Scrutable

Woodchopper wrote: Tue Aug 30, 2022 3:42 am

EACLucifer wrote: Mon Aug 29, 2022 11:30 pm

jimbob wrote: Mon Aug 29, 2022 7:06 pm

That is not the most surprising thing you have posted.

Indeed. I'm not sure what the most surprising thing I posted is, tbh.

In other news, possibly, there's talk of the Americans sending more military aid by ship than by air. It's from an Arestovych briefing, and he's not the most reliable source, but if true, it could mean much heavier equipment - possibly even IFVs like the Bradley and tanks, though this is speculation on my part.

Ammunition, lots of ammunition.

Also quite possibly lots of vehicles that aren't big dramatic armoured fighting vehicles. All terrain cargo trucks, humvees, that sort of thing. And amongst armoured fighting vehicles, things like older model M109s would be adding to existing capabilities, and very welcome.

Logistics is where wars are won or lost... so material and the means to move it isn't a bad shout.

Looks like the Ukrainian push has started?

TopBadger wrote: Tue Aug 30, 2022 9:00 am Logistics is where wars are won or lost... so material and the means to move it isn't a bad shout.

Looks like the Ukrainian push has started?

Yup

And another area where Russia seems to be trying to emulate Nazi Germany.

Which apparently started Operation Barbarossa with over a thousand TYPES of lorry.

TopBadger wrote: Tue Aug 30, 2022 9:00 am Logistics is where wars are won or lost... so material and the means to move it isn't a bad shout.

Looks like the Ukrainian push has started?

Looks like a lot of probing attacks all along the line west of the Dnipro, coupled with redoubled efforts against river crossings. More strikes against pontoon ferries this morning, and overnight hits against Russian positions and the bridges. Even if the Russians do try and take their vehicles over the bridges, Ukrainians have fire control over them, so if the Russians do try to retreat with their equipment, and the bridges hold, Ukraine can easily target a queue of vehicles across the bridge and hit them with GMLRS and, in the case of the Antonivksy bridges, tube artillery, and thus block them.

So far, the main progress appears to have been across the Inhulets, towards the northern end of the section of frontline, with sources from both sides talking about a Ukrainian advance there, but it's likely they are trying all the doors to see which ones open, so to speak. I don't think the goal is a big breakout and encircling manoeuvre at the moment, more likely it's an attempt to accellerate attrition and render some positions untenable to try and provoke a Russian retreat or collapse that sees them leave a lot of their equipment on the field, and maybe a lot of their troops, too, if Ukraine is able to set up and implement a highway of death type scenario with their artillery.

Fascinating article discussing possibilities for supplying Ukraine with enough equipment to form multiple armoured brigade combat teams. The article talks about combining elements of NATO and existing Ukrainian force structure - ie two artillery battalions rather than one to compensate for less air support.

The short version is that we're talking in the realm of one billion seven hundred dollars formation, or a bit under nine billion for five of them. This uses vehicles that are available in reserves (it focusses on American vehicles, eg Abrams tanks, but it wouldn't be too unreasonable to try and scrounge up some older Leopard 2s, and at 87 main battle tanks per formation, it would be possible to keep each formation to one variety of tank, and indeed if multiple formations are raised, some might still use Soviet-type tanks)

I would add that if work began on this now, on training, pulling vehicles out from mothball condition and so on, these formations might be going into battle around the end of the spring mud season.

Woodchopper wrote: Tue Aug 16, 2022 6:53 am Lack of effective air defences could also mean a return of the
Bayraktars to the battlefields.

That's exactly what's happened in Kherson oblast.

Link contains footage of Bayraktar drone blowing up a self-propelled gun. Consider yourselves warned of that.

As noted in the post, they are targetting lower value targets now, even mortar positions, indicating two things; firstly, Ukrainian SEAD/DEAD has, with the arrival of AGM-88 HARM, allowed these drones to operate over the frontlines a lot more than before, indeed they'd previously been withdrawn from the role, and secondly, it is likely that M270/HIMARS and excalibur shells have taken over a lot of the really high value target destruction, and indeed for DEAD, which the Bayraktars were used for north of Kyiv, the AGM-88 HARM can do that directly.

Again though - Russians out in the open with no cam netting to screen the vehicle.

