Woodchopper wrote: ↑Fri Jul 08, 2022 2:31 pm
WFJ wrote: ↑Fri Jul 08, 2022 1:59 pm
WFJ wrote: ↑Fri Jul 08, 2022 1:43 pm
Is something new she's said? She was mocked a few weeks ago for saying Germany is not sending tanks to Ukraine because Gepards aren't really tanks. But then she wasn't placing limits on what they could be used for, just explaining (maybe incorrectly, I don't know) that they are
not used in frontline fighting.
Missed edit window
Source here:
https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/ ... t-100.html
Seems to be an off the cuff remark rather than an elaboration of government policy.
To Germany's credit, they seem to have found a way around Swiss intransigence re: 35mm Oerlikon ammo. Specifically, they have contracted a Norwegian firm to make some new ammo, test firings starting soon, apparently.
One other note re: the Gepard. If Ukrainians can operate the Gepard, they can operate the simpler, less complicated Leopard 1, of which there are some in storage. The Gepard has the same hull, same engine and track maintenance, but also has a complex radar. A lot of discussion of the Leopard 1 has treated the L7 105mm as if it is a pea-shooter, and yet it can, depending on ammunition, punch through anything other than the frontal armour of an MBT, and it wouldn't have much trouble with the frontal armour of a T-62 or probably a T-64. The Russians are arming new units with old MT-LBs, so some Leopard 1s to treat as mobile gun positions could be damn useful in the same way that the T-62 isn't totally useless, and adding ERA or slat armour could at least protect them against RPGs.
In fact, I think it is time to completly discard the "bUT iT'S ToO comPLiCaTEd fOR uKRaiNiANS tO USe" nonsense - Ukrainians are successfully using PzH2000 and Krab, both of which are more complicated than older model Abrams or Leopard 2, and also using M109s, which are as complicated as older tanks. If Ukrainians can cope with M270s, then there's no real reason not to supply them with Bradleys, which use the same chassis.
As a general war update, I'm seeing a lot of calls from officials for citizens in occupied Kherson oblast to get out if they can, and to stay away from military facilities*. Effectively, the Ukrainian government and ZSU are warning of a coming offensive. This has lead to discussion of whether this is a good idea, as it sacrifices any chance of operational surprise. Personally, in this era, I do not think preparations for a large offensive can effectively be concealed. Additionally, these warnings could be a bluff, to draw forces to Kherson (or Zaporizhzhia, where there have been some warnings), or they could be warning of not a ground offensive but a long-range artillery campaign against depots and so on.
The HIMARS campaign continues, with several more ammunition depots (secondaries observed on footage) struck, as well as recent strikes on railway infrastructure, including reportedly a hit on the replacement bridge the Russians built in Kup'yansk. There's also talk of partisans destroying an important bridge near Melitopol - these partisans could well be ZSU special forces, and even if they are raised from the occupied territories, will surely be coordinating with ZSU. Discussion by Russian milbloggers indicates that the Russian forces are, at the frontline at least, experiencing a shortage of shells, and it is hard to see how their logistics can adapt to the threat of long range precision rocket strikes without substantially reducing the amount of supplies delivered to the front.
*
I'm also seeing claims that the Russian occupiers have responded to attacks on bases near occupied Melitopol by moving equipment into residential areas so as to use the citizens as human shields as c.nts like Hamas do. It isn't surprising, given the general Russian disregard for civilian lives, and it means that Ukraine may well be better off continuing with the approach of adapting their older "Corrosion" tactics to the current front line and try to starve Russian positions of supplies until they collapse rather than assaulting them directly.