Spanish blackout of 28 April 2025
Posted: Mon Jun 23, 2025 2:54 pm
It was quite unclear at the time, or in the following period, why the blackout occurred. We now have an official report from Red Eléctrica. They essentially admit that they were chancing it already, and so unable to cope when coming into contact with additional cockups.
The following useful summary should be credited to a former power systems engineer called Simon Gallagher, and came to me second hand:
1. On the day, the system did not have enough large synchronous generators online to control voltage. This was due to some thermal plants being unavailable - the TSO [Transmission Systems Operator] did not replace them with alternative voltage-controlling units. Over 80% of the generation was inverter based.
2. Earlier in the morning, before the blackout, the system experienced multiple oscillations. The TSO took lots of actions to dampen these (including meshing x10 400 kV circuits, switching the DC interconnectors with France to constant power mode, and disconnecting shunt reactors). These actions successfully stopped the oscillations - but, and it is a big but - they also caused voltage to rise and made the system much less flexible in managing it. With over 82% of generation now inverter-based, and few synchronous units available, the system became ‘stiff’ to voltage control. The stage was set.
3. The first generators tripped on overvoltage - even though voltages were still within the grid code limits. This was wrong settings or insufficient ride-through capability. Questions here on compliance.
4. From there, it was all downhill. The system lacked enough voltage control resources - and those still connected did not behave as they should. Generators that should have been absorbing reactive power were not doing so sufficiently, and some were even injecting reactive power. This led to increasing voltage rise, triggering even more generator trips until the system collapsed entirely.
We have previously discovered in Britain that over-sensitive trip-out settings can turn what ought to be small incidents into major blackouts. It was a major factor in that large blackout that occurred in eastern England a little while ago. In that incident, an initial modestly-sized problem caused a large off-shore windfarm to trip out, which made the overall incident too large to handle. Its trip-out settings were too sensitive. It was discovered that over-sensitive trip-out settings are widespread.
The following useful summary should be credited to a former power systems engineer called Simon Gallagher, and came to me second hand:
1. On the day, the system did not have enough large synchronous generators online to control voltage. This was due to some thermal plants being unavailable - the TSO [Transmission Systems Operator] did not replace them with alternative voltage-controlling units. Over 80% of the generation was inverter based.
2. Earlier in the morning, before the blackout, the system experienced multiple oscillations. The TSO took lots of actions to dampen these (including meshing x10 400 kV circuits, switching the DC interconnectors with France to constant power mode, and disconnecting shunt reactors). These actions successfully stopped the oscillations - but, and it is a big but - they also caused voltage to rise and made the system much less flexible in managing it. With over 82% of generation now inverter-based, and few synchronous units available, the system became ‘stiff’ to voltage control. The stage was set.
3. The first generators tripped on overvoltage - even though voltages were still within the grid code limits. This was wrong settings or insufficient ride-through capability. Questions here on compliance.
4. From there, it was all downhill. The system lacked enough voltage control resources - and those still connected did not behave as they should. Generators that should have been absorbing reactive power were not doing so sufficiently, and some were even injecting reactive power. This led to increasing voltage rise, triggering even more generator trips until the system collapsed entirely.
We have previously discovered in Britain that over-sensitive trip-out settings can turn what ought to be small incidents into major blackouts. It was a major factor in that large blackout that occurred in eastern England a little while ago. In that incident, an initial modestly-sized problem caused a large off-shore windfarm to trip out, which made the overall incident too large to handle. Its trip-out settings were too sensitive. It was discovered that over-sensitive trip-out settings are widespread.