Not sure from those images if the drone is the one doing the busting or painting the target for something else.

Report from the front line in the Donbas: https://twitter.com/sommervilletv/statu ... CbUrxgnNqQ

Various videos beginning to emerge on Telegram of overrun Russian positions in Kherson Oblast. Between that and the fact that Bayraktars are hunting tanks and mortars as well as SPGs, it's clear the offensive is having some impact, though how much is not yet clear.

There's also some evidence of Ukrainian losses. A few tanks seen abandoned - probably after suffering what's called a "mobility kill", where they are immobilised - and a YPR-765 captured. The initial phase of an offensive is generally the most costly.

In some ways, the best thing the Ukrainians could do would be to put the Russians in a position where they have to counter-attack. It might not take the capture of much terrain to do it. Currently, aside from Sukhy Stavok, there's little in the way of really concrete information about territorial changes, but Russian sources talk about advances from there to Kostromka and Bruskyns'ke and perhaps south from there, and there is some evidence of possible Ukrainian advances in the north of the theatre too. The degree to which the Ukrainians have maintained OPSEC is impressive, and cloud cover also limits the effectiveness of satellite imagery and tools like FIRMS.

So we don't know if the offensive is achieving it's desired goals. In terms of attrition we don't know which side is suffering greater losses, either absolute or in proportion to what they can sustain and recover from.

And it's dangerous to try and extrapolate too much from the tiny snapshots we have, which are all released by biased sources, of course.

Bridge over the lock at Nova Kakhovka. Via CoupSure.



Road bridge is completely done for. Rail bridge likely can't take any meaningful amount of weight. First bridge span to completely fall in the Battle of the Bridges.

EACLucifer wrote: Sat Sep 03, 2022 4:01 pm Bridge over the lock at Nova Kakhovka. Via CoupSure.



Road bridge is completely done for. Rail bridge likely can't take any meaningful amount of weight. First bridge span to completely fall in the Battle of the Bridges.

For context, two of the four routes across the Dnipro are in this shot, one damaged span, one utterly destroyed span. The other two bridges are the Antonovsky road and rail bridges. The former has been terribly chewed up and cratered right across one span and almost certainly can't safely take much load, while a big chunk was taken out of the latter some time ago.

Russia is now almost completely dependant on helicopters and ferries made from pontoon sections to cross the Dnipro, and their attempt to build a barge bridge doesn't seem to have gone anywhere lately. And all the troops defending against the Ukrainian Kherson offensive are dependant on supplies that have to cross the Dnipro.

TopBadger wrote: Fri Sep 02, 2022 9:38 am Again though - Russians out in the open with no cam netting to screen the vehicle.

Not sure from those images if the drone is the one doing the busting or painting the target for something else.

One would need a thermal blanket to hide from a Bayraktar's thermal vision. They do exist, but I don't think Russia has them. Track marks are a giveaway too.

And it's probably the drone doing the attack on its own. They carry a pair of MAM-L guided glide bombs. They are small, but accurate enough for direct hits and powerful enough to penetrate top armour.

From a summary by Aleksey Arestovych, advisor to the president of Ukraine

There are 30 BTGs on this bank of the Dnipro but Ukrainian forces "continue to accomplish their objectives". The main goal of the Ukrainian forces is to reveal and strike the Russian logistical system.

As a result of intensive Russian action since the start of the offensive, the Ukrainians have seen, and hit logistical targets that were previously hidden.

[…]

Ukrainian tactics in the south: Arestovich says that the Kherson operation will go on for a long time because the Ukrainians are trying to avoid unnecessary losses of both military and civilians.

[…]

Arestovich explains that in the army one must always use the strongest capability he possess. In some areas, the Russian army has a numerical superiority in terms of artillery and aviation. However, the Ukrainians posses better reconnaissance and long range accurate weaponry.

All Ukrainian military operations are structured around the combined employment of these 2 capabilities.

[….]

Therefore, Ukraine will play to their strengths and organise the offensive in such a way that it primarily employs these weapons that do not need to be in direct contact with the enemy.

We should not expect a "Severodonetsk" style offensive from Ukraine where 9 brigades had to be pulled off the line for refitting after the battle.

