to the Donbas and round Kharkiv.

That may change with all the new equipment

https://twitter.com/DarthPutinKGB/statu ... lgj8v7gr1Q

Darth Putin
@DarthPutinKGB
·
Apr 30
My average of getting a general killed every 6.5 days has improved. To 6.6.

I remain a master strategist

Detailed and comprehensive thread on Russian problems and incompetence in the Donbas offensive: https://twitter.com/ian_matveev/status/ ... YeGHZ6m9Iw

It’s in Russian but Twitter’s translate function seems to work well.

Thanks.

One section of the thread highlighted the random missile attacks on Odesa one day, a warehouse somewhere the next. This could be simple terrorism. But the thread attributes it to the need to present something to Putin.

The Russian army is shelling for show. We know very well how the police work in Russia. How do cops make statistics, inventing, for example, drug cases. Or the protests. In the state structures of the Russian Federation, a lot is done for reporting, without real results

Ros aviation and partially artillery act not in the interests of the army, but in the interests of accountability. "Launch rockets every day so we can report progress every day." Rejection of concentrated fire plays into the hands of Ukraine. It's easier to fix a damaged bridge than to build a new one.

lpm wrote: Tue May 03, 2022 8:22 am Thanks.

One section of the thread highlighted the random missile attacks on Odesa one day, a warehouse somewhere the next. This could be simple terrorism. But the thread attributes it to the need to present something to Putin.

The Russian army is shelling for show. We know very well how the police work in Russia. How do cops make statistics, inventing, for example, drug cases. Or the protests. In the state structures of the Russian Federation, a lot is done for reporting, without real results

Ros aviation and partially artillery act not in the interests of the army, but in the interests of accountability. "Launch rockets every day so we can report progress every day." Rejection of concentrated fire plays into the hands of Ukraine. It's easier to fix a damaged bridge than to build a new one.

Yes, and that seems to be an example of a wider criticism that in the Donbas and much more so earlier, there were many uncoordinated attacks. That accords with an explanation that individual commanders need to show that they are attacking, but that there is little overall coherence. If true, that would be partly due to a failure of leadership (ie no one higher up the hierarchy is able to effectively direct what the commanders lower down are doing) and a lack of a common cause or ethos (ie commanders in the field aren't cooperating in order to achieve common objectives).

There's a lot of talk going round about a Ukrainian push east from Kharkiv, perhaps as far east as Staryi Saltiv. Pushing the Russians back across the Seversky Donets in the north is a big deal in terms of securing Kharkiv against bombardment, but also allows the forces that have been defending Kharkiv to threaten the Russian supply lines from Belgorod to Izium.

EACLucifer wrote: Tue May 03, 2022 9:55 am There's a lot of talk going round about a Ukrainian push east from Kharkiv, perhaps as far east as Staryi Saltiv. Pushing the Russians back across the Seversky Donets in the north is a big deal in terms of securing Kharkiv against bombardment, but also allows the forces that have been defending Kharkiv to threaten the Russian supply lines from Belgorod to Izium.

Yes, it seems that Russia is able to concentrate enough forces around Izyum-Severodonetsk to be able to make slow incremental advances, but at the cost of inadequate numbers of troops and equipment elsewhere.