The Invasion of Ukraine

[headshot]

Thanks Allo V Psycho, that's a great way to get to grips with the distances.

Yeah, that’s good. Most of the map area within the circle isn’t even Birmingham. In this scenario, the whole of Birmingham remains safe with only parts of Staffordshire, Warwickshire and the Black Country under Russian influence.

Church Stretton would be a great place to mount a counter offensive. Rocket launchers on Caer Caradoc’s Iron Age hill fort, lunch at Van Doesberg’s and secret base in Minton Batch for maximum topographic defence.

[Woodchopper]

Victory! https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-europe-60856533

Russia says the "first stage" of what it calls its "special military operation" has been mostly accomplished and that it will now concentrate on "the liberation of the Donbas".

Western analysts are of course suggesting this splendid triumph means Russia recognises its strategy has failed and they need to pull back and just concentrate on trying to secure Donbass. Meanies.

Here’s a thread from someone who was at the briefing: https://twitter.com/polinaivanovva/stat ... 4mr0-Uxmpg

Reports from Ukraine that Russia has withdrawn some forces from near Kyiv: https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-eur ... type=share

Hint that separatists in Luhansk may have a referendum on joining Russia: https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/15 ... 9XKQafk5lA

Both seem to be consistent with Russia now focusing upon the Donbas and intending to claim victory if it can annex some territory there. Harder to get Ukraine to agree to that though.

[TopBadger]

Russia now focusing upon the Donbas and intending to claim victory if it can annex some territory there. Harder to get Ukraine to agree to that though.

Might have been easier for Ukraine to accept if (a) was based on a referendum and (b) Russia hadn't hadn't forcibly evacuated Ukrainians to Russia from these areas.

Maybe thats behind the forced evacuations... when the time comes, move some Russians in... hold a rigged referendum.

[Woodchopper]

Russia now focusing upon the Donbas and intending to claim victory if it can annex some territory there. Harder to get Ukraine to agree to that though.

Might have been easier for Ukraine to accept if (a) was based on a referendum and (b) Russia hadn't hadn't forcibly evacuated Ukrainians to Russia from these areas.

Maybe thats behind the forced evacuations... when the time comes, move some Russians in... hold a rigged referendum.

I doubt very much that we can trust the results of a referendum. But there are much easier ways to rig a vote.

[Bird on a Fire]

Donetsk and Luhansk were both already 70%+ Russian-speaking, with ~40% ethnic Russians.

I'm not sure whether a referendum would be more likely to split along ethnic or language lines. But the language is significant due to both exposure to Russian propaganda and Ukraine's attempts to suppress use of Russian as a minority language (the latter of which doesn't sit well with me).

Plus, as Chopper says, Russia is quite capable of rigging votes without mass deportations.

[jimbob]

Victory! https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-europe-60856533



Western analysts are of course suggesting this splendid triumph means Russia recognises its strategy has failed and they need to pull back and just concentrate on trying to secure Donbass. Meanies.

Here’s a thread from someone who was at the briefing: https://twitter.com/polinaivanovva/stat ... 4mr0-Uxmpg

Reports from Ukraine that Russia has withdrawn some forces from near Kyiv: https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-eur ... type=share

Hint that separatists in Luhansk may have a referendum on joining Russia: https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/15 ... 9XKQafk5lA

Both seem to be consistent with Russia now focusing upon the Donbas and intending to claim victory if it can annex some territory there. Harder to get Ukraine to agree to that though.

An alternative view

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... t-march-25

The absence of significant Russian offensive operations throughout most of Ukraine likely reflects the inability of the Russian military to generate sufficient combat power to attack rather than any decision in Moscow to change Russia’s war aims or concentrate on the east. Rudskoi’s comments are likely an attempt to gloss the Russian military’s failures for a domestic audience and focus attention on the only part of the theater in which Russian troops are making any progress at this point. The West should not over-read this obvious messaging embedded in a piece of propaganda that continued very few true statements.

[EACLucifer]

An alternative view

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... t-march-25

The absence of significant Russian offensive operations throughout most of Ukraine likely reflects the inability of the Russian military to generate sufficient combat power to attack rather than any decision in Moscow to change Russia’s war aims or concentrate on the east. Rudskoi’s comments are likely an attempt to gloss the Russian military’s failures for a domestic audience and focus attention on the only part of the theater in which Russian troops are making any progress at this point. The West should not over-read this obvious messaging embedded in a piece of propaganda that continued very few true statements.