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/statu ... jX8W-vIbig

Woodchopper wrote: Sat Sep 03, 2022 9:42 pm From a summary by Aleksey Arestovych, advisor to the president of Ukraine

There are 30 BTGs on this bank of the Dnipro but Ukrainian forces "continue to accomplish their objectives". The main goal of the Ukrainian forces is to reveal and strike the Russian logistical system.

As a result of intensive Russian action since the start of the offensive, the Ukrainians have seen, and hit logistical targets that were previously hidden.

[…]

Ukrainian tactics in the south: Arestovich says that the Kherson operation will go on for a long time because the Ukrainians are trying to avoid unnecessary losses of both military and civilians.

[…]

Arestovich explains that in the army one must always use the strongest capability he possess. In some areas, the Russian army has a numerical superiority in terms of artillery and aviation. However, the Ukrainians posses better reconnaissance and long range accurate weaponry.

All Ukrainian military operations are structured around the combined employment of these 2 capabilities.

[….]

Therefore, Ukraine will play to their strengths and organise the offensive in such a way that it primarily employs these weapons that do not need to be in direct contact with the enemy.

We should not expect a "Severodonetsk" style offensive from Ukraine where 9 brigades had to be pulled off the line for refitting after the battle.

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/statu ... jX8W-vIbig

This dashboard https://datastudio.google.com/reporting ... y-bX2eFilo would support that claim

Yes, Phillips O’Brien points out in this thread that the FIRMS data is showing most of the explosions being behind the front line.

He calls the Ukrainian strategy one of tempting Russian forces into the area and then slowly destroying them.

https://twitter.com/phillipspobrien/sta ... ETWeV_2WhQ

Woodchopper wrote: Sun Sep 04, 2022 9:25 am Yes, Phillips O’Brien points out in this thread that the FIRMS data is showing most of the explosions being behind the front line.

He calls the Ukrainian strategy one of tempting Russian forces into the area and then slowly destroying them.

https://twitter.com/phillipspobrien/sta ... ETWeV_2WhQ

I think it's about 20,000 Russian troops to the west of the river. That could make for very interesting logistics with no bridges.

The logistics outcome is obvious, surely? It can't be done.

Therefore Russia has to withdraw from the west side.

Either do it now, or do it when you're half way to disaster, or do it when disaster has happened.

It's amazing how rational people can see how something ends, yet carry on with the status quo regardless. It's a deep-seated human flaw. Can't bear to take a small loss now even when you're certain that means a huge loss later. Russia is doing something akin to climate denial.

lpm wrote: Sun Sep 04, 2022 10:18 am The logistics outcome is obvious, surely? It can't be done.

Therefore Russia has to withdraw from the west side.

Either do it now, or do it when you're half way to disaster, or do it when disaster has happened.

It's amazing how rational people can see how something ends, yet carry on with the status quo regardless. It's a deep-seated human flaw. Can't bear to take a small loss now even when you're certain that means a huge loss later. Russia is doing something akin to climate denial.

Looking at the wiki entry for Khe Sanh, with 6000 marines, the estimate was 185 tons per day. Which was a lot more per person than the 6th Army needed at Stalingrad but probably closer for a 21st Century Russian army.

so call it 600 tonnes per day. Which I can imagine would be pretty easy with a road link. But as you say, less so without one.

But is that tons used in combat, or tons used in combat plus stock lost to enemy attacks? And what would be Russia's starting point, in terms of stock already on the west side?

A simple equation: opening stock / (stock destroyed per day + usage per day - deliveries per day) = days left

Presumably Ukraine is doing all three: hit the stockpiles - fairly simple aerial reconnaissance to locate the Russian storage positions. Force them to up their combat usage. And reduce Russia's deliveries per day.

The other aspect is how fluid stock flows are within the Kherson region. The Russian occupied territory is 100 miles long, from the south west tip (Oleksandrivka) to north east (Vysokopillya), and 30 miles wide. That's like London to Bristol. The daily flow of trucks isn't just the pinch points on the river.

How many civilians are in the occupied area? They need feeding and medical care as well. It will be pretty dire for them, not that the Russians will give a sh.t.

jimbob wrote: Sun Sep 04, 2022 10:28 am

lpm wrote: Sun Sep 04, 2022 10:18 am The logistics outcome is obvious, surely? It can't be done.

Therefore Russia has to withdraw from the west side.

Either do it now, or do it when you're half way to disaster, or do it when disaster has happened.

It's amazing how rational people can see how something ends, yet carry on with the status quo regardless. It's a deep-seated human flaw. Can't bear to take a small loss now even when you're certain that means a huge loss later. Russia is doing something akin to climate denial.

Looking at the wiki entry for Khe Sanh, with 6000 marines, the estimate was 185 tons per day. Which was a lot more per person than the 6th Army needed at Stalingrad but probably closer for a 21st Century Russian army.

so call it 600 tonnes per day. Which I can imagine would be pretty easy with a road link. But as you say, less so without one.

Food may not be such of an issue, given the size of the area in question and it's agriculture, especially as some foodstuff are piling up in silos unable to be exported.

In the other direction, though, ammunition's going to be a massive problem. A 152mm shell weighs about 50kg. With propellant and packaging, that doubles. Rocket artillery is much worse, needing a truckload of ammunition for every salvo. And Russia so far has been very poor at advancing without massive artillery superiority, and, because their guns are less accurate and gunners less well trained, to achieve functional superiority, that means firing multiple shells for every Ukrainian shell, especially those fired from western weapons.

And there's another factor with the logistical situation, too. Convoys are starting to queue up near the ferries. It's showing on satellite imagery. They are, of course, perfect targets, and some hits have been reported. Dispersing them while waiting for the ferry would reduce that risk, but unless the operation ran like a swiss watch, would then add delays, and that might even be delays with the ferry waiting in position, which makes that a target, and so on...

I'm still not happy the bridges are destroyed enough. Obviously the Kakhovsky road bridge is, but I would be happier if they weren't even viable for small numbers on foot, as I want the Russian forces in Kherson utterly trapped. Retreating without their heavy equipment would be good, especially if they left some of it intact, but I'd rather see five figure numbers of Russian POWs, and helicopters shot down trying to get them out. That would provide enormous leverage for Ukraine.

Woodchopper wrote: Sun Sep 04, 2022 9:25 am Yes, Phillips O’Brien points out in this thread that the FIRMS data is showing most of the explosions being behind the front line.

He calls the Ukrainian strategy one of tempting Russian forces into the area and then slowly destroying them.

https://twitter.com/phillipspobrien/sta ... ETWeV_2WhQ

Yes. O'Brien's been very astute on this theatre. This is also what I was talking about earlier when I was talkng about accellerating attrition. Ukraine has lured in more Russians to right-bank Kherson. They've crippled their lines of supply. Their replenishment rate for equipment, fuel and ammunition is effectively fixed, determined by what the ferries and limited truck supply can handle. The rate of expenditure is determined by the intensity of combat, so increasing the intensity of combat increases the shortfall in Russian supplies.

Ideally, Ukraine would be wanting to take positions Russia couldn't tolerate them holding, in order to force costly Russian counterattacks. Threatening the Ground Lines of Communication to Davydiv Brid is one example of that approach.

And as of writing, it looks like the Ukrainians have finally liberated Vysokopillia, in the north of the theatre. And they also appear to have at least entered Ozerne, north of the Siverskyi Donets in Donetsk Oblast, which is a surprise.

Russian uniforms found abandoned at overrun Russian position. Footage reminiscent of late stages of the Kyiv campaign, however, scope is not known. This could easily be very localised. Euan MacDonald notes this could indicate Russians changing into civilian clothes and deserting.

A lot of videos showing Russian POWS, including some in quantity. Won't link, though I will point out that just documenting prisoners of war almost certainly doesn't fall foul of the Geneva Convention.

EACLucifer wrote: Sun Sep 04, 2022 2:54 pm I'm still not happy the bridges are destroyed enough. Obviously the Kakhovsky road bridge is, but I would be happier if they weren't even viable for small numbers on foot, as I want the Russian forces in Kherson utterly trapped. Retreating without their heavy equipment would be good, especially if they left some of it intact, but I'd rather see five figure numbers of Russian POWs, and helicopters shot down trying to get them out. That would provide enormous leverage for Ukraine.

The Ukrainians may be following advice from Sun Tzu who warned against completely cutting off your enemy's retreat as it encourages them to fight more fiercely rather than run away. Not sure if that translates well to modern times when surrendering is a lot safer.