This is the culmination point that was mentioned earlier, and in a lot of technical discussions. There was a bit of back and forth in some places as some people were using a definition that was based on the attacking forces transitioning to defence, which is what they should do when their attack culminates, but it isn't the definition of the concept - culmination is when the loss of attacking forces and increase in friction for the attacking side is such that they can no longer sustain their attack.

[lpm]

Fundamentally I suspect attack is impossible in 2022. Same as 1915.

Defenders have stealth capability, operating in small units. Attackers in massed formation are 100% visible 100% of the time. Attackers can't get mobility (on European terrain) because defenders can chose the exact point to stall them. Air supremacy can't be won due to volume of SAMs. And the logistics pipeline cannot flow.

What I want to see from military experts is a discussion of what would have happened if NATO had invaded Ukraine. Better troops and equipment, all that maintenance and tyres sort of stuff, proper leadership. Would NATO quality and quantity have made the initial blitzkrieg a success? Would NATO be able to keep a logistics pipeline endlessly flowing on Ukraine's terrain?

I think it's an alarming wake-up for our entire military. In my lifetime it's been worrying about Soviet tanks storming west to the channel, followed by worries about Russia reclaiming the Balts or even ex-Warsaw Pact eastern countries. Now looks like these scenarios were never remotely possible, even in the 1980s. WW2 tank formations just can't work, unless they have easy mobility in a desert against a crap enemy.

I reckon if NATO moved 100 miles into Russia, with a logistics pipeline trailing behind them, they'd be stopped and would have exactly the same resupply issues Russia is now experiencing, leading to inevitable defeat for NATO. And I think a US carrier group off Taiwan would be overcome by sheer quantity of incoming missiles. And I think a Chinese force landing in Taiwan would grind to a halt. My guess is that for the last 50 years we've been blind to a reality that is now apparent.

[lpm]

One of those single-use Switchblade drones cost $6,000. The USA has sent Ukraine 100. What if the defender has 1,000? 10,000? Let's spend $6 billion and get one million of the things.

Or more realistically a mix of capabilities, with cheap ones for food trucks and bigger ones for armour. And fast forward to another 10 years worth of technology improvements...

Loitering munitions, hovering unseen over every enemy formation. Squad of 4 guerillas with a Switchblade in a backpack, given the exact coordinates of the best thing to attack. Precision raids on a convoy by a few dozen Switchblades.

How can anything move? How can there be any concept of a front line where two forces engage?

[bjn]

Account in the Guardian of a small 30 person team that the Ukrainians credit with significantly helping to stop that column which was headed to Kyiv.

But the convoy of armoured vehicles and supply trucks ground to a halt within days, and the offensive failed, in significant part because of a series of night ambushes carried out by a team of 30 Ukrainian special forces and drone operators on quad bikes, according to a Ukrainian commander.

The drone operators were drawn from an air reconnaissance unit, Aerorozvidka, which began eight years ago as a group of volunteer IT specialists and hobbyists designing their own machines and has evolved into an essential element in Ukraine’s successful David-and-Goliath resistance.

The Ukrainian soldiers were equipped with night vision goggles, sniper rifles, remotely detonated mines, drones equipped with thermal imaging cameras and others capable of dropping small 1.5kg bombs.

“This one little unit in the night destroyed two or three vehicles at the head of this convoy, and after that it was stuck. They stayed there two more nights, and [destroyed] many vehicles,” Honchar said.

[EACLucifer]

An interesting interview with a Ukrainian pilot and an American one

In terms of western aid to Ukraine, it's important to consider what they are asking for. They've got more combat experience now than most westerners, it's downright patronising to assume that western politicians know what Ukrainians need better than Ukrainian combatants and leaders.

Not only are they talking about the Polish MiGs, but also about American jets, with F16s mentioned. It's important to remember that fighter pilots can convert from one plane to another much faster than new pilots can be trained, and that the assumptions we have about how long things take are based on how long they take to do perfectly under no time pressure - much like the various "it takes at least five years to develop a vaccine" takes from just two years ago. Ukraine needs an airforce, and it needs anti-air and anti-ground capabilities. One issue they face is missiles - they are using older missiles that use SARH, where the attacking plane's radar needs to paint the target until the moment of impact, but their missiles are in general outdated. I don't know whether the Polish MiGs are adapted for better munitions or not. The MiG29 is also typically not intended for any meaningful ground attack role. The advantage of western planes would be the integration of western weapons. F15s, F16s and F18s can carry a whole host of different AA missiles, and guided bombs. It might be quicker to adapt the pilots to new planes than to adapt the weapons to the old planes, and some of these planes are being withdrawn in the west. I'm not quite sure when the RAF is planning on retiring the last of it's Tornadoes, for example, but they can carry much better ground attack weapons than either side possesses - Brimstone missiles that allow for attacks on multiple vehicles in one pass, and cruise missiles with a low radar signature that makes them very hard to shoot down.

Ultimately, a negotiated looks a long way away. We should be equipping Ukraine with the equipment they need not just to stall the Russian attacks, but to take back their own country - all of it. Not least because if the Ukrainians possess that capability, it puts real pressure on the Russian negotiating position.

[Woodchopper]

An interesting interview with a Ukrainian pilot and an American one

In terms of western aid to Ukraine, it's important to consider what they are asking for. They've got more combat experience now than most westerners, it's downright patronising to assume that western politicians know what Ukrainians need better than Ukrainian combatants and leaders.

Not only are they talking about the Polish MiGs, but also about American jets, with F16s mentioned. It's important to remember that fighter pilots can convert from one plane to another much faster than new pilots can be trained, and that the assumptions we have about how long things take are based on how long they take to do perfectly under no time pressure - much like the various "it takes at least five years to develop a vaccine" takes from just two years ago. Ukraine needs an airforce, and it needs anti-air and anti-ground capabilities. One issue they face is missiles - they are using older missiles that use SARH, where the attacking plane's radar needs to paint the target until the moment of impact, but their missiles are in general outdated. I don't know whether the Polish MiGs are adapted for better munitions or not. The MiG29 is also typically not intended for any meaningful ground attack role. The advantage of western planes would be the integration of western weapons. F15s, F16s and F18s can carry a whole host of different AA missiles, and guided bombs. It might be quicker to adapt the pilots to new planes than to adapt the weapons to the old planes, and some of these planes are being withdrawn in the west. I'm not quite sure when the RAF is planning on retiring the last of it's Tornadoes, for example, but they can carry much better ground attack weapons than either side possesses - Brimstone missiles that allow for attacks on multiple vehicles in one pass, and cruise missiles with a low radar signature that makes them very hard to shoot down.

Ultimately, a negotiated looks a long way away. We should be equipping Ukraine with the equipment they need not just to stall the Russian attacks, but to take back their own country - all of it. Not least because if the Ukrainians possess that capability, it puts real pressure on the Russian negotiating position.

The article does though state that it would take 'months' before the Ukrainians could effectively use the fighters, though that would be shorter then upgrading the Ukrainian aircraft.

The calculation for western donor states isn't just about what Ukraine needs, but also a) how much can they afford to give financially, b) the effect of the donation on their own forces, and c) the risk of an escalatory response by Russia.

[EACLucifer]

The article does though state that it would take 'months' before the Ukrainians could effectively use the fighters, though that would be shorter then upgrading the Ukrainian aircraft.

Firstly, we need to accept that this war might last months, secondly, capabilities Ukraine has in the pipeline but not yet fielded still strengthen Ukraine's hand in negotiations

The calculation for western donor states isn't just about what Ukraine needs, but also a) how much can they afford to give financially, b) the effect of the donation on their own forces, and c) the risk of an escalatory response by Russia.

This is true, but given a significant amount of kit is mothballed, or due to be withdrawn in favour of newer kit, it's not too huge a concern.

As for escalation, the "can't possibly do anything to upset Russia" crowd had their way for twenty years, and what's it got us? Hundreds of thousands of dead Syrians, millions of refugees and war in Ukraine, and subverted democracy in the west.

Firstly, if Russia wants to escalate, they'll escalate, regardless of what the west is done. They don't need provocation, excuse or even pretext

Secondly they are already deploying a huge amount of their combat power. They don't have much ability to escalate a little bit.

Thirdly, to respond directly to arms supplies to Ukraine from NATO would mean targetting NATO - something Russia is currently likely to be wary of doing.

[EACLucifer]

Bellingcat and the WSJ now reporting that the Ukrainian negotiators - and also Roman Abramovich, who was apparently present - suffered symptoms consistent with poisoning at peace talks at the beginning of March.

Bellingcat posts linked, as I don't have a WSJ account.

[Herainestold]

link to WSJ story

https://www.wsj.com/articles/roman-abra ... 1648480493

Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich and Ukrainian peace negotiators suffered symptoms of suspected poisoning after a meeting in Kyiv earlier this month, people familiar with the matter said.

Following the meeting in the Ukrainian capital, Mr. Abramovich, who has shuttled between Moscow, Lviv and other negotiating venues, as well as at least two senior members of the Ukrainian team developed symptoms that included red eyes, constant and painful tearing, and peeling skin on their faces and hands, the people said.

The victims blamed the suspected attack on hard-liners in Moscow who they said wanted to sabotage talks to end the war. A person close to Mr. Abramovich said it wasn’t clear who had targeted the group.

Mr. Abramovich and the Ukrainian negotiators, who include Crimean Tatar lawmaker Rustem Umerov, have since improved and their lives aren’t in danger, the people said. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, who has met with Mr. Abramovich, wasn’t affected, they said. Mr. Zelensky’s spokesman said he had no information about any suspected poisoning.

By the time a German forensic team with the required know-how was able to perform an examination, too much time had passed for the suspected poison to be detected, he said. “It was not intended to kill, it was just a warning,” Mr. Grozev said.

Mr. Zelensky has asked President Biden not to impose sanctions on Mr. Abramovich, who owns a minority stake in the steel company Evraz PLC and has Portuguese citizenship, because he is involved in the negotiations, according to people familiar with the call. Mr. Abramovich, who also owns the Chelsea soccer club, has been sanctioned by the U.K. and the European Union.

Mr. Zelensky has indicated that Ukraine is open to compromise, saying it would be willing to maintain a neutral status if it receives binding security guarantees from both the West and Moscow. He has ruled out Moscow’s demand to discuss demilitarization of the country. Any agreement with Russia would have to be endorsed by a popular referendum held after all Russian forces withdraw to the positions they held before Feb. 24, he told Russian media on Sunday.

[Trinucleus]

Russia now focusing upon the Donbas and intending to claim victory if it can annex some territory there. Harder to get Ukraine to agree to that though.

Might have been easier for Ukraine to accept if (a) was based on a referendum and (b) Russia hadn't hadn't forcibly evacuated Ukrainians to Russia from these areas.

Maybe thats behind the forced evacuations... when the time comes, move some Russians in... hold a rigged referendum.

Yes, a referendum will settle the matter once and for all

[lpm]

The retreat from Kyiv is long over due.

Presumably Ukraine will try to pick off pieces as they leave.

Any glance at the map shows Russia needs to convert this into an east of the Dnieper thing. The east-west line from that bend in the Dnieper all across to the seized territories, with Mariupol razed, giving the Sea of Azov corridor. Plus a north-south line somewhere - they're not going to get Kharkiv or Sumy, so abandon that idea too and concentrate on getting all of the Luhansk province?

[EACLucifer]

The retreat from Kyiv is long over due.

Presumably Ukraine will try to pick off pieces as they leave.

Any glance at the map shows Russia needs to convert this into an east of the Dnieper thing. The east-west line from that bend in the Dnieper all across to the seized territories, with Mariupol razed, giving the Sea of Azov corridor. Plus a north-south line somewhere - they're not going to get Kharkiv or Sumy, so abandon that idea too and concentrate on getting all of the Luhansk province?

There's an old, but still relevant concept in military matters - that of Interior Lines and Exterior Lines.

The quickest way to explain it is to imagine terrace of houses, and the distance it takes to travel from the front door to the back door. The owner of the house can walk through the house from the front door to the back door, because the owner of the house has interior lines, and thus the journey is a short one. A stranger without keys to the house has to walk down the street, along the connecting alley and back up the other street, because the stranger has exterior lines. The journey is thus a much longer one.

The Russians northwest of Kyiv have to withdraw north to Belarus, then around Ukraine, and re-enter at some point in the east. The Ukranians northwest of Kyiv can get on the road and head there directly. In short, a Russian redeployment will take longer than a Ukrainian one, meaning the Russians cannot this way outmanoeuvre the Ukrainian response.

A good historical example of this is the Battle of Gettysburg, where the Union forces could rapidly redeploy along their intererior lines to counter any rebel offensive, but the rebels could not so easily move their forces from one part of the front to another.

As for the Russian claim that it is a conciliatory gesture to slow/halt their attacks on Kyiv, this is of course b.llsh.t. The Ukrainians should hound them all the way to the border if it looks like they will gain an advantage by doing so - eg a morale boosting propaganda win, an encirclement of Russian troops, or just disproportionate attrition on the Russian side.

[lpm]

My assumption is the troops from Kyiv retreat will rest, reform, retrain and re-equip, returning to action in the east in the summer maybe. A proper build up and then try again for overwhelming force.

Would be mad to race them round and put them in piecemeal.

[EACLucifer]

My assumption is the troops from Kyiv retreat will rest, reform, retrain and re-equip, returning to action in the east in the summer maybe. A proper build up and then try again for overwhelming force.

Would be mad to race them round and put them in piecemeal.

Quite likely, though "would be mad to" sums up quite a bit of what Russia has done in this war, including starting it.

Russia's ability to increase their fighting capabilities at the front is limited. Russia shouldn't be allowed any temporary ceasefire without troop withdrawal, as right now they need it more than Ukraine, and any temporary ceasefire that does occur should not see any slackening of arms and training supplies to Ukraine - Russia needs a pause to regroup and re-equip - to catch it's breath, in effect. They should not be in a position where they can pause and then resume from a relatively stronger position.

[jimbob]

I have shared links to individual assessments from this think tank before.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... ct-updates


28th March update:

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces have not abandoned their objective to encircle and capture Kyiv, despite Kremlin claims that Russian forces will concentrate on eastern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recaptured the Kyiv suburb of Irpin on March 28. Ukrainian forces will likely seek to take advantage of ongoing Russian force rotations to retake further territory northwest of Kyiv in the coming days.
• Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks toward Brovary and did not conduct offensive operations toward Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. Russian operations in northeastern Ukraine remain stalled.
• The Ukrainian General Staff stated that a battalion tactical group (BTG) of the 1st Guards Tank Army fully withdrew from Ukrainian territory near Sumy back to Russia for possible redeployment – the first Ukrainian report of a Russian unit fully withdrawing into Russia for redeployment to another axis of advance in this conflict.
• Russian forces continued to steadily take territory in Mariupol.
• Ukrainian resistance around Kherson continues to tie down Russian forces in the area. Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the southern direction

.

far more comprehensive details in the link

[lpm]

Trostyanets looks like a significant defeat for Russia. They got out in a hurry leaving a lot of wrecks behind.

[EACLucifer]

Trostyanets looks like a significant defeat for Russia. They got out in a hurry leaving a lot of wrecks behind.

Yes. They abandoned kit, too, including piles of artillery shells, heavy artillery pieces, and similar. They didn't want to leave, they were pushed out. The amount of kit lost is absolutely staggering. It was a major battle and a heavy defeat for the Russians.

Trostyanets is strategically significant as it is on a major north south road allowing supplies to reach Sumy from the south, and is just north of a major east-west road allowing supplies to be sent towards Kharkiv.

[EACLucifer]

Looks like the Russians really are moving a meaningful amount of troops back into Belarus. When one is rotating troops to replenish exhausted ones with fresh ones, one should move the fresh ones in first, though you never know with the Russians right now and basic military competence.

This is very unlikely to be to do with any sort of peace talks. I remember before the war, a major topic of discussion among OSINT types was that the Russians didn't have the strength to attack from every position they'd staged troops, and would attack on one to three axes, with the remainder of the staged troops then forming followup echelons*. It appears that this view was correct, and so Russia looks like it might be trying to redeploy troops away from Kyiv, but it won't be fast, and there's a very real chance the attacks on Kyiv will have cost the Russians more of their combat power than they cost the Ukrainians.

It's still a very fluid situation, though, and Russian officials lie constantly, and satellite photography - especially that available to the public - is far from perfect.



*Incidentally this is an area where I was quite wrong - I originally assumed they wouldn't attack Kyiv as Belarus could have been a useful backdoor to avoid sanctions if officially uninvolved.

[sTeamTraen]

I thought it might be informative to choose a UK city a bit like Kiev, and have a look at what it might look like under the same attack from the North. Birmingham seemed the best match. Current map (25th May) from https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... t-march-25 Ukrainian counter offensives around Market Harborough, I think, and Church Stretton and Bridgnorth, according to the original map.

Birmingham (my former home town) can't get a break, it seems. In the 1980s book "The Third World War: The Untold Story", Birmingham gets destroyed in a nuclear strike and NATO takes out Minsk in retaliation. I hope it's not going to become the new "Area the size of Wales". (FWIW, I've seen American sources that compare Kyiv in size to Chicago